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Foreword 
The papers presented in this volume are the main results of a strategic institute pro-
gram organised during 2006-2007 at NIFU STEP on “Innovation processes in an evo-
lutionary perspective”. The objective of the program has been to conduct theoretical 
studies of innovation processes based on an innovation system approach, partly by 
addressing rather broad issues relating to our more basic understanding of innovation 
systems, partly by addressing more specific systems and processes of innovation. 
Building on previous research activities at NIFU STEP, the program has provided 
opportunities for working further with issues for which it otherwise would have been 
difficult to obtain funding. 
All papers presented in this volume will be developed further with the intention 
of publishing in different journals or books. However, we have found it feasible to 
present the papers in this volume to provide a collection of most of the work organi-
sed in the actual institute program. In addition to these papers, there will also be pub-
lished a separate report in Norwegian on systems of commercialisation organised on 
university campuses. 
The funding of the strategic institute program is provided by the Norwegian 
Research Council. We are very grateful for having had this opportunity for working 
with some more basic issues related to innovation systems. 
 
Oslo, January 16, 2008 
 
 
Per Hetland Olav R. Spilling 
Managing Director Project Coordinator 
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Outsourcing knowledge appropriation 
Åge Mariussen 
Abstract 
Because actions to promote innovation by definition have open-ended outcomes, there is a 
considerable uncertainty connected to calculation of private investments in R&D to promote 
innovation. Recently, by Malerba and others, attempts have been made to overcome this un-
certainty with reference to the predictability provided by technological regimes. The institu-
tionalization of technological regimes, so the story goes, in some sectors create conditions for 
sector-specific private appropriation of knowledge which results in Schumpeter II type of 
firms. Here, the uncertainties of innovation is contained by hierarchy. In the current phase of 
globalization, China successfully applies knowledge accumulation strategies to first copy and 
secondly through price competition out-compete most Western industrial sectors. In this situ-
ation, strategies of private knowledge appropriation should not be seen as carved in stone. In-
stead, the diffusion of technological regimes beyond the borders of firms enables make-or-buy 
experiments which results in dynamics of co-evolution, co-specialization and co-optation of 
different strategies of innovation. These heterogeneities when it comes to strategies of innova-
tion do not just evolve between, as Pavitt pointed out, buy also inside sectors. Based on Nor-
wegian data (CIS2000, Creditinform 2002) and with reference to a recent analysis undertaken 
by MERIT, the paper analyzes this differentiation of strategies of innovation among Norwe-
gian firms.  Two basic strategies of coping with actions under uncertainty are identified: op-
portunism and adaptation. These strategies must be seen in the context of the long-term dy-
namics they are involved in, which creates experimental combinations of knowledge appro-
priation, knowledge outsourcing and knowledge externalization. The analysis highlights the 
significance of small firms specializing in innovation and investing heavily in R&D for the 
rest of the economy. 
 
“Most firms are unable to make very rational calculations about any one project because 
of the uncertainty which is inherent in the process, because they lack the information 
necessary for rational behaviour and because they lack the time and the inclination to get 
it or to use very complex methods of assessment.” (Freeman 1986). 
Introduction 
Arrow point out that since actions aiming at innovation by definition has unknown 
outcomes, investments in innovation cannot be based on rational economic calculus. 
Freeman confirms this empirically (Freeman 1986). Never the less, Malerba provides 
a theory of why rational economic actors despite these uncertainties invest their mo-
ney in innovation (Malerba & al. 2005). Malerba do this by referring to technological 
regimes, which   
 
“define broad prescriptions and tradeoffs which identify the basic dynamics and 
mechanisms and viable firm behaviour” (Malerba and Orseningo 1993:45).  
 
Technological regimes, according to Malerba, may be observed by focusing on 
sectors. The sector system of innovation approach builds on the assumptions that  
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• First, sectors differ when it comes to conditions for protecting the firm know-
ledge base and appropriating new technology (Malerba refers to this as 
“appropriability”).  
• This, secondly, is supposed to be motivated by sector-specific opportunities to 
make a profit. Firms with successful knowledge monopoly strategies may be 
expected to make money more easily on their investments in innovation in 
some sectors than in others.  
• Third, this is likely to provide varieties between sectors when it comes to in-
centives of knowledge accumulation, or private investments in R&D. 
Some sectors are likely to have high cumulativeness in terms of learning and 
knowledge creation and a high level of appropriability, in other words the related 
ability of economic actors of firms to protect their knowledge base in different coun-
tries, through patenting and /or by accumulation of a unique form of private know-
ledge inside a firm. Other sectors according to Malerba consistently are more open for 
external intruders. This, he think, reduces the incentive to learn cumulatively. Sectors 
with high cumulativeness and appropriability are likely to converge towards similar 
types of well-established and innovative large firms with a high level of technology-
specific internal heterogeneity, characterized by “creative accumulation” (the Schum-
peter II or SII mode of innovation). On the other hand, sectors with low appropriabi-
lity and low cumulativeness, in other words more open for external intruders, are in-
side the “creative destruction” mode of innovation (the Schumpeter I or SI mode of 
innovation).  
 
“The empirical evidence (Malerba and Orsenigo 1996) suggests the existence of 
differences across sectoral systems in the pattern of innovative activities, and, for 
each sectoral system, of broad similarities across countries. This result provides 
support for the relevance of the technological regimes in determining sectoral in-
variances across countries in innovation patterns. This is as long as appropriability, 
cumulativeness and opportunity conditions are quite similar across countries. 
Empirical analysis has shown that appropriability and cumulativeness conditions 
are similar across countries.” (Malerba 2004:23) 
 
Opportunity, according to Malerba and Orsenigo reflect the ease of innovating for 
any given amount of money invested in research (opt.cit page 48). Science is seen as a 
major source of opportunities, but during the evolution of industries, opportunity con-
ditions and requirements will change. In this paper, these simplistic notions are chal-
lenged by a more nuanced perspective on innovation as actions under uncertainty. 
Since innovators are unable to calculate their investments in relation to their out-
comes, they follow alternative strategies, designed to cope with this uncertainty. 
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By way of introduction, let us briefly remind ourselves of some of the objections 
which may be raised against explaining firm organization with reference to techno-
logy, as well as the mechanisms which encourage externalization of knowledge. 
 
Society and technology 
The sociological roots of the various systems of innovation theories and models are 
leaning in favor of a perspective of co-evolution of technology and society, rather 
than seeing societal forms of organization, such as the organization of firms and the 
ways in which firms learn through various systems of innovation as determined by 
technologies. These roots go back to the socio-technical paradigm (Trist 2001, Cole 
and Walder 1981), as well as later studies of the social construction of technology 
undertaken by Bijker, Hughes, Latour and others. A common theme in these early 
studies was the various ways in which human forms of societal organization and 
technology are interrelated. The sociologists backing the socio-technical paradigm 
and the historians of technology involved in the social construction of technology 
school were confronting a common enemy, approaches which saw the organization of 
work and society as, broadly speaking, determined by technology. 
Similarly, in the varieties of capitalism research program, founded by Richard 
Whitley and his allies, there is a line of arguments in favour of the impacts on bu-
siness or firm organization by certain national level institutional complementarities. 
The roots of these institutional differences between countries, according to Whitley, 
are nationally specific ways of handling risk and uncertainty, sharing and privatizing 
knowledge, and relating different forms of knowledge to each other. This results in 
nationally specific configurations between interest groups in sectors and as well as 
different knowledge configurations within firms. This, again, results in varieties of 
firm organization, in the ways in which relations between different types of know-
ledge are perceived, and knowledge is accumulated and protected (or appropriated) 
by firms. These things are often discussed with reference two “models”, such as the 
US/UK or entrepreneurial model and the form of organized capitalism usually associ-
ated with countries like Germany and Sweden. 
These objections should point in the direction of a certain caution when it comes 
to explaining patterns of innovation only with reference to technological regimes. 
However, technological regimes may be seen as dynamic in their own right when it 
comes to innovation. 
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Co-evolution of strategies of innovation 
Rip and Kemp (Rip & Kemp, 1998) define technological regime as “…the rule-set or 
grammar embedded in a complex of engineering practices, production process tech-
nologies, product characteristics, skills and procedures, ways of handling relevant 
artefacts and persons, way of defining problems; all of them embedded in institutions 
and infrastructures”. Institutionalization, generalization and diffusion of the rules and 
concepts defining technological regimes have enabled what one might call applied 
forms of transaction cost theories promoted by Coase and Williamson. The problem 
within transaction cost theory was the question posed by Coase in 1937 of weather an 
activity should be integrated into the hierarchy of the firm or simply bought in a mar-
ket (The “make or buy” problem). Coase concludes by saying that the size of the firm 
is dependent on the costs of using the price mechanism, and on the costs of organi-
zation of other entrepreneurs. The problem was that of opportunism in market tran-
sactions. Opportunism distorts the price mechanism and creates uncertainty. Efficient 
market transactions without too complex contracts require clear cut definitions and 
standards of what is to be supplied. As long as a transaction is open ended, with no 
clear definition of the product, fiat provided by hierarchy was seen as a guarantee 
against opportunist behaviour. One would assume that actions to promote future inno-
vations should be integrated inside the firm, and not outsourced. If so, in order to 
innovate, the firm should accumulate a heterogeneous knowledge base.  
On the other hand, in a world where technologies becomes increasingly complex 
and expanding, even the largest hierarchies becomes too small to appropriate any 
specialized service integrated in the operation of the technology. In the real world, 
accordingly, to appropriate highly specialized forms of knowledge by internalizing 
the specialist inside the hierarchy is likely to create slack or capacity which is not 
used, thus undermining productivity. Outsourcing of functions, and the related know-
ledge, means that the demand for appropriation must be relaxed. The nice thing about 
outsourcing is that it enables price competition, even when it comes to highly speci-
alized services, simply because out there, in the larger cluster, the scale of the market 
is so large that markets for even the most highly specialized skills may develop.  
What is more, according to transaction cost theory, the market may protect you 
against opportunism if the outsourced product may be defined clearly, within the 
framework of the technological regime.  
In this way, the institutionalization, generalization and diffusion beyond the 
border of the firm of technological regimes provided the tool by which outsourcing 
was possible. The technological regime provides widely distributed and accepted 
definitions which enables modularization and hence efficiently working markets of 
technologies. If a clear market standard is possible, competition between several 
suppliers will ensure a sufficient quality at a low price. In this way, technology is 
 11
externalized and shared, and specialized producers are subjected to price competition, 
enhancing productivity. This process also tends to create a differentiation between 
supplier firms trying to optimize productivity in the production of standardized 
components, and highly innovative firms further up in the value chain, synthesizing 
components, creating a variety of new products, based on input from their suppliers. 
Examples of this are found within sectors with widely different technologies, such as 
textiles, ship-building, construction, aviation, food industry, and consumer 
electronics. Outsourcing soon proved to be an important element in globalization, as 
corporate actors realized the potential to offshore production and in that way cut 
deeply in terms of costs. 
One of the drivers for Chinese success in the global market is the economy of 
scale and low levels of cost in the huge Chinese domestic market. Another important 
factor is the Chinese strategy to copy successful forms of western capitalism inside 
the Chinese economy. This is done by coordinating cumulative Chinese learning 
processes which results in a copy inside China of a technological regime in USA or 
Europe (Krug 2006). These processes typically start with the relocation of 
standardized production (suppliers or sub-suppliers) from USA or Europe to China at 
the end of the technology which is standardized and outsourced. Once this lower level 
of the value chain is put in place in China, the Chinese are able to coordinate 
processes of knowledge accumulation which enables them to copy the entire 
technological regime, including higher-levels of the value chain, and its consumer 
market products inside China. Once the technological regime is copied, it may turn 
out low cost global market consumer products. This, it goes without saying, breaks 
down barriers of appropriability painstakingly constructed in USA and Europe. What 
appeared to be fortifycations of “appropriability” and “cumulativeness” once carved 
in stone, is now in sector after sector turning into thin air. 
These considerations should lead to some caution when it comes to applying 
simplistic dichotomies like Schumpeter II or Schumpeter I types of innovation. 
Instead, the long term dynamics of outsourcing leaves a trail behind them, as co-
specialization, co-evolution and sometimes also co-optation (Carayannis, 2006) 
between firms and sectors.  Let us, based on these considerations, look at the ways in 
which different strategies of innovation may be classified, and how the relations 
between these classifications may be explained, taking a long term perspective on co-
evolution and co-optation.  
 
Method 
If firms are not able to calculate strategies of innovation in a very rational way, if 
these strategies are shifting, co-evolving and contextualizing each other, it is not a 
good idea to start sending informants standardized questions of what their “strategy of 
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innovation” happens to be. This has created a methodological problem in studies of 
systems of innovation. As Lundvall points out: 
 
“to find new ways to define the embryonic elements of the innovation process is 
therefore a challenge.” (Lundvall 2007).  
 
To solve this problem, the paper applies two related methods.  
First, a statistical method called factor analysis. This is an inductive approach. 
The objective of a factor analysis is to generate a classification. A factor is an analytic 
variable, created through calculus, which explains variation in a set of input variables. 
The strength of the factor is a measure of how much variation in the selected set of 
input variables the factor explains. The factor, seen as an abstract, analytical variable, 
is characterized through correlations with input variables. The input variables in this 
analysis are information on innovation and budgets in Norwegian firms, combined 
with data on sectors. If all input variables are correlated to each other in a straight-
forward way, this results in one factor. However, if the direction of a relation, say, 
between R&D investments and profitability is changing, the analysis is likely to ge-
nerate several factors, which may be seen as indicative of different strategies of inno-
vation. The output of the factor analysis is then interpreted. The question is: what are 
the embryonic elements of the process of innovation this type of firms are likely to be 
involved in? Based on the outputs of a factor analysis, it should be possible to make 
an analytical conceptualization of this strategy. These analytical concepts are not ta-
ken a priori, but they are derived as empirically based interpretations of the factors. 
Secondly, since strategies are only expected to be understandable in their context, 
the study try to connect different types of strategies into a pattern which may be de-
scribed as a preliminary sketch of the structure of the national system of innovation of 
Norway. In order to do so, since some of the strategies may only be understood as 
adaptations to clustering, the study also operates with aggregated statistics of sectors. 
Through an ecological analysis, the context variables are then introduced together 
with firm level variables.  
Factor analysis can not explain causality, or cause-effect relations. It is usually 
assumed that cause-effect relations presuppose time series data. The current paper on 
the contrary aims at drawing a sketch of the Norwegian system of innovation. In 
terms of method, the paper in this way falls back to a sociological tradition founded 
by Max Weber. Weber used a statistical mapping of Protestant, Catholic and Calvinist 
regions and countries, and used that map to develop a theory of the long-term genesis 
of the system of capitalist production, including the embryonic ways of calculation 
involved in that process.   
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Since one of the outcomes of this analysis was the identification of strong 
relations between sector level and firm level variables, the analysis also includes a 
causal model, using correlation coefficients. Here, we make the assumption that a 
positive correlation between an independent and a dependent variable is an indication 
that there is a cause-and-effect relation. The objective of this step is to illustrate the 
impact of clusters (understood as agglomerations of firms in innovative sectors with 
high levels of R&D) on firm level strategies of clustering, where certain firms apply 
exploitation of knowledge externalities as their strategy. In the model, it is also 
assumed that clusters are again created by opportunities, which are measured as profit 
differences, or deviations from “perfect competition”.  In this way, given the 
assumptions of this causal model, we estimate indicators for the impact of 
opportunities on clustering and innovation.  
In discussing co-specialization between firms, the paper is interpreting the quan-
titative material with reference to a theory of long term dynamics, both in terms of 
firm trajectories, decisions of firm strategies, such as decisions of what to keep ex-
ternally and what to externalize, and in terms of clustering or exploitation of know-
ledge externalities. For this purpose, organizational theories of actions under uncer-
tainty, outsourcing and logics of make or buy as outlined in organizational theory 
come in handy, to explain trajectories of co-evolution. Some of these suggestions are 
substantiated with reference to results from empirical case-studies, and other avail-
able knowledge of specific sectors and firms. 
 
Co-specialization between sectors and firms 
The classic analysis of co-specialization was carried out by Pavitt (1984:364). Based 
on interviews on strategies of innovation with British firms in different sectors, he 
came out with a model which illustrates technological linkages between firms in dif-
ferent sectors. Certain sectors in the economy were specialized in developing equip-
ment and other technologies applied by other sectors. Other, more scale-intensive 
sectors, such as for instance chemical industries, depended on science-based know-
ledge, which was provided by firms in other sectors specializing in commercial appli-
cations of science. A fourth type of firms depended on others for their innovations. 
These firms were supplier dominated. This discussion by Pavitt was carried further by 
Lundvall, who referred to these kinds or relations as user-producer interaction. Co-
specialization between on one hand science based firms and technology providers, on 
the other hand scale-intensive firms and supplier dominate firms were also discussed 
by Michael Porter, as clusters (1990). 
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Figure 1: The main technological linkages amongst different categories of firms. 
K. Pavitt, (1984: 364) 
 
The arrows indicate directions of transfer of technology and innovation. Specia-
lized equipment suppliers are innovating through interaction with scale intensive 
firms and science based firms. In addition, scale intensive firms get innovations 
through contacts with science-based firms. Supplier dominated firms are innovating 
through input from science based and scale-intensive firms. Now, if the Pavitt classi-
fication still is valid, co-evolution and co-specialization is taking place between sec-
tors. If so, sectors could develop different versions of the Schumpeter II firm, appro-
priating privatized knowledge.   
However, preliminary results from the on-going EU-funded Systematic project 
(Hollanders, 2007) on the contrary suggest that there is a considerable variation bet-
ween firms or co-specialization within the same sectors. Hollanders outline a typology 
of innovation strategies which cut across different sectors.  
• Strategic innovators have introduced a product or process innovation that is at 
least partly developed in-house, they have performed R&D on a continuous 
basis, they have introduced at least one product which is new to the market 
and they are active both in national and international markets. These strategic 
innovators are likely to innovate in a way which is later adopted by other 
firms inside the sector.   
• Intermittent innovators develop innovations at least partly in-house, and they 
have introduced new-to-market innovations. 
• Technology modifiers have developed an innovation at least partly in-house, 
but they do not perform R&D 
Supplier 
dominated 
firms 
Scale-intensive firms Science-based firms 
Specialized 
equipment 
suppliers 
 15
• Technology adopters have developed innovations which depend on adapta-
tions of equipment or products made by others.  
• The fifth type is non-innovative firms. 
In the MERIT study, these types are mapped based on micro-level data for more 
than 70 000 (N=71477) European firms in all sectors. Now, interestingly, the study 
reveals that these types are found also in sectors with fairly low levels of innovation. 
Food, energy and textiles have some (3-4%) strategic innovators, and an even higher 
amount of technology modifiers (10-15%). The relative shares of strategic and inter-
mittent innovators are higher among innovative sectors like aerospace (34 and 13%), 
ICT (18 and 29%) and chemicals (19 and 27%).  
This should indicate that in addition to the Pavitt differentiation at the sector 
level, between on one hand innovating and R&D intensive sectors and on the other 
hand sectors adopting these innovations there is also, as pointed out by Hollanders, a 
differentiation between firms within the same sectors. Taking these variations 
between highly innovative and less innovative firms both across and within sectors 
into consideration, we get the following classification of strategies under uncertainty. 
 
Table 1: Typology of firms and sectors 
Firm\ sector Supplier dominated/ scale 
intensive sectors 
Science based/ equipment 
supplying sectors 
Strategic/ intermittent firms Adapters (R&D intensive firms) 
Strategic innovators 
Opportunists 
R&D intensive firms 
Strategic innovators 
Firms modifying/ adopting 
innovations from others 
Adopters Clusters / externalities  
 
This creates four categories.  
• First, adopters are firms which are mainly adopting technologies and inno-
vations developed by others. There firms are found in sectors which are 
supplier dominated or scale intensive.  
• Secondly, as demonstrated by MERIT, even inside these sectors they find 
highly innovative “strategic” and “intermittent” innovators. We will assume 
that these highly innovative firms which are located in sectors which rely 
upon others sector to innovate as adapters.  
The adapter will play the role of strategic innovator through their ability to adapt 
or apply technologies or science based inputs from the “science based/ equipment 
supplying” sectors in developing new processing technologies. The new adaptations 
may then, once they are developed, be adopted by the adopters. A typical role for an 
adapter is a firm located in a processing industry sector testing (and adapting) new 
production technologies provided by an equipment supplier, thus innovating a new 
process. There may be other adapters, such as radical innovators in textile industries, 
designing new cloths, which are later processed by adopters, their subcontractors.    
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In the context of science based or equipment supplying sectors, the similar differ-
rentiation is likely to be between on one hand the strategic innovators, typically firms 
who play a leading role in R&D-driven development of new products, or firms deve-
loping new technologies, and on the other hand firms within the same sectors who are 
innovating through copying these technologies, modifying them, and combining them 
with other technologies. These latter firms are not investing in innovation themselves. 
Instead, they rely on what in the literature is known as “knowledge externalities”, or 
clustering (Cooke, 2002). Before we return to the issue of clustering below, we will 
first take a look at the heterogeneities created by variation of innovation strategies 
both between and inside sectors.  
The basic dimension, in line with Pavitt, may be seen as the differentiation bet-
ween scale-intensive adopters of technology from others, and the small and large 
firms developing this technology. This differentiation reflects two different types of 
firm with different institutional complementarities. It boils down to the discussion of 
the uncertainties created by opportunism, and the need of the hierarchy to control this 
uncertainty. 
 
Opportunism and clustering 
To Coase (1937) and Williamson (1985), opportunism in the market was based on the 
exploitation of the ignorance of buyers, or information imbalances, by sellers who 
withdrew information of true production costs to reap a super-profit. From a certain 
point of departure, making super-profits from product innovation may be seen as a 
form of opportunism. One example of this is product innovators who exploit priva-
tized knowledge. In sectors characterized by conditions favoring this kind of oppor-
tunism, there is likely to be differences in levels of profits between firms. These dif-
ferences are a signal that the market mechanism has “imperfections” because know-
ledge appropriation/ information imbalances enable super-profits. If the secret know-
ledge of the success story had been common knowledge, competitors would intrude 
and destroy the opportunities created by private knowledge appropriation.  
The actor operating in this kind of market is likely to be motivated by a vision of 
an opportunity. He can see other innovators making lots of money (observable as pro-
fit differences in the sector), and he can see a technological possibility for making a 
new product which may succeed in this market in the future, possibly giving an 
equally high return. He starts to behave in ways which in organizational theory are 
referred to as opportunistic. The new product may break the established rules of the 
game, it may be based on large investments in R&D, and in that way it may recom-
bine elements which have not been combined before.  
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The term opportunism refers to the fact that these firms rely on the possibility to 
get super-profits through knowledge privatization, or through the construction of in-
formation imbalances, in the discussion of Williamson. These strategies may some-
times be fairly short-term. Successful opportunism is likely to lead the firm into a 
position where it controls a more complex knowledge base, which enables at least for 
a while a stronger competitive position. This position may have to be defended 
through new investments in R&D. Now, however, the firm may also enjoy other 
strengths, like control of markets, a brand name, and financial resources. These suc-
cess stories also recreate the conditions which constructed them in the first place, as 
other entrepreneurs may use the example to be inspired, and risk new adventures with 
high R&D investments. This is the upper-right end of the table, R&D investing firms 
in R&D-intensive industrial, where there are large profit variations.  
Private investments in R&D also results in knowledge which sooner or later will 
become externally available. Opportunism creates knowledge externalities. Others 
may steal or copy ideas and technologies, and innovate through fairly low R&D in-
vestments. Firms in sectors with concentration of R&D may be expected to be able to 
innovate themselves, by playing the role of intermittent innovators and technology 
modifiers. These are the externalities of opportunism. We will look for these oppor-
tunist externalities in particular in sectors and regions characterized by high opportu-
nities and high levels of sector R&D investments. This is observable as clusters. 
Clustering may be seen as another kind of opportunism, the free-rider, exploiting 
common knowledge generated by investments made by other. This is the lower-right 
end of the table, clusters generating externalities inside sectors. 
What should be emphasized here is that clustering is significant because it links 
the R&D-investing actors in the system of innovation with forms of innovation which 
are not R&D – related. It also links the chains of causality between opportunities and 
innovation, in that way looking upon externalization as opportunity-driven. 
 
Adapters - adopters  
Adopters use technologies developed by others in scale-intensive sectors character-
rized by processing industries submitted to price competition. In order to be adopted, 
these technologies have to be adapted. Adapters are innovating and testing new value 
chains within these sectors, through experimenting with new technology from the 
outside in innovative and new ways. In order to do so, they may also start to modify 
technology by themselves, and to work closely with suppliers of technologies and 
new products in other parts of the cluster. These firms are likely to have high levels of 
product innovations inside sectors where R&D-levels and levels of product innova-
tions are low.  Unlike opportunists, adapters have a more long-term calculus. Profits 
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flowing from their investments are assumed to come through an equally long-term 
sequence of harvesting the innovation. In other words, they do not need to be inspired 
by the same kind of profit differences in the sector, which motivates opportunists. 
Their reward is a successful adoption, within another mode of calculus. 
Firms and sectors 
The analysis below is based on Norwegian CIS data (N=3027) for 2000, combined 
with firm budget data for 2002 (Creditinform). Sector statistics is obtained through 
aggregation. In terms of firm level innovativeness, we construct an indicator (a factor) 
based on firm rate of product innovation and firm rate of R&D investments. In exami-
ning variation across and within sectors, we use two factors. The Firm innovation fac-
tor is based on two variables, innovation, measured through the Oslo manual standard 
as share of new or improved products of total turnover, and firm rate of R&D invest-
ments. The correlation of these two variables with the joint firm innovation factor is 
0.815. This factor is the vertical axis in the table below.  
Similarly, the sector opportunity factor is based on standard deviation of profits 
in the sector and the sector R&D rate. Sector is defined on a NACE level 2 (N=36). 
Sector with low scores on this indicator are likely to be in the scale-intensive/ supplier 
dominated category of Pavitt, while firms in the other end are science based firms and 
suppliers of specialized equipments and services. The plot below illustrates that even 
though there is a correlation between the meso level variables and firm level R&D 
investments and innovation, there is a lot of variation within all sectors. 
 19
sector opportunity and R&D intensity
3,000002,000001,000000,00000-1,00000
Fi
rm
 in
no
va
tio
n 
an
d 
R
&
D
 in
te
ns
ity
12,00000
10,00000
8,00000
6,00000
4,00000
2,00000
0,00000
-2,00000
 
 
Figure 2: Typology of firms and sectors 
 
Here sector opportunity is the horizontal axis and firm innovation is the vertical.  
The columns are variations (maximum and minimum values) within sectors of 
firm innovation and R&D intensity. Even in sectors characterized by low levels of 
opportunities, and low sector levels of R&D investments, there are firms with high 
levels of R&D investments and high levels of product innovation. This basically 
points in the same direction as the conclusion of the MERIT study. There are highly 
innovative firms in sectors with low levels of innovation, and there are firms who are 
not innovative or investing in R&D in sectors characterized by high levels of R&D 
investment and high opportunities. We will look closer at two examples, in each end 
of the sector opportunity and R&D axis. On one hand a sector with a relatively low 
level of R&D investments and opportunities, aquaculture, and on the other hand a 
sector with high levels of opportunities and R&D, business services. 
 
Adapters and adopters – the case of aquaculture 
Aquaculture in Norway is based on domesticated off-shore production of salmon. The 
industry is experimenting with domestication of new species, such as cod. This acti-
vity includes the development of new processing technologies. Here, we will include 
the following input variables: 
• Profits  
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• Assets  
• Size, measured as total turnover 2000  
• Innovation, measures as share of new products to the market (the extended 
Oslo protocol definition)  
• Rate of external R&D investments  
• Rate of internal R&D investments Export as share of turnover  
• Turnover/ employee 
In terms of variations of firm strategies in aquaculture, we get the following four 
factors, which may be interpreted as four distinct strategies.  
 
Table 2 Aquaculture: Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
  
Adapters 
Labs 
Scale intensive 
adopters  
Adapters 
Testbeds 
Strategic  
innovators 
PROFITS ,062 -,029 -,041 ,872 
ASSETS -,245 ,093 ,817 -,136 
Total turnover in 2000 -,038 ,887 -,060 ,253 
Share of new or impro-
ved products to market ,135 -,157 ,817 ,210 
Rate external R&D ,962 -,041 -,106 -,027 
Rate internal R&D ,985 -,089 ,025 -,006 
Export share -,136 ,747 ,009 -,499 
Turnover/ employee -,343 ,131 ,212 ,486 
 
The labels in this table refer to the analytical interpretation of the factor scores on 
the variables. Here, we find four types of strategies, expressed as four factors.  
 
Scale intensive adopters,  
Scale-intensive adopters are firms with high turnover (+0.887), high export shares 
(+0.747), fairly high productivity or turnover/ employee (+0.131), and low profits  
(-0.029). These large scale producers of standardized products are fighting for sur-
vival in an export market characterized by fierce price competition. In doing so, they 
are adopting standard technology, available from other sectors in their cluster. 
 
Adopters.  
We find two types of adopters, labs and testbeds. 
• Labs (Factor 1) are firms with high levels of R&D investment (+0.962 ex-
ternal R&D and +0.985 in internal R&D), low profits, low turnover, and a 
moderate level of innovation (+0.135). Labs are externalized research labo-
ratories, or, to be more precise, research projects, organized as firms. They are 
accordingly highly R&D intensive, but they typically have not yet reached the 
level where they are able to start to turn out new products. New products in 
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this respect are test products, which typically represents a small part of the 
total turnover.  
• Testbeds are firms with a combination of large assets (0.817) and new pro-
ducts (0.817). Typically, these firms are producers trying to launch new spe-
cies, such as domesticated cod, which used to be the major innovation strategy 
in the industry. Testbeds are not investing in R&D, they are not profitable, but 
they have lots of assets. Assets in this context are licenses issued from the re-
gional authorities to produce new types of fish products at certain locations in 
the sea. The test production itself, it goes without saying, is a part of the deve-
lopment of the new product, and it is not profitable. This unprofitable produc-
tion is financed through credits which are given by banks, with a guarantee in 
the license. This is why these firms are flashing the value of the license in 
their budgets, they need it to get the long term credits which is financing their 
product development efforts.  
• Opportunists/ strategic innovators: fodder. In aquaculture, production of fish 
fodder is differentiated from production of fish. They are producing fodder for 
the domestic market of exporters, and hence do not export themselves. Fodder 
is the key element on the cost side of aquaculture production, and it is crucial 
to the quality of the consumer market product. For human consumers of sal-
mon, eating a fish which has been fed on a wrong diet could potentially be a 
health risk. The industry is struggling hard to keep a high health profile in the 
market. Salmon is good for your heart (and it does not contain too much poi-
sonous components). Fodder is also crucial to texture, color, and taste of the 
product. Fodder is a key element in this strategy, and it is accordingly the link 
of the value chain where the profit of the sector ends. In this respect, the fod-
der industry is a strategic innovator in the sector, it supplies the size intensive 
companies with new products which make it possible to maintain a high qua-
lity and at the same time reduce the price. In this relation the size-intensive 
companies plays the role of adopters: they buy new types of fodder. 
Together, this illustrates the highly diversified character of the sector. This 
diversification is the result of a process of co-evolution, where different strategies of 
innovation are followed by different types of firms. In this sector, there is also a co-
optation between labs and testbeds and the large scale producers. Labs and testbeds 
are R&D departments and off shore laboratories often owned and financed by owners 
of large scale producers and profitable fodder companies. This finding is consistent 
with the idea presented in the introduction, that R&D intensive firms in a low-R&D 
intensive sector is likely to be innovating new processes, through adoption. In this 
case, the new process is commercialization of cod. The analysis also show that 
 22 
because of the differentiation between fodder and salmon production, this sector also 
have a success story which is in the direction of a strategic innovator, not an adapter. 
This contributed to the heterogeneity within the sector. 
If this sector had been characterized by Schumpeter II type of firms, these things 
would have been integrated within the large scale producers, to secure private appro-
priation rights. These factors are instead the inventory of a disintegrated value chain, 
which makes up a wide variety of innovation strategies. We would like to see the 
existence of this disintegrated value chain as the result of rational decisions made by 
actors who knows a lot about the things they are doing. 
Tentatively, an explanation may be outlined as follows. 
To the large scale producers, competing on price and struggling to maximize 
productivity, there are several advantages in outsourcing experiments with new 
adaptations of technologies and new processes. When you are specializing in pro-
ductivity enhancement, you should be extremely conservative in the choice of tech-
nology, and only adopt what is well proven and tested. In other words, standard 
production is not open for experimentation. Another advantage in outsourcing is the 
uncertainties of experiments. Labs and testbeds are likely to fail. If you are risking 
money, there are many advantages of isolating this risk to a separate firm, rather that 
including these losses in the bottom line of the large company. 
This is why adaptation and adoption are two different strategies which are 
followed by different, co-evolving firms.  
 
Opportunity-driven innovation: The case of business services 
Another example in the other end of the scale has a high score on opportunity and a 
high sector based investment rate in R&D is business services 
 
Table 3 Business Services: Rotated Component Matrix(a,b) 
  Component 
  Labs 
Global, scale 
intensive Success stories 
PROFITS -,583 -,015 ,542 
ASSETS -,021 -,059 ,640 
Total turnover in 2000 -,096 ,798 -,002 
Innovation (Share of new or 
improved products to market) ,264 ,126 ,547 
Rate external R&D ,664 ,001 ,332 
Rate internal R&D ,869 ,000 -,011 
Export share ,190 ,423 ,074 
Turnover/ employee -,078 ,781 -,053 
 
The interpretation of this output is the following three factors or main types of 
firm strategies in this sector 
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• Labs with a high level of R&D investment, a moderate level of innovation, 
and a dramatically negative rate of profits.  
• Global actors, fighting in global markets with cost competition and a resulting 
low level of profits, compensated by a large turnover and low R&D invest-
ments. 
• Success stories have a high level of profits (0.542). They also have a sophisti-
cated internal knowledge base, with a high level of knowledge assets 
(+0.640), and they have a high level of innovation (+0.547), and fairly high 
investments in external R&D (+0.332). 
The combined existence of labs and success stories explains the high score of this 
sector on opportunities. There is a substantial variation of profits, and this variation is 
motivating investments in laboratories, which are highly unprofitable on a short term 
basis.  
In this case, a lab is likely to be a project with innovators, struggling to 
commercialize a new product, financing their journey through the credit market. On 
the other hand, there are actors within this sector who are following straight forward 
strategies of price competition, with low profitability combined with large scale 
service production.  
Again, these heterogeneities of strategies within the same sector confirm our 
initial hypothesis.  
Externalities created by opportunists 
In turning to the cause-effect model of clustering (or exploitation based on knowledge 
externalities), the analysis is based on the following variables: 
 
Opportunities. 
At the level of sector, we see the standard deviation of profits within the sector as an 
operational way of measuring the visible opportunities of making money based on 
investments in product innovations. A large standard deviation is indicative of the 
existence of success stories, or firms who have been able to innovate in a successful 
way, thus creating high profits, combined with firms making deep and long-term 
R&D investments. 
 
Sector rate of R&D. Regional based knowledge externalities.  
Similarly, we assume that the regional R&D rate is indicative of proximity-based 
knowledge externalities, which enables firms located in the region to innovate with 
no or limited own R&D investments.  
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Here, we are referring to the 36 sectors of the Norwegian economy, when we 
apply a 2-digit level of NACE.  
At the firm level we include innovation (New or improved products as share of 
total turnover) and R&D rate of the firm (R&D investments as share of turnover).  
Assuming that causal relations or influences between variables may be 
empirically observed and measured as coefficients of correlation, we will expect that 
all these variables are positively correlated. Sectors with high opportunities are likely 
to have firms with high private investments in R&D. This is likely to result in high 
sector based R&D-rates, and high levels of innovation in firms. Similarly, we expect 
highly innovative sectors of be concentrated in highly innovative regions. 
The model of causality, including the computed coefficients of correlation, is 
illustrated below. Actual correlations are illustrated below.  
 
 
Figure 3: Causal model of the relation between opportunities, clustering and 
innovation 
 
Impacts of clusters 
A proper model with causality is based on time series data. In this example, we are 
only including data from one point in time (2000). The implication of this is that the 
analysis can only be seen as indicative of a possible cause-and-effect relationship. In 
looking at the impacts of sector R&D investment rates on innovation, we have a di-
rect impact, and an indirect, through the firm R&D investment rate.  
SECTOR 
INVESTMENTS IN 
R&D (RATE)  
FIRM 
INVESTMENTS 
IN R&D (RATE) 
INNOVATION 
(NEW 
PRODUCTS AS 
SHARE OF 
TURNOVER)
OPPORTUNITIES 
(ST DEV OF 
PROFITS IN 
SECTOR) 
0.260 
0.144 
0.261 
0.327 
0.233 
0.261 
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Table 4: Model of impacts of clusters on innovation. 
Variable Chain of causality Impact 
Sector Direct effect 0.261 
Sector Indirect, through firm R&D investment (0.261*0.327) 0.085 
Total  Cluster 0.346 
 
Again, the coefficient 0.346 should only be seen as indicative of a positive causal 
relation between clustering and innovation. 
 
Impacts of opportunities on innovation 
Opportunities (standard deviations of profits) are positively correlated to sector level 
of R&D investments and regional level of R&D investments. Opportunities are also 
directly correlated to innovation in firms. If we look at the direct and indirect impacts 
of opportunities on innovation, we have the following main linkages 
 
Table 5: Impact of opportunity on innovation 
Variable  Chain of causality Impact 
Opportunity Direct  0.144 
Opportunity Indirect, through Sectors 0.068 
Opportunity Indirect, through firm investments 0.076 
Total   0.288 
 
Again, this result should be seen as indicative only, as data are not time series. 
Given these reservations, the analysis suggests that there are positive causal impacts 
of opportunities, measured as variations in profitability if we take the intermediate 
effects of clusters (sectors) into consideration.   
Paradoxes of knowledge appropriation 
Malerba is right in emphasizing that there are important differences between sectors 
when it comes to innovation performance and investments in innovation. But both the 
European level results reported by MERIT as well as the analysis of Norwegian data 
presented in this paper suggest that there are variations of strategies of innovation 
within sectors as well. In this article, we have discussed innovation from two op-
posing perspectives of action under uncertainty, as opportunism or adaptation. 
 
Opportunists are clustering together 
The opportunist is sensitive to his environment. He is looking for external possibili-
ties to make more money than others, and at the same time, he wants to reduce the 
associated uncertainties, and avoid making too large investments in R&D to innovate. 
Opportunist product innovation strategies aim at accumulating knowledge through 
R&D investments, and control this knowledge in a way which creates a super-profit. 
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The analysis confirms that opportunities, in terms of differences in profits in a sector, 
are positively correlated with the level of innovation. The correlation coefficient is 
0.144. Similarly, the direct impact of opportunities (profit differences) on firm invest-
ments in R&D is 0.233.  
At the same time, through his wish to appropriate knowledge, the opportunist is 
likely to generate knowledge externalities. Knowledge externalities is failed 
appropriation, in the sense that it consists of opportunities for other actors to steal, 
copy or in other ways make money on accumulation of knowledge paid by others. In 
looking across sectors, we found that high opportunities, measured as differences in 
profits, are also strongly positively correlated to high rates of R&D investments at the 
sector level. We referred to this agglomeration of private investments in R&D as the 
cluster. The total cluster impact on product innovation is estimated to 0.346. This 
should be compared to the impact of firm level R&D investments in innovation, 
which is 0.327. Indeed, in controlling for the cluster impact through firm level R&D 
investments, the firm level is down to 0.242. The result suggests that the cluster of the 
firm is at least as important to product innovation as R&D investment decisions 
undertaken by the firm itself. 
There are two main types of opportunity-driven innovations.  
First, there are success stories or, what the MERIT group refers to as strategic in-
novators. Firms with well developed knowledge base combined with a high level of 
product innovation, a high level of R&D investments, a highly values knowledge 
base, and high profits. These firms are often seen as strategic innovators within their 
sectors, supplying the rest of the sector with innovations, or they play a similar role 
within the global networks where they operate. These firms are the long-term outputs 
of successful strategies of knowledge accumulation and appropriation through R&D 
investments. 
Secondly, however, we have also identified another type of firm, in this paper re-
ferred to as laboratories. There firms often represents externalization of knowledge 
privatization. They may be test-beds or laboratories, innovating new products and 
processes. Labs are externalized R&D projects organized as firms.  
In R&D intensive industries, these firms may be projects organized around 
radical ideas with a potential to offset and destroy the knowledge base of existing 
success stories. They correspond to the discussion of Schumpeter I by Malerba, with 
the difference that this competition occurs within the context of markets protected by 
high barriers of knowledge accumulation, and sophisticated mechanisms of 
knowledge appropriation. Their existence documents that knowledge appropriation 
strategies aiming at creating a single type of strategic innovator in a sector has failed, 
there still is external technological competition, challenging the existing success 
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stories. In other cases, these firms are also real outsourced laboratories, emerging 
within the size intensive processing industries, which focus on adopting existing 
technologies.  
 
Throwing out the opportunists: adaptors and adopters 
According to Coase the hierarchy of the firm is set up to control and prevent opportu-
nism. However, it is well known that opportunists may prevail inside organizations. 
As opportunists are pushing their own projects and ideas, and set aside routines and 
established rules, they are often regarded as disruptive to organizational efficiency 
and productivity. It is well known that efficient processing of standardized products 
often is possible through well-defined routines, adopting well-tested and approved 
technologies, developed by others. The institutionalized norms and incentive struc-
tures inside these organizations are likely to be supportive of efficiency.  
Integrating rule-breaking opportunistic experimentation with new processing 
technologies into these organizations may entail several uncertainties. First, it may be 
seen as normatively disruptive to the company. Secondly, in processing of natural 
resources, like fish and petroleum, it is crucial to maintain a continuous flow of pro-
duction. Experimentation may disrupt this continuity. It would accordingly result in a 
high level of uncertainty, potentially hurting the core function of the company. One 
way to solve this problem is to differentiate within processing sectors between adap-
tors and adopters.  
Outsourcing of R&D-based product innovation in the processing sector itself 
makes it possible to share the extreme uncertainty which characterized these projects 
with several external investors and owners.  
 
Outsourcing of knowledge appropriation  
The analysis indicates that opportunism and adaptation creates a pool of innovative 
small firms out in the open, busy in accumulating and appropriating new knowledge. 
Two dynamics of outsourcing and co-evolution inside sectors are suggested 
• opportunism-externalization and  
• adaptation-adoption.  
In addition, we have the relations between sectors 
• opportunism-adoption 
• opportunism-adaptation  
• externalization-adoption 
• externalization-adaptation 
These dynamics suggest a deeper strategy, outsourcing of knowledge appropri-
ation, or adoption - opportunism.  
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The alternative would be to internalize knowledge appropriation through invest-
ments in innovation into the firm.  There are several good reasons why this option is 
selected away. These good reasons have to do with uncertainty management. Since 
the uncertainty of knowledge appropriation projects is extremely high, only firms 
enjoying formidable advantages of scale may be expected to turn out a reasonable 
rate of profit, following a strategy of knowledge accumulation and appropriation. The 
externalization of knowledge privatization and new knowledge appropriation reduces 
significantly the risks involved in radical innovation from the point of view of the 
large scale firms. Outsourcing of innovation makes new sources of funding possible. 
Investors supporting these projects may themselves have advantages of scale. 
Through investing in several projects, they will sooner or later hit one which may pay 
for the other losses. This reduces the incalculable risk in investments in innovation.  
Outsourcing of innovation is private knowledge appropriation, within a context of 
ownership which is deliberately kept open for external investors.  In this way, impor-
tantly, we are far away from the Schumpeter II type of large scale corporate actor 
innovating through investing in internal R&D. Corporate actors give up on appropri-
ation, and in return they avoid the uncertainties these projects carry.  What they in-
stead achieve is a market of success stories they may buy themselves into. Once these 
entrepreneurial firms succeed, they become valuable targets of large scale investors, 
wanting to renew their knowledge base. 
The paper seems to confirm the idea that there is a specialization of different 
roles in systems of innovation. Some firms are specializing in innovation whereas 
other firms are specializing in using innovations made by others. Between these 
opposite positions, there are various intermediaries. In innovation policy, one often 
finds the idea of policies promoting more innovation across all firms. This approach 
is often expressed through ideas of incremental change through “additionality” of 
policy instruments. If the division of labour in the system of innovation is working 
well, the focus should instead be on the core actors driving innovation in the system. 
These core actors are here seen as opportunists and adaptors, characterized as firms 
with high rates of R&D investments and high rates of innovation. The R&D 
investments of these firms should be subsidized, for three reasons: 
1. These firms create new products and processes diffused to and adopted by 
others.  
2. They also create knowledge externalities exploited by others 
3. If they succeed, they are likely to become highly profitable, and accordingly 
create new opportunities (profit differences), which inspire other entrepre-
neurs to invest more private money in innovation 
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Financial systems, open innovation and technological 
regimes: A theoretical discussion 
Sverre J. Herstad 
 
Abstract 
There is an increasing research (Dahlander and Gann 2007, Laursen and Salter 2006, 
Cassiman and Veuglers 2006, Christensen et al 2005) and policy interest (OECD fortc,) in so-
called “open” (Chesbrough 2003, 2005) innovation strategies. The novel contribution of this 
concept is primarily related to how it extends the notion of innovation systems to include 
processes of knowledge sourcing and commercialization occurring in the equity market 
(Chesbrough and Schwartz 2007, Waites and Dies 2007). This paper goes beyond 
Chesbroughs own analysis by discussing more detailed how growing private equity activity 
and the spread of the “shareholder value” logic of corporate control combine to produce a 
distinct institutional landscape which influences not only the possibilities for new enterprises 
to gain access to finance, but redefines the room for decision making, strategy and structure 
within large, publicly listed enterprises. This institutional complementarity (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992) is representing an incentive against the long-term build-up of diverse internal 
capabilities and competencies, including but not limited to formal R&D, and a similar 
incentive towards basing corporate business renewal on acquiring new technologies readily 
available in the market – i.e. in the form of small, technology-based firms. This provides 
flexibility and responsiveness (Chesbrough and Teece 1996) complementary to high 
opportunity and high uncertainty Schumpeter Mark I regimes. On the other hand, the 
institutional foundation underlying this model may very well be constraining firms operating 
in regimes with lower rates of change and a heavier reliance on long-term development of 
dedicated knowledge, skills and assets. It also raises serious questions related to a possible, 
major decrease in outflows of knowledge spill-overs from industry, and its long-term impact 
on growth.  
Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Freeman (1987) and Lundvall (1988), a firm 
understanding of the interactive and inter-organizational dynamics of innovation has 
been established. The primary research emphasis of different innovation system 
approaches has been on interaction within and across value chains, between actors 
holding knowledge, i.e. on user-producer relationships involving research institutes, 
suppliers, and customers; and their resulting knowledge diffusion and externalities. 
They remain limited in their ability to deal with issues such as strategy formulation in 
general and the link between innovation strategies and business models in particular. 
The task of including finance, corporate control and strategy in innovation system 
analysis remains (O’Sullivan 2005).  
The “open innovation” concept of Henry Chesbrough (2003) has brought with it a 
supplementary focus on strategies for a) sourcing and b) commercializing 
technologies outside the realms of innovation system linkages as traditionally defined 
– i.e. ongoing knowledge-development within and in relationships between industrial 
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actors, research institutes and universities. It introduces knowledge sourcing and 
commercialization through equity and patent markets, and argues – normatively - that 
firms should not attempt to develop themselves what can readily be acquired in the 
market for patents or corporate control. In advocating this, it uses corporate business 
models and organisational principles as its point of departure, and focuses heavily on 
business strategies maximizing private returns on R&D by minimizing of own 
production of spill-overs, and by utilising involuntary spill-overs and controlled spin-
offs originating in the activities of other private or public actors. 
The following focuses on what Chesbrough (2005) refer to as outside-in 
(acquisitions) and inside-out (controlled spin-outs) strategies of open innovation – 
strategies utilising the market for corporate control to source, commercialise and 
recombine technologies. Consequently, it leaves issues such as innovation search and 
collaboration aside, acknowledging that these are far better covered by mainstream 
innovation studies (see Dahlander and Gann 2007 for a critique of Chesbroughs 
broader open innovation concept).  
Understanding open innovation  
The concept of “closed innovation” is tightly linked to US industry and the large-
scale in-house R&D labs which grew out from the particular institutional landscape of 
the 1950s and 1960s (see figure 1 - 3).  Much used examples include Fairchild 
Semiconductors, AT&T and its Bell Laboratories, later to be inherited by Lucent 
Technologies, Xerox and IBM. Common to what Chesbrough (2003) claim was a 
distinct paradigm is the emphasis on building and protecting knowledge monopolies 
through explorative science; with very few and selective interfaces towards the 
external environment. This in turn rests on specific financial foundations conducive to 
long-term knowledge exploration and privatization, of which the massive public 
funding of industrial R&D in the US is but one component. First and foremost, it rests 
on sheltering from short-term financial performance and reporting constraints; and 
administrative autonomy to allocate corporate earnings towards cumulative and 
uncertain, internal knowledge development (Lazonick 2005). Closed innovation, i.e. a 
strong strategic emphasis on internal knowledge development,  ‘…favor internally 
generated resources because of their reluctance to reveal valuable information about 
their investment projects’ (to equity or bond markets); they favor equity financing 
over debt financing (because dept constrain liquidity independent of earnings), and 
debt financing through banks (where information is privatized) over open-market 
bonds (susceptible to the same public information problems as equity) (Bah and 
Dumontier 2001:675-676, 685, 690, Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995).  
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Second, it rest on the ability to develop, diffuse and accumulate firm specific 
knowledge and competencies in house. The inherent non-exclusive and often tacit 
nature of knowledge and competencies entail that such primarily move with the 
mobility of people; and are lost or gained through the ability to retain or attract 
personnel. The ability to develop, accumulate and appropriate rents from specialized 
knowledge development is therefore contingent on the ability of enterprises to 
develop internal labor markets (Lam 2000) through which excessive external turn-
over of personnel (see O’Sullivan 2000) is avoided. According to Morgan (1995:11, 
in Asheim 1997:161) this ’…process of continuous improvement through interactive 
learning... presupposes a workforce that feels actively committed to the firm”. This, 
in turn, presupposes the commitment of the organisation to the individuals working 
within it (Lazonick 1994 in Asheim 2000:3). Low external mobility of personnel, in 
turn, for the same reason equals fewer uncontrolled spill-overs of knowledge and 
technology into the external environment, thus in effect plugging the most important 
pipeline for technology-based new-firm formation (Bhide 1996, 2000, Franco and 
Filson 2002, Lindholm-Dahlstrand 2001, Cassiman and Ueada 2004) and potentially 
leaving many ideas and technologies not commercialized nor in other ways made 
available for societal experimentation (Carlson and Eliasson 2002).  
This model of cumulative internal knowledge development nurtured by mutual 
capital-labor commitment does not fit well with the current regime of rapid 
technological change and the potential for super profits; within particular ICTs; nor 
does it fit well with the now high rate of turnover of employees in US enterprises 
(Farber 2007, Wever 1995). And it fits particularly badly with the modern mode of 
corporate control developed in the US.  Resulting human resource management 
principles, in turn, appear to contradict modern theories of organizational design and 
communication quite severely (Tourish and Hargie 2004); highlighting the emphasis 
put on recombining through factor markets rather than developing through 
organizational learning  created by the system as a whole (see O’Sullivan 2000:43-
52). Against this background, the strength of the US economy within certain high-
tech sector poses key questions concerning the dynamics and limitations of this 
distinct “societal mode” of organizing industrial innovation (Boyer 2004).  
Closed innovation constraints 
Business strategies reflect the defined objectives of corporate enterprises; and hence – 
in the case of large publicly listed enterprises - the systems a) defining what these 
objectives are, and b) securing that corporate management is pursuing them (Kester 
1996, Blair 1997). Understanding strategies in relation to institutional conditions thus 
imply understanding systems of corporate control. By the early 1970s, the US 
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industrial landscape was dominated by large, diversified conglomerates managed 
under – and growing from – the principle of “retain and reinvest”. Rather than being 
distributed to the financial markets as dividends, corporate returns where used to fuel 
further diversification and growth – controlled by the “visible hand” of a managerial 
elite which at the time was untouchable from the point of view of stockholders. 
Returns, on the other hand, had through the 50s and 60s been secured by rapidly 
expanding consumption markets; and investments in R&D supported by the massive 
expansion of the role of federal government in industry after World War II 
(O’Sullivan 2000, Gordon 2003, Porter and Stern 1999)1. On top of this came 
antitrust legislation drawing the “make-or-buy” decision in the direction of either full 
vertical integration, or buy on a pure market basis. Managers where not only left to 
follow their own preferences for growth and diversification, but received strong 
institutional support for it. Within these enterprises the “first generation” (Lam 2000, 
Roussel et al 1991), or closed (Chesbrough 2005), technology-push R&D 
organization came to flourish. 
During the 1970s this logic was challenged from two sides; the slow general 
economic growth and high inflation of the period, causing markets to stagnate, and 
new players, in particular Japan, applying modes of industrial organization deviating 
significantly from those found in the US (Hollingsworth 1991) and eating a larger and 
larger piece of the stagnating cake (Fligstein and Shin 2007, Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000).  According to Jensen (1993), the period starting in the early 1970s saw  
 
“…technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces … changing the 
worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during 
the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution… corporate internal control 
systems… failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth 
and the requirement for exit”.   
 
The first generation – closed – R&D model was challenged.  
While managers preferred growth and diversification, shareholders demanded 
competitive valuation of, and liquidity in, their assets. This lacking alignment of 
preferences between owners and managers of productive assets was considered the 
main barrier to necessary structural change, and opened up for the new ideology of 
corporate management later to be known as the principle of “maximizing shareholder 
value” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, Fligstein 2001). Building on agency theory, it 
claimed that managers are “agents” hired to act on behalf of – and only on behalf of – 
shareholders. Shareholders, in turn, are in a unique position because they invest in the 
                                                 
1 For instance, during the 1950s more than half of the revenues of IBMs domestic electronic data 
processing business stemmed from government programs.  
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development of productive assets, the returns from which are “residual”, i.e. they 
cannot by their very nature be contractually defined. To increase investments, and 
secure the optimal allocation of these investments between different activities, 
mechanisms must therefore be in place to make sure that corporate management – at 
any given point in time - act only to for the purpose of maximizing these residual 
returns. Institutional barriers to this, such as labor market frictions or employee co-
determining rights, must consequently be removed2.  
With this the capital allocation function of the economy was taken out of 
conglomerate hierarchies, and embedded in external capital markets. Returns from 
invested capital was to be allocated to projects within enterprises only to the extent 
that the market did not signal, through relative stock appreciation or depreciation; that 
it perceived it could not make better use of it elsewhere. A system of market co-
ordination was installed; relying heavily on entry-exit signals based on publicly 
available information and the formation of expectations. The success criteria of 
individual companies became not long-term survival, but short-term secondary 
market capitalization gains relative to benchmarks and expectations developed by 
investors kept at arms length; continuously scanning the market for other investment 
options. The carrot was management stock options; the stick was the real threats of 
hostile take-overs or legal action towards managers failing to meet their judicially 
defined obligations to take care of the short-term interests of minority shareholders. 
This, in turn, paved the way for a new understanding of “professional” corporate 
management, which is still in the process of being spread far beyond the US by likely 
and unlikely agents ranging form institutional investors to governments. 
Predictability, transparency and public disclosure of information on the industry side; 
in itself constraining the information privatization conducive to closed innovation; is 
linked to portfolio diversification and trading based on market indicators and 
mathematical modeling at the owner/investor side.  The lack of private knowledge 
exchanges and financial commitment between investors and US industrial enterprises 
is clearly visible in data comparing ownership concentration between the US and 
continental Europe (Barcha and Becht 2001, Allen and Gale (eds 2000). “Retain and 
reinvest was during the 1980s replaced by “distribute and downsize” (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000, O’Sullivan 2000) – the problem was solved with a knife. As of the 
early 1980s the large-firm sector share of US investments in research and 
development has fallen dramatically (figure 3). This occurred while overall intensity 
of business expenditures on research and development increased, and following from 
a distinct downturn in intensity during the 1970s (see figure 1).  
                                                 
2 The main mechanisms are performance-based management rewards, i.e. stock options, and the threat 
of a hostile take-over with consequent replacement of the management team if companies are 
underperforming.   
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The institutional foundation of US managerial control, and hence the “closed 
innovation” paradigm, eroded. This effectively eliminated the ability of incumbent 
enterprises to secure their own revenue streams through activity diversification. The 
management of risk was to be taken care of not by corporations but by the equity 
market, through investor portfolio rather than corporate activity diversification. 
Individual enterprises was to handle weakening markets through downsizing and 
buying less in the market for inputs, e.g. by adjusting the workforce size according to 
its contribution to revenues today or equity market expectations of the next quarter. 
And, according to Chesbrough (2003), they should enter new growth markets by 
acquiring actors already present in those markets, or holding technologies of 
knowledge relevant for these, rather than attempt entry based on internal development 
of new capabilities.  
Fixed costs related to operating large R&D labs and accumulating broad, in-
house competencies and skills by avoiding employee turnover (see O’Sullivan 
2000:124) on IBM) don’t fit very well with this (Herstad 2005). Rather, emphasis 
was put on retaining only “narrow and concentrated skill bases” (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 1998). Consequently, the way work is organized in the United States has 
undergone radical changes during the last 20 years. Job stability has declined for 
long-tenured workers, there has been a large increase in the use of contract and 
temporary workers (Dickens and Posen 2001), long-term employment has become 
much less common (Farber 2007). Hire-and-fire strategies create porous 
organizational boundaries; eases knowledge sourcing in the labor market, and 
provides the flexibility sought to protect short-term earnings.  Farber (ibid:23) point 
out that whereas  
 
”…both the U.S. and Japan have been faced with similar global competitive 
pressures…firms in the U.S. have laid off workers, even those in long-term 
primary jobs. Reassignment to other jobs within firms has not been an important 
phenomenon”.  
 
According to Jensen (1989, 1993) downsize and distribute was necessary to boost 
structural change, and results where “as intended”. Porter and Stern (1999) agree, and 
praise the willingness of the system to investment in radically new technologies. In 
Porter (ed) (1992) this understood as a tendency to over-invest in “…discrete, stand-
alone investments that generate leaps in position”, and a preference against 
“...complex patterns of complementary investments, whose returns can only be 
assessed as a group’ (Porter (ed) 1992:64) which translate into under-investments in 
cumulative learning. Porter and Stern (1999) do express serious concern about shift in 
corporate R&D away from long-term research projects, and towards short-term 
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development, although they do not link this explicitly to corporate control. 
Chesbrough (2005:191) similarly points out how “…industry can no longer be 
expected to underwrite the bulk of the costs of early-stage research” and that the shift 
in strategic orientation means that the future will see “…less basic research being 
conducted within corporate research laboratories”.  
 
 
US industrial R&D/GDP 1953-2001, all sources of funding
Source: National Science Foundation
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Figure 1: R&D performed by US industrial enterprises as percentage of GDP. 
 
Last but not least, the focus on “shareholder value” is part and parcel of the 
transformation of corporate stock into a “currency” for the open innovation regime 
(Carpenter et al 2003). A strong, relative valuation of own stock meant that other 
enterprises can be acquired without any effect on cash reserves, cash flows or even 
debt.  Combined, this means that the constraints imposed on running diverse long-
term development projects within complex conglomerates are supplemented by the 
emergence of alternatives to such strategies; contingent, or course, on the success of 
the enterprise in boosting shareholder value to begin with. Focus on transparency, 
cost-effectiveness and core competencies meant appreciation of own stock; which in 
turn means increasing purchasing power in the acquisition market. The role of the 
market for corporate control in combining and recombining component technologies 
and knowledge becomes apparent.  
We have now entered the realm of equity-based open innovation. For course, 
critical in enabling such strategies are vibrant markets of companies-to-be acquired; 
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i.e. technology and capabilities “held in stock”, awaiting recombination with other 
technologies or capabilities.   
 
R&D performed by US industrial enterprises, all sources of funding. 
Percentage change from preceeding year, constant dollars.
Source: National Science Foundation
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Figure 2: Growth rates, R&D performed by US industrial enterprises. 
Open innovation opportunities 
New players have entered the innovation funding game, paving the way for new 
models of innovation (Chesbrough 2003). These include pre-seed and seed investors, 
investing in the early high-uncertainty phases of a company lifecycle; venture 
capitalists investing in the border territory between uncertainty and risk,  and last but 
not least expansion phase or buyout actors focusing e.g. on entry into 
underperforming public enterprises in need of a committed, large owner. These are 
nurtured by the availability of institutional or private capital seeking alternative high-
risk, high-return investment opportunities with only medium-term requirements to 
commit and still unwilling to abandon the virtues of portfolio diversification. This 
capital is filtering out of private households in the form of pensions, insurance 
schemes and other non-realestate investments; and from established industry in the 
form of earnings not reinvested but distributed to the market for the purpose of 
seeking the “next big thing” (Perez 2002)3. It is also, importantly, comprised of 
                                                 
3 Perez (2002) introduces the distinction between committed and knowledgeable industrial capital, and 
financial capital continuously scanning the market for new high-return, high-uncertainty business 
opportunities.  
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capital retained by incumbents who are seeking to resolve their need for technological 
renewal with capital market incentives against reinvesting revenues in intramural 
R&D. Equity investments in promising new firms offer either this transparency, or 
the possibility to isolate and conceal ventures on the side of core activities; and the 
option of returns through exit rather than returns through a revenue flow presupposing 
long-term commitment. All this stimulated, or course, by the long history of 
successful exits made by the US venture industry since its infancy in the late 1940s4; 
and resulting in the share of total R&D performed by large, publicly listed enterprises 
dropping (figure 3). By way of comparison, the Nordic countries developed their first 
private equity actors as late as during the 70s and early 80s; and saw this market 
collapse in the wake of the stock-market crash in 1987.  
 
Share of total R&D in US firms with less than 1000 employees, 1956-2003
Source: National Science Foundation, calcuations by Mark Knell
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Figure 3: The increasing role of smaller R&D-performing enterprises in the US 
 
                                                 
4 The first venture investment fund, American Research and Development,  was established in 1946 by 
employees of Harvard and MIT, and members of the Boston investment community, motivated by the 
prospects of super profits stemming from government-funded technological development programs 
(O’Sullivan 2000:130-131). 
 40 
Private equity capital serve three primary functions: It 1) for limited period of 
time shelter promising companies from the earnings requirements and reinvestment 
constraints of the organized capital markets, the funding constraints of individual or 
family ownership, and the collateral constraints related to bank funding. This enables 
development (seed capital) and refinement of new technologies (venture capital), and 
the consequent expansion into large-scale production and distribution (expansion 
phase capital). It also provides first aid for companies left for too long in the public 
market cold (buyout capital), and – presumably (Langeland 2003) – ensures a high 
level of integration (Lazonick 2005) between corporate management and investors 
with industry-specific competencies and knowledge. Ad-on acquisitions to combine 
with other technologies or capabilities are a part of this picture. But more importantly, 
it enable 2) the stable supply of trade-sale or acquisition candidates which is critical 
to outside-in open innovation strategies at the large-firm side of the equation. These 
are instrumental in creating a market for discrete, stand-alone technologies. Last but 
not least their existence 3) supply incumbents with a means to share risk or 
uncertainty related to (core or non-core) research and development programs, this as 
such activities can be located in separate companies and private equity invited in to 
share the risk; and a means of isolating and perhaps even “hiding” ventures on the 
side of core competencies. Equity investments don’t depress operational returns.  
Vibrant private equity activity does not emerge out of thin air, but is rather a 
product of the same capital market characteristics which imposes constraints on the 
incumbent side of the equation. A key determinant of venture capital investments is 
the market for exit (Jeng and Wells 2000), and consequently the overall secondary 
market capitalization and liquidity sought nurtured by “shareholder value” ideology.  
Black and Gilson (1998:258) argues that the potential for exit through an IPO is 
critical to the development of an active venture industry even given how exit 
predominantly occur through the sale of portfolio companies to other industrial 
companies.  
The existence of a vibrant IPO market provides a guarantee for liquidity without 
assuming the existence of a trade-sale candidate at the desired time of exit. In 
addition this market enables performance-based compensation of managers and 
researchers without constraining liquidity, and gives the manager-entrepreneur a call 
option for regaining control at the time of the IPO.  The importance of a viable exit 
market is confirmed by Jeng and Wells (2000), who find a significant, positive and 
robust relationship between IPO activity and venture investments even when 
controlling for the obvious possibility of reverse causality5. Highlighting the concept 
of complementarities these authors also find a significant positive relationship 
                                                 
5 I.e. IPOs driven by venture activity, rather than driving venture activity. 
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between civil law legal systems and intensity of IPOs; and a significant negative 
relationship between labor market rigidities and seed capital investments. Controlling 
for cross-country fixed effects related to investment regulations, these also find that 
pension fund levels exert a positive influence on new funds raised. The authors also 
point out that whereas their models have a high explanatory power for later-stage 
venture investments, their explanatory power is much lower for the early-stage 
venture activity (Jeng and Wells 2000:285).  
 
 
Figure 4: The interdependencies between capital markets, incumbents and new firm 
formation. 
 
So, by way of concluding (see figure 4) private equity markets enable new 
strategies on the side of incumbents; but their activities presuppose a certain general 
financial set up, which in turn provides incentives (equity-based open innovation) and 
constraints (long-term cumulative, collective knowledge development) on 
incumbents; and impose their own set of constraints on portfolio companies. Seed and 
venture capitalists do not commit to financing the ongoing accumulation of 
organizational competencies; they finance stand-alone, discrete modular technology 
development projects for a limited period of time; i.e. limited to the predetermined 
lifespan of the fund, not to the commitment required by involved technologies. 
Venture-backed IPOs in the US economy are therefore, not surprisingly, highly 
concentrated around a limited number of sectors (see figure 6 below) with highly 
specific knowledge and opportunity (Malerba and Orsenigo 1993) conditions.  
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Divergent national systems 
This indicates the importance of diversity in institutional configurations (Boyer 
2004), and diversity between economic activities in their requirements for 
institutional support. The question is the extent to which US institutional 
preconditions for open innovation strategies are present in other economies. Figure 5 
below shows equity market capitalization relative to GDP, a commonly used indicator 
for equity market size. In the US, this ratio was in 1995 231% of the ratio for EU15; 
decreasing to 175 % of EU15 in 2005. The largest economy in Europe, Germany, 
showed a ratio of only 46 % in 2005, compared to the US level of 144% the same 
year. This reflects the political, judicial and academic emphasis of the US on 
nurturing vibrant equity markets, of which the shareholder value mode of corporate 
control is part and parcel.   
 
Domestic equity market capitalisation relative to GDP
Source: ECMI 2006
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Figure 5: Divergent national equity markets 
 
What it is does not reflect is differences in overall capital market development, 
but differences in the relative importance of bank, bond or debt financing 
respectively; and related differences in modes of control. Relatively even scores on 
(open market) bond financing; which combines certain aspects from equity and bank 
loan financing respectively; ad to highly divergent scores on bank assets and equity 
financing respectively and in sum reflect the role of non-market debt financing in the 
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so-called bank based systems of continental Europe and Japan, versus the role of 
capital allocated through open bond or equity markets respectively in the US (see 
table 1). Bank financing come with privatized communication between funding 
source and enterprise management. As debt holders are not awarded residual returns, 
it also means far weaker incentives so seek high uncertainty – high super profit 
strategies - and it enables long-term cumulative knowledge development as it does 
not come with a demand for transparency or potential super profits. Last but not least, 
to the extent that banks are able to directly influence corporate strategies, the 
preference is strong towards retain and reinvest principles of governance, as this 
secures the role of specific enterprise, on which banks hold in-depth private 
information, as future profitable customer for debt.  
 
Table 1: Size of bond markets, equity markets and bank assets relative to GPD. 2004. 
Source: ECMI (2006)  
 
 Bond market Equity market Bank assets 
EU15 141,7 % 59,9 % 236,8 % 
US 168,8 % 116,1 % 72,7 % 
Japan 168,6 % 61,6 % 146,6 % 
 
In Germany, the shareholder value doctrine has, historically, been counteracted 
by concentrated ownership and large banks, placed in positions where they have been 
able to exert control over industry and act on their preferences towards securing long-
term revenue flow from a stable portfolio of key debt customers (and consequently 
long-term but conservative investment strategies); in Japan by the dense pattern of 
cross-ownership within industrial groups providing much of the same function; in 
Sweden by the Wallenberg and Handelsbanken spheres controlling a large proportion 
of Swedish publicly listed companies. In this case, roles as equity holders have 
combined with roles as debt suppliers (i.e. through the Wallenberg-sphere control of 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, and the Handelsbanken control of equity investor 
AB Industrivärden).  Denmark shows an enduring and highly peculiar pattern of 
ownership by self-governed foundations, the sole purposes of which are to secure the 
long-term survival of controlled enterprises. The latter, in essence, is “retain and 
reinvest” taken to the extreme; and nobody would accuse the Danish economy of 
lacking industrial competitiveness. In the Nordic economies, the true outlier is 
Norway. The state and foreign institutional investors are the largest owner groups 
among listed companies, and the former has – perhaps paradoxically in itself but not 
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against the background of the second largest owning group – been a key proponent of 
shareholder value ideology.  
The link between the equity market in general and venture activity indicates that 
the strong seed and venture capital markets found in the US cannot readily be 
duplicated in such bank-based financial systems (see Becker and Hellmann 2003). 
European countries did develop secondary markets during the early 1980s, allowing 
pioneering European private equity funds to exit their investments and consequently 
triggering a wave of new fund raising (Gompers and Lerner 2004:347). These key 
exit markets collapsed after the 1987 stock market crash, and European private equity 
investors where unable to exit their investments (ibid: 345). A similar cycle 
reappeared after the collapse of Neuer Markt and other high-risk organized markets in 
the wake of the 2001 dotcom bubble collapse. According to Gompers and Lerner 
(ibid); the problem is related to the exit environment, and therefore to the financial 
system set-up as a whole. 
In addition, many European economies such as the Nordic countries and 
Germany have employment protection legislation, high degrees of unionization and 
employee co-determining rights in corporate decision making which provide effective 
barriers against full-fledged shareholder value governance principles - arguably to the 
extent that this has slowed down necessary structural change in certain European 
economies. One should not downplay the role of this system in bringing about the 
new industrial landscape in the US, but simply keep in mind that the contemporary 
high-growth industries in the US are limited to a handful characterized by specific 
knowledge and opportunity conditions (Malerba and Orsenigo 1993), and that US 
industry as a whole continue to produce trade deficits no small, open economies such 
as those found in the Nordics would be able to endure.   
Following Boyer (2004:25) it is reasonable to assume that “the impact of a given 
(institutional) characteristic can be unfavorable in one instance, beneficial in another, 
without this implying the existence of some “outliers”… actually, these “outliers” 
may well define coherent institutional configurations that remain unnoticed by 
theoreticians”. In other words, if and only if institutional deviations from the US 
“mobile capital – mobile labor” model translate into negative effects on long-term, 
overall economy performance do proponents of shareholder value have a case. 
Statistical studies of the relationship between long-term macro-economic growth and 
financial systems appear to reveal no such effects (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
2002, Beck and Levine 2001) but rather, in accordance with Boyer (2004), find that 
‘…overall financial development boost economic growth…having a bank-based or 
market-based system per se does not seem to matter much’ (Beck and Levine 2001). 
Others have found bank-based systems most conducive to long-term growth (Arestis 
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et al 2001), only to later come up with findings in favor of equity-based systems 
(Arestis et al 2004:4). This has forced them to conclude that ‘…the apparent failure of 
large cross-country studies to identify a significant effect of financial structure on 
economic growth may be due to their failure to account sufficiently for cross-country 
heterogeneity’ (ibid:15-16).  
Carlin and Mayer (2003) conducted the first large-scale attempt at empirically 
dealing with sectoral heterogeneity, categorizing industries as debt-dependent, 
equity-dependent or skill-dependent. They found that concentrated equity ownership 
– rather than the dispersed equity ownership which is the functional outcome of 
shareholder value ideology – “…is associated with faster growth of equity and skill-
dependent industries and with higher R&D shares of equity-dependent industries’. 
Committed equity financing may in part be associated with higher R&D intensity 
because ‘…unlike concentrated shareholders in Sweden, dispersed, anonymous 
shareholders in the UK may be unable to commit to other stakeholders’ – including 
employees (Carlin and Mayer (2003:218)). This is, apparently, quite contradictory to 
the apparent success of the US in fostering high-tech industries. What it does indicate 
is that the equity-based systems represented by the latter have a superior ability to 
handle uncertainty, i.e. situations where risk cannot be handled through the 
commitment of intelligent industrial capital (Perez 2002, O’Sullivan 2005). This all 
points towards a need for understanding innovation strategies, and their institutional 
foundations, against the background of different industry characteristics. 
Innovation models, financial markets and technological regimes 
As knowledge bases and markets diverge significantly within6 and across sectors; and 
the sectoral composition diverge across economies, so will required investments in 
knowledge and modes of innovation diverge across firms and societies. Ongoing 
experimentation and recombination in the interplay between incumbents, new 
technology based firms and venture capitalists presupposes distinct knowledge, 
cumulativeness, and opportunity and appropriablity conditions (Malerba and 
Orsenigo 1993). There must exist a steady outflow of knowledge which, within the 
investment horizon constraints of these actors, can be harnessed, recombined and 
developed into a marketable technology; opportunities to earn super profits from 
radical innovations must be high enough to defend exposure to high risk or 
fundamental uncertainty; and cumulativeness and complexity at the firm level must 
                                                 
6 It is increasingly recognised that sectors defined statistically by their output or main areas of activity 
show a high degree of heterogeneity in innovation strategies across the actors who constitute them. 
Coherent groups of firms, defined by similar innovation strategies, are in turn argued by some (see 
Mariussen, this volume), to be found across sectors.  
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be low enough rule out that appropriation requires the build-up of broad, collective 
and specialized organizational competencies related to e.g. marketing, production and 
multi-disciplinary research (see Aglietta and Breton 2001). 
As we have seen above, the existence of fundamental uncertainty, low 
cumulativeness at the organizational level and broad availability of knowledge 
externalities from either public or industrial research undermines the rationale for 
closed innovation models at the incumbent side of the equitation. If cumulativeness 
on the other hand exists at the industry or regional level; i.e. in the form of 
externalities, the scene is set for vibrant equity-based open innovation based on the 
existence of knowledge commons (Foray 2000) sown by externalities, fertilized by 
venture capitalists and harvested by incumbents. Last but not least, as a result of a 
low degree of so-called strategic protection following from complexity and tacitness 
(Cassiman and Veuglers 2006), it is a prerequisite that stand-alone technologies can 
be protected by formal IPR measures, i.e. patents; otherwise venture capitalists would 
be investing in hot air. A decade before Chesbroughs (2003) main publication, 
Malerba and Orsenigo referred to this as Schumpeter Mark I technological regimes; 
driven by entrepreneurs and characterized by “creative destruction”.  
But Schumpeter himself later discovered that these conditions are not general to 
industry or to the process of technological development. They are specific to either 
certain phases of a technology lifecycle or a technological paradigm (Perez 2002), or 
to certain technological regimes or “fields” of innovation (Mariussen, this volume).  
As Chesbrough (2003) himself readily admits, there is a vast difference between 
designing and operating nuclear power plants, and creating consumer software in a 
basement. When knowledge bases are cross-disciplinary, cross-functional, 
experience-based and co-specialized (Blair 1997); and development as well as 
appropriation require access to specialized equipment and complementary capabilities 
(Teece 2001); cumulativeness at the organizational level may still prevail and 
necessitate a far higher degree of internal, long-term knowledge development. These 
knowledge conditions (Cassiman and Veuglers 2006) may in turn severely dampens 
the outflow of externalities from private research, thus weakening those external 
knowledge commons upon which large-scale venture activity rests. As knowledge 
bases are specific to commercial activities rather than research disciplines, the 
outflow of public research knowledge which directly translate into innovations is very 
limited (Mowery and Sampat 2005), consequently further weakening the external 
knowledge common. Porters (ed) (1992) “...complex patterns of complementary 
investments, whose returns can only be assessed as a group’ prevail; and are weakly 
complementary to venture capitalist demand for stand-alone, discrete technological 
development ventures. 
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In the latter case innovation is not closed but patterns and modes of open 
innovation are different. It may for instance be far tighter linked to interactive 
collaboration within “..a more or less integrated structure, in the sense of strict 
linkages between elements’ (Nooteboom 2001:4) holding specialised, synthetic and 
analytic knowledge (see Smith 2000), and since there is less new firm formation and 
less venture capital seeking to invest, the prospects in the equity market is far more 
limited. The technological dynamism of combining and recombining found in the 
contemporary version of Schumpeter’s Mark I model is replaced by sensitivity 
towards the closed innovation constraints of the shareholder value mode of control,  
and its related labor market flexibility. These conditions are referred to by Malerba 
and Orsenigo as Schumpeter Mark II “creative accumulation”.  
 
Value of US venture-backed IPOs, by sector
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Figure 6: The sectoral composition of US venture-backed initial public offerings 
(IPO) 
 
So now we see how innovation model goes hand in hand with both institutional 
contexts (national economies) and technological regime (sectors). A strong focus on 
technological renewal through outside-in open innovation presupposes a stable supply 
of technology-based companies available for acquisition. This, on the other hand 
presupposes first that other companies are applying strategies resulting in new firm 
formation, i.e. either uncontrolled spill-overs from “closed model” R&D efforts, or 
controlled spin-offs in the form of inside-out open innovation, then it presupposes the 
existence of a market within which such activities can be developed further, held in 
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stock, recombined (ad-on acquisitions) and offered as self-sufficient packages to 
potential bidders. Private equity capital linked to a viable IPO market serves this 
function, but comes with the constraints of investment lifespan and preferences 
towards stand-alone, discrete – modular – ventures.  Last but not least, it presupposes 
a final market for these activities, i.e. incumbents seeking external technological 
renewal. Thus, a context – an industry and/or a place - dominated by large 
conglomerates who rarely spin off activities and whose employees rarely leave to 
establish new technology based firms, provides little room for open innovation 
strategies. This situation is found in e.g. Japan or Germany, in part a result of weaker 
external labor mobility than found in the US; to a larger extent a result of the capital 
market mechanisms analyzed above.  Similarly, when external mobility of knowledge 
workers in vibrant labor markets combine with a very strong corporate focus on core 
competencies, and consequently strategies of continuously redefining these by 
developing new business models and de-merging non-core activities, a larger room 
for applying open innovation strategies is established, with its own self-sustaining 
logic.  
Discussion 
The upside: Knowledge diffusion and experimentation 
Outside-in open innovation strategies are powerful tools for business to use when 
coping with fundamental uncertainty, rapidly adjust to new market demands and act 
according to opportunities which will – following from specific knowledge 
conditions- emerge outside the corporate umbrella. Combined with inside-out 
strategies they are further powerful mechanisms for economies to secure diffusion 
and consequently experimental recombination of knowledge (Carlsson and Eliasson 
2002). They stimulate and enable broad knowledge diffusion from corporate 
enterprises and research institutes and into the economy, only to then provide the 
foundation for continuous processes of combining and recombining this knowledge 
with what is already there. Private equity capitalists competing with each other, based 
on different experiences and competencies, secure broad and early market-based 
evaluation of new firms and technologies; whereas established firms focusing on 
technological renewal through acquiring such activities similarly secure broad 
evaluation at the last and critical to the economy stage of absorption. This Eliasson 
and Carlson (2002) refer to as the “experimentally organized economy”.  
But according to Chesbrough (2005) these practices go hand in hand with 
stagnating of declining investments in private sector research; and with investment in 
development “showing clear signs of becoming more short term” (Porter 2005:8). 
This is not surprising, given that the “new innovation funders” of Chesbrough (2003) 
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by their very nature build on harvesting from “knowledge commons” and are 
reluctant to commit to long-term cumulative and complex learning; and given how 
incumbents are prohibited by law and constrained by institutional mechanisms from 
themselves committing to such ventures.  
The downside: Cumulative knowledge development and maintenance of 
knowledge commons 
Problems therefore arises if the current regime of tightening corporate control and 
opportunities stemming from venture activity result in equity-based open innovation 
practices diffusion throughout industries as substitutes for internal knowledge 
development, as in several of Chesbroughs US (2005) cases (see also Carpenter et al 
2003). If the technological renewal of incumbents is to depend on the availability of 
new technology based firms; and the emergence of such firms is dependent on 
knowledge development no longer occurring within the population of incumbents as a 
whole, could such practices be able to sustain industrial dynamics over time? Or 
rather, will technological and leadership again shift away from the US, as it did 
during the 70s and 80s, towards economies with institutional and political conditions 
conducive to other models of industrial innovation – such as e.g. Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, China, or even some of the Nordic countries? Since open innovation, in 
essence is a model focused on short and medium term efficient allocation of existing 
productive resources, not a model for the long-term build-up of such, it is tempting to 
answer that the answer to the second question is yes.  
When Chesbrough (2003:41) claims that the “internally oriented, centralized 
approach to R&D has become obsolete” as “useful knowledge has become 
widespread”, he may to a certain extent be right from the medium-term perspective 
of industry and private returns, although he does assume away – or rather neglect7 - 
the role of tacit, industry-specific and co-specialization of knowledge (Blair 1997) 
and stretches his own cases far beyond their external validity.  From the perspective 
of the economy as a whole and its social returns, he is making statements about 
efficient allocation of resources – knowledge – which is out there predominantly as a 
result of private companies “internally oriented approaches to R&D” (see Mariussen, 
this volume). The knowledge common (Foray 2000) of Silicon Valley did not 
materialize out of thin air; nor was it the result of somebody deciding to implement 
                                                 
7 Chesbrough (2003, 2005) systematically treat “knowledge” as something homogenous; neglecting its 
wide variety of possible forms and thus varying degrees to which it is easily available externally – and 
where. Such perspectives were present in earlier work such as Chesbrough and Teece (1996), in which 
the authors warn against excessive reliance on outsourcing at the expense of the long-term build-up of 
internal capabilities, points to the role of conditions specific to individual firms and industries – and 
warn against “blindly following fads”. This is the true ironic.  
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the latest business model in fashion. It was constructed in the interplay between 
public funding and private sector R&D, gaining its dynamics primarily from private 
sector large-scale production of externalities which then spilled out to be harnessed 
by the emerging venture capital industry.   
Against this background it is not ironic (Chesbrough 2003:35) that e.g. Cisco 
outperformed Lucent Technologies (who had inherited the remains of famous Bell 
Laboratories after the break-up of AT&T) by substituting investments in R&D with 
investments in promising start-ups - established in part by former Lucent employees; 
it simply reveals the importance of knowledge spill-overs and heterogeneity – the co-
existence of different actors and strategies - in driving industrial development. So 
does another example used by Chesbrough (2005), the closed innovation model 
applied by Fairchild Semiconductors versus the open model initially applied by its 
spin-off Intel; the former effectively producing research results in the form of patents 
and publications, the latter becoming a highly profiled commercial success without 
initially operating any internal R&D.  
What is somewhat lost in the Chesbrough (2005) version of the story is how the 
business model of Intel built on – or presupposed – the existence of a completely 
different business model applied by Fairchilds.  Without the closed innovation of 
Fairchilds, no open innovation at Intel. The external effects of Fairchilds did not stop 
with Intel; in fact, “…so great was the outflow of people and ideas that the majority 
of semiconductor firms formed in Silicon Valley in the 1960s could trace their origins 
back to Fairchilds” (Saxenian 1994:26, cited in O’Sullivan 2000). And where did 
Fairchilds have its roots? It was a spin-off from Shockley Semiconductor, established 
by the researcher who led the development of the transistor at Bell Laboratories. By 
building on externalities from closed innovation efforts, open innovation strategies 
presuppose the existence of actors operating large, internal R&D labs, consequently 
producing controlled spin-offs and not least uncontrolled spill-overs (se Mariussen, 
this volume).  
A more specific problem with this model is its sensitivity towards business cycle 
fluctuations following from its last-instance dependence on equity market 
capitalization. When overall capitalization drops, markets for IPO dry up, venture 
funds and their investors find their capital locked up; investors become unwilling to 
ad additional capital and funds cannot realize capital gains and use these to fund new 
investments. Seed investors then become unable to exit their investments, and the 
venture cycle grinds to a halt (see figure 7).  To this comes, of course, incumbents 
forced to downsize activities and fire staff to protect own revenues on behalf of 
shareholders, leading knowledge development in society as a whole to slow 
significantly down.  
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Venture fundraising, IPOs and market capitalisation in the US. 1999-2005
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Policy implications 
Everybody cannot live of externalities from everybody else. As Mariussen argues in 
this volume, it is critical for the innovative performance of industry as a whole that 
some industrial actors, in each sector and/or region, are willing to sustain investments 
in intramural R&D. If not, less knowledge will be fed into the system as a whole. A 
key question which emerge out of this is to what extent university or other forms of 
public research, linked to systematic commercialization efforts on the spin-off side, 
and private equity funding on immediate absorption and commercialization side, can 
substitute corporate R&D. The contemporary role of university or other public 
research in the private equity deal-flow tends to suggest no (Naas et al 1998, Herstad 
and Naas 2007, EVCA 2005, EVCA fortc, Cassiman and Ueda 2004), so does the 
general econometric work on the role of spill-overs from R&D (see Griliches 1998) – 
and recent empirical work on e.g. the Norwegian (Mariussen, this volume) and Dutch 
(Frenken et al 2002) economies. 
It is also known that the direct sourcing of technologies from university research 
historically has occurred only within a limited number of sectors, primarily chemicals 
and pharmaceuticals (Mowery and Sampat 2005) – industries operating based on 
knowledge bases (see Asheim and Gertler 2005) directly fuelled by scientific 
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progress. Services and creative industries are but two recent examples of sectors 
growing rapidly based on knowledge bases deviating significantly from those who 
can be fed directly by knowledge developed through university research. This 
indicates that there is little reason to believe that future industrial development and 
growth can be sustained if – as Chesbrough (2005) advices – it is to be based on 
public research and commercialization efforts alone.   
In addition to the observed importance of industrial R&D as source of knowledge 
spill-overs, there are two more specific reasons why public research cannot substitute.  
First, the idea of large-scale industrial renewal driven mainly by commercialization of 
university research neglects complexity and heterogeneity in industrial knowledge 
bases, i.e. the need, created by clients and product markets, to build complex, cross-
disciplinary and cross-functional knowledge bases – and it neglects how the existence 
of such private sector knowledge bases, or “competence blocks” in the words of 
Carlsson and Eliasson 2002,  may be a prerequisite for the commercial value of 
university research results to be harnessed.   
Second, it neglects the fact that private sector R&D and broader knowledge 
development is embedded within a commercial environment to begin with; thus 
substantially increasing the likelihood that key researchers hold the commercial 
understanding, practical knowledge and willingness necessary to “sell” ideas as 
commercial projects in-house, or successfully establish new firms. And significantly 
increasing the likelihood of access to and absorption of knowledge not available from 
the academic community, e.g. the experience-based knowledge of suppliers, operators 
or customers. Linkages to such knowledge sources are far more likely to already “be 
there” or easily established, hence decreasing search, selection and networking costs.  
To this come the prospects of support from knowledgeable corporate venture capital 
able to commit far longer than independent venture capital is high and increasing. 
This does not downplay the fundamental role of universities and public research 
institutions in long-term knowledge exploration and diffusion, but accepts the 
limitations inherent in such processes being disciplinary in nature and occurring de-
coupled from the commercial context within which it is to enter and draw additional 
knowledge. The current emphasis on, and diverse experiences with, the creation of 
“technology transfer offices” at universities throughout Europe, modeled on US 
experiences, is symptomatic of this problem.  
Overall this points towards a need to embed innovation policy in a true system 
understanding of industrial dynamics, which is contextualized against the background 
of specific economies with their respective institutional set-ups (labor and capital 
markets, industrial relations) and the industrial specializations – with their different 
regime characteristics – which have developed within them. In the “era of open 
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innovation” (Chesbrough 2003), or rather in economies with well developed open 
innovation practices, what should be supported massively by public policy is perhaps 
the industry intramural R&D efforts which have been – and from all existing 
evidence will and should remain – key in sustaining the competitiveness of existing 
industries and the flow of externalities into society as a basis for new ones (see 
Mariussen, this volume, for empirical evidence from Norway). Only after this flow is 
secured may industrial development be driven by private equity capital.  
This, in turn, also means that economies where knowledge is excessively 
contained within corporate R&D labs or universities should consider measures aimed 
at increasing controlled or uncontrolled spill-overs; and perhaps even increasing the 
absorptive capacity of the economy as a whole. But this is all context dependent, as 
the overall objective will have to be to establish the right mix of knowledge 
exploration and diffusion, in the private as well as public sector. Different corporate 
strategies presuppose the co-existence of each other, and it is in the interface between 
complementary strategies of exploration, diffusion and experimentation we find 
technological dynamics at the level of economies.  
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‘Nordic design’ in innovation policy: Embedding 
Collaborative Social Relations in Developmental 
Constellations. Lessons from a case study8 
Finn Ørstavik 
Abstract 
More than ever before, policy making in modern countries is based on the idea that innovation 
can provide solutions to major societal challenges, and that science is an essential tool in 
order to generate useful innovations. The linear model thinking about the relationship between 
science and industry takes for granted that science is the ultimate source of not only invention, 
but also of innovation, and that the support for autonomous and unfettered science is the best 
guarantee for genuine progress. In this paper we point out how a systemic approach differs 
from linear model thinking, and why systems thinking is more appropriate when we try to 
develop policies and institutions that effectively can couple scientific efforts and efforts to 
develop value creation activities (in terms of goods production as well as public and private 
service provisioning). We argue that the systemic approach was inherent in pioneering years 
of building a new institutional system of innovation in Norway after World War II, and that 
this approach was forced on the defensive by a gradual return to linear model ideology. This 
development may have peaked with the establishment of a singular research council in 1993. 
The establishment of a new fund for industrial research some years later marked an interesting 
return to the systems paradigm. Today, in a time when the overall institutional system of 
innovation in Norway is under debate and is undergoing important changes, it is all the more 
important to take into consideration the new fund’s logic, the preconditions for its existence, 
and its effectiveness.   
Introduction  
With the seemingly infinite potentials of exploiting science and technology in human 
endeavours, politicians have increasingly come to focus on how progress can be 
achieved by developing scientific knowledge. After World War II, in the era marked 
by socialist and democrat political influence in many countries, modernity became 
associated with a rationalized and knowledge based society. Science and technology 
was believed to make the fundamental difference, distinguishing present society from 
primitive societies, and potentially also from societies subjected to the irrationalities 
of unrestrained capitalism.  
Making society in general more science based, poses a dual challenge: First, it is 
a question how to make non-scientists become more able to access and employ 
scientific knowledge. Second, the question is what can be done to make men and 
                                                 
8 The paper is based on a case study of Fiskeri- og havbruksnæringens forskningsfond, undertaken in 
2006, and on theoretical work carried out with support from the NIFU STEP strategic institute program 
on innovation, financed by the Norwegian Research Council in 2006 and 2007. I gratefully 
acknowledge this support, which gave me the opportunity to further develop theoretical ideas that I 
have been working with for a long time. I also thank my colleagues Olav Spilling and Sverre Herstad 
for valuable suggestions and critical comments of earlier versions of this text.   
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women of science interested in dealing with societal needs by way of their own 
research efforts. In practice, these issues have often been reduced to the following 
two imperatives: Improving the absorptive capacity of non-scientists, and providing 
scientists with adequate resources and autonomy, to enable them to carry out the 
research they themselves see as pertinent.  
This is the essence of what we call the “linear model” thinking about the 
relationship between science and productive activities in society (be it in business or 
in public service provision). This way of thinking has been very important also in 
Norway in the post-World War II period, but it has not ruled the ground alone. The 
objective of the present paper is to show how “linear thinking” has paved the way for 
a specific structuring of the Norwegian institutional system of innovation, and 
furthermore, to direct attention to a quite recent institutional innovation that 
represents an alternative approach, but also, in a certain sense, a return to the past.  
Making our argument, we in the following start out with a brief detour into 
innovation theory. We deal with some of the complexities of coupling science and 
research, technology and business activities. The focus is set upon the opposition 
between a linear conceptualization of the science-technology-industry relationship 
and another, systemic approach. We pay specific attention to implicit assumptions 
about social relations, and show how the “linear model” implicitly builds on specific 
ideas about such relations, in a way that the systemic approach does not.  
After this theoretical discussion, we turn our attention towards policy. We 
characterize the institutional system of innovation as it has been developed in 
Norway, through the interplay of major policy areas such as national economy, 
industry, energy, defence, etc. We explain how the innovation system was structured 
at the outset, with a military research establishment (the Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment; NDRE), and a civilian research council (the Royal 
Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; NTNF) as the two main 
pillars. We point out how systems thinking came to influence this original 
institutional set-up, and go on to contrast this with later developments. We highlight 
how the establishment of a singular research council in 1993, the Research Council of 
Norway (RCN), completed a transformation of the institutional system of innovation, 
and argue that the new system distributed authority and power among participants in 
innovation oriented, publically funded research and development efforts in another 
way than the system had done earlier. 
Was there “a baby in the bathwater” that ought not to have been thrown out when 
the earlier system was dismantled? At the time, there were dire warnings about 
merging the financing of innovation oriented industrial research activities with the 
other financing schemes of the more academically oriented research councils into the 
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RCN. In spite of this, and even though the new research council would develop it’s 
own thematic and strategic programmes, the principle of shaping funding schemes 
and programmes on the basis of industrial sectors and divisions was abandoned. 
Moreover, the ‘modus operandi’ that had been established in the NTNF, in which 
decisions were taken in a business-like and decentralized manner, could not remain 
the same in the RCN, where formal procedures, impartiality, and peer review based 
evaluation of scientific merit formed basic elements of the new order. 
More than 50 years after the establishing of the first national research council, the 
NTNF, and nearly 10 years after the council’s demise, another national research 
financing agency was established that resembled its predecessor NTNF in some 
significant ways. As will be described in more detail later, the industrial research and 
development fund that a small group of politicians were instrumental in creating at 
the turn of the millennium, was set up as a strategic agency specifically for the 
fisheries and aquaculture industry. Its mission was to create industrial development 
and growth by way of strategic funding of scientific research and technological 
development. The fund was meant to achieve this goal by establishing close 
collaborative relations between businessmen, technologists and scientists. In spite of 
the heterogeneity of their members, also in terms culture and social status, these 
developmental constellations were to realize genuine interactive learning. 
In a quite peculiar way, then, the Post War approach to funding of collaborative 
R&D embodied by the NTNF was to survive in the sector of fisheries and 
aquaculture. The Ministry of fisheries and coastal affairs in this way became the 
home of an institution which had as its primary focus the promoting of industrial 
development by way of strategic and applied research and development (R&D). We 
believe there are important lessons to be learnt from the fund and the reasons for its 
establishment. Hence, we analyze both the raison d’être and the modus operandi of 
the fund.  
In the concluding section, we use the results of the earlier theoretical and 
empirical analysis to draw conclusions concerning Norwegian innovation policy and 
the overall structuring of the institutional system for innovation in Norway. We point 
out how the new research fund has been built on an important insight regarding the 
nature of innovation efforts. We conclude that the interaction of firms and research 
groups within well defined industry specialties can be said to reflect a ‘Nordic design’ 
in innovation policy, as it builds on egalitarian principles and reflects a kind of small-
firm industrial organisation that may be specific for Nordic countries.  
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The non-hierarchical systems approach to innovation 
A key point that has been made repeatedly in the literature on innovation is that 
research and development in itself does neither result in business success, industrial 
development, nor economic growth. Scientific and technological efforts have to be 
coupled with specific value creation activities in productive ways (Lundvall 1992; 
Edquist 1997; Malerba 2004). That is to say, novelty must be developed in a context 
where scientific interests are balanced with practically oriented strategic and 
economic interests (Acha, Marsili et al. 2004), and where efforts to change business 
activities at one point in a value chain are matched by changes along other points in 
the same value chain. 
Kaufmann and Tödtling (2001) argue that innovation systems analysis should 
exploit a more subtle systems concept and focus on self-organisation. Both Van de 
Ven’s process perspective on innovation (Van de Ven, Angle et al. 1989; Van de 
Ven, Polley et al. 1999) and social constructivist ideas about innovation as the 
construction of heterogeneous networks (Rip, Callon et al. 1986; Latour 1987; Bijker, 
Hughes et al. 1989; Bijker and Law 1992) can be used for this purpose. Also Niklas 
Luhmann’s idea that communication is the constituting element of social systems 
may be employed, so that innovation systems be defined as  
 
“that web of communication emanating from and relevant for an emerging 
developmental constellation of heterogeneous actors making efforts to realize a set 
of related ideas about a possible future state of affairs.” (Orstavik 2008).  
 
As such, innovation systems bridge micro and macro phenomena, constituting 
arenas for the structuration processes where reflexivity and ‘structuration’ – in 
Giddens’ sense – are crucial aspects of the dynamics (Giddens 1979; Giddens 1984). 
In this way, it also becomes obvious that innovation systems are not “clockworks” in 
which movement of parts are mechanically conditioned, predictable and available for 
exact measurements. 
Innovation happens in developmental constellations in which action to some 
extent is coordinated, but not programmed in detail (Van de Ven, Angle et al. 1989; 
Breschi and Malerba 1997; Van de Ven, Polley et al. 1999; Malerba 2002; Acha, 
Marsili et al. 2004; Malerba 2004). The ‘resultant force’ of individual efforts will 
have a certain magnitude and a direction, but will be composed of forces acting in 
diverse fields and in multiple directions. For example, when we focus on innovation 
in business, the intended aggregate effect over time is change in value creation 
processes and their results (product and process innovation). Changes are co-
produced along value chains (Hippel 1988; Hippel 2005), and are diverse at different 
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places, but functionally complementary. The set of significant actors is heterogeneous 
and marked by significant complementarities (Levinthal 2000).  
In the literature on innovation systems, whether the focus is set on sectoral 
systems (Malerba 2004; Breschi and Malerba 2005), regional systems (Cooke 2002; 
Cooke, Heidenreich et al. 2004) or national systems (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; 
Nelson 1993; Freeman 1995; Lundvall 1999; Lundvall, Johnson et al. 2002; Nelson 
and Nelson 2002), authors fundamentally conceive of innovation systems in a 
structuralist manner; as institutional and organizational structures influencing the 
actions of individuals and firms. In contrast to this, unless we in this paper explicitly 
refer to institutional systems of innovation, we define innovation systems differently. 
They are not institutional or organizational structures, nor are they simply aggregates 
of individual action.9 Rather, systems of innovation are webs of communication 
evolving around complexes of actions which are goal directed and reflexively 
coordinated. Coordination is not in principle hierarchical nor monolithic, but 
distributed and interactive. Strictly speaking, the innovation systems we are interested 
in are self-organized10 webs of communication - related to ongoing activities to 
produce a desired future state of affairs.11  
A specific issue that deserves closer scrutiny is the balance of power between 
actors playing their respective roles in innovation systems. How are productive 
developmental constellations composed? In what way and by what kind of 
mechanisms can sufficient coordination be achieved? What is the nature of effective 
use of power in the system of innovation? How is the distribution of power related to 
the effectiveness of innovation efforts, and in what way is it related to the direction 
and the content of the efforts? And of specific interest in this paper: How can and 
should policies and policy tools reflect social relations and power in their design and 
their operations? 
                                                 
9 In this text, we do not distinguish organizations and institutions, in the way proposed by Edquist. For 
example, in line with everyday language, we may use the terms government agencies and public 
institutions to denote the same organizations. We are aware, however, that the term institutions also 
can be used to denote normative structures and conventions. 
10 We here try to use the term self-organisation in the same sense as Luhmann, as Autopoiesis. That the 
system of communication is self-organized does not imply that there are no structural constraints on 
what happens, but that the intelligence in this system is distributed, and that no single actor can control 
the specific outcome of interactions. 
11 We use the term innovation system rather than innovation process, to underline that we are not 
simply interested in ‘development histories’, or the unfolding of events that are causally and 
chronologically related. We are concerned with understanding in what way innovation happens under 
varying conditions, in diverse countries, regions, sectors, etc. How can systemic relations be 
understood in relation to the specific conditions that an evolving innovation system are faced with? 
Institutions on the national and sectoral level may be important, as may technological specificities, 
industry sector conditions, etc. However, the analytical observation point, the ‘unit of analysis’ is the 
innovation system itself. 
 64 
In the developmental constellation underlying an innovation system, member 
organisations may not necessarily belong to the same value chain, and will often 
encompass other types of entities than commercial firms. They may be firms that are 
outside the value chain, or other types of organisations, such as research institutes, 
nongovernmental organisations, government agencies, etc. These actors have 
resources that make them into useful resources in the innovation effort. However, 
they usually have widely different overall competences, production activities and 
missions. 
Faced with this kind of heterogeneity, the questions concerning coordination and 
the nature of social relations in a developmental constellation become critical. 
Communication across organisational borders of firms in diverse parts of production 
system (along the value chain) will often be problematic, as firms’ ‘realities’ and 
immediate goals are different.12 For actors belonging to entirely difference sectors of 
society, this challenge is still greater. Even the long term goals of each partner may 
not be consistent with the goal of promoting the development of valuecreation 
activities of the commercial firms in the developmental constellation, and may be 
only loosely related to the strengthening of the value chain that the firms are playing a 
part in. How, then, should adequate coordination be achieved? Who are to decide on 
project goals and development strategies? How should relations between actors be 
constructed, and how should disputes be settled? How can the necessary element self-
organization in the innovation system be achieved?  
The issue we here touch upon, and which obviously has been subjected to a lot of 
research since Burns and Stalker in 1961 first published their landmark contribution 
to the study of management of innovation (Burns and Stalker 1995), is crucial not 
only for innovators playing a role and investing resources in innovation. It is also of 
great importance to scientists and research institutions playing their part in such 
efforts. And it is a very significant issue for policy makers and government agencies 
endowed with responsibilities to promote science and to foster commercially 
successful innovation.  
The science-bias in the institutional system of innovation in Norway 
Our theoretical argument so far has served to substantiate the following claims:  
• In order to achieve innovation – or in more general terms, social and economic 
change – basic science alone is not enough to ‘deliver the goods’.  
                                                 
12 For example, a bakery and a mill may be highly dependant on each other, but may still have 
completely different production systems and core competencies. Developing a new baked product may 
presuppose changes in the way flour is produced, and although changes in the bakery and in the flour 
producer’s production systems are needed, change efforts may be very different and may depend on 
learning in interaction in completely different contexts. 
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• It is only in the constructive interplay of diverse types of actors and activities 
that successful innovation can be achieved. 
• This interplay, and the necessary coordination and consistency of actions, is 
not easy to realize, at is depends on communication and matching of ideas and 
interests of a heterogeneous set of actors.  
Scientists in basic research, and in almost all research carried out with the 
primary objective of contributing to the stock of scientific knowledge, are usually 
quite detached from specific production systems for goods and services. And 
scientists will be subjected to different framework conditions than people both in 
commercial firms and in public service provision organisations. Both availability of 
resources, time horizon in demands for producing tangible results, as well as basic 
success criteria tend to be different. All this may lead the research institution (or even 
a specialized corporate research group) to play an auxiliary role with respect to the 
activities in the commercial operations of firms (or service providing organizations) 
in a developmental constellation.  
For Norwegian policy makers, a most important lesson from the research and 
development experience of the war was that scientists and engineers – even in a class 
society such as the British – under the duress of war had been able to work together 
effectively, coupling practical engineering knowledge of technology with advanced 
academic science. When Norwegian science was to rise from the ashes of war, this 
kind of collaboration was considered to be essential (Ørstavik 1994). The question 
how it could be realized was clearly not approached as a theme for academic 
research. This was seen as a practical and political problem in which 
institutionbuilding and technological systembuilding became intertwined aspects. In 
the defence sector, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) since its 
establishment in 1945 came to form a key bridgehead, bringing the US and Norway 
closer together in military, technological and scientific matters (Ørstavik 1989). In the 
civilian sphere, the NTNF (Norges Teknisk Naturvitenskapelige Forskningsråd; the 
Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research) was established in 
1946 with the explicit aim of promoting scientific research and “to ensure that the 
results obtained were used to the benefit of the industries of the country” (Barlaup 
1956). 
In this way, both the military and the civilian sector received important inputs 
from people having taken part in the war research effort. The coupling of industrial 
and scientific concerns was essential, and organization and institution building were 
recognized as crucial issues. This was the case for people inside and close to both the 
NDRE and the NTNF. Both institutions were eager to promote growth, but it was the 
NTNF that was in a position to devote significant national resources to a systematic 
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expansion of the general research system, as well as to promoting the development of 
more science based civilian industry. Put in modern terms, NTNF saw it as its key 
task to contribute to the growth of a national system of innovation in Norway. The 
council became instrumental in promoting the emergence of a sector of publically 
funded, industrially oriented research institutes. A number of such institutes were 
established under the auspices of the council, and came to form an ‘institute sector’ 
endowed with responsibility for and receiving public funding for undertaking a 
substantial part of the total industrial R&D performed in Norway (Kaloudis and Koch 
2004).  
What is of particular interest here is a certain symmetry in the thinking about the 
domains of science, technology and industry in the two institutions. First, these 
domains were all seen as important for the overall political effort of rebuilding 
Norway, and in developing the country as a modern welfare state. Second, the way of 
thinking about development and change was systems-oriented; it was seen as 
essential to make the leading men from these diverse spheres work actively together, 
to realize national goals. The leading men of the period were, and to some extent also 
saw themselves as, strategic builders of a modern Norwegian nationstate (Ørstavik 
1990; Slagstad 1998).  
The NTNF became an arena where representatives of industrial firms and 
scientists from research laboratories met and where they obtained support for 
establishing common research and development projects. Activities were based on 
industrial realities; industries and emerging technology areas with great potential for 
industrialization and commercialization provided the basic dividing lines in the 
structuring of fields of activity. But NTNF found no simple and uncontroversial way 
to promote innovation by productive coupling of science and business. In fact, the 
NTNF system over time came to be heavily criticized as being both ineffective and 
unfair. In the end, the NTNF structure was dismantled, and resources were merged 
with resources from other research councils, into a new Research Council of Norway 
(RCN). The family of NTNF institutes had at this point in time already been 
repositioned institutionally and legally, as independent, non-profit contract research 
institutes. 
Clearly, the RCN establishment could not erase completely the pattern of sector-
based organisation in the Norwegian institutional system of innovation as a whole. 
The organization of the public system for funding R&D based on industries and 
technological areas survived under the auspices of various ministries, most 
importantly under the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (OED) and the Ministry of 
Defence (FD), but also under the Ministry of agriculture (LD) and the Ministry of 
Fisheries (FKD). All these ministries maintained their own research financing 
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schemes, and remained sponsors of selected research institutions. These parts of the 
Norwegian institutional system of innovation were largely shielded from the 
restructuring going on and could also in a certain degree continue to be shielded for 
some of the competition that other actors in the research and innovation system 
increasingly were being exposed to. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Norwegian system of education, research and innovation13 
The institutional system of innovation in Norway is illustrated in figure 1. We 
here show how government ministries fund and coordinate actions of agencies in the 
public sector. It is important to note, however, that such agencies often retain 
considerable autonomy. On the other hand, the Research Council of Norway (RCN) 
which is formally endowed with a central co-ordinating role of research and in 
                                                 
13 Source: Norges forskningsråd (2007). Det norske forsknings- og innovasjonssystemet. Statistikk og 
indikatorer 2007. Oslo, Norges forskningsråd. The illustration was developed for Indikatorrapporten 
2007 by the author of the present paper. 
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principle covers all research fields except defence, have a limited ability to act in this 
role, as ministries insist on keeping part of the research portfolio out of the hands of 
the council.  
The RCN is intended to deal with both basic and more applied research, as well 
as development and innovation oriented activities in industry and other value creating 
enterprises, such as in the public system of non-profit service provisioning. In the 
innovation field, RCN collaborates with Innovation Norway, the main public agency 
set up to promote entrepreneurs, newly-founded and small and medium-sized 
enterprises, as well as with the Industrial Development Corporation of Norway 
(SIVA). This is a public enterprise set up to improve the national infrastructure for 
innovation, which in practice means that the institution owns and maintains premises 
that is leased out to newly established firms, entrepreneurial research spin-offs, etc.14 
As we have seen, the involvement of business interests, government and research 
institutions was an explicit goal in the first decades after the war, and was obvious 
both in the case of the NDRE and the NTNF. The preference was to select certain 
large firms, and to deal with them as industrial locomotives. Such firms would 
usually have at least in part public ownership. However, the years around 1980 stand 
out as a political turning point. At this time even the leading strategists in Labour 
found that there was a need for paying increased attention to the dividing lines 
between business and government. As part of a broad reorientation, the NTNF model 
in science and R&D policy was phased out, and the new, singular research council 
was created (Ørstavik 1999; Skoie 2005).  
Also in the RCN, as earlier in the NTNF, relevance for business is emphasised in 
the rhetoric. But statistics show that the actual funding of R&D from public sources 
has been directed overwhelmingly to public and to independent, non-profit research 
institutions with origins in the public sector. Only 5% of RCN funding went directly 
to the industrial sector in 2003 (The Research Council of Norway 2006). This raises 
the question how RCN funding instruments are designed and how effective they are 
in promoting business relevant effects. The Technopolis evaluation of the RCN 
(Arnold et al. 2001) argues that evaluation is underutilized in the council, and in 
general, that the issues concerning design of funding instruments and their effects is 
an issue that only to a limited extent has been subjected to systematic analysis. 
However, Hervik and colleagues (2006) have been commissioned to evaluate the 
impacts of RCN-funded research over so-called user-directed programmes, and have 
attempted to make quantitative estimations of the effects of such projects. Also, NIFU 
                                                 
14 SIVA and the other public institutions set up to promote and direct innovation in Norway are 
described more fully in chapter 4 in Spilling (ed.) (2007).  
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STEP has produced an overview over innovation policy tools that have been applied 
in Norway (Norges forskningsråd 2002).  
It might be considered self-evident and a consequence of the basic rationale for 
the RCN, that it is science and the advance of scientific knowledge that is the key 
priority in the RCN, and not business innovation. The role of the council is to support 
science, not business. This is why it is the case that even in explicitly innovation 
oriented programmes, research institutes and academic institutions in most cases are 
an obligatory point of passage as developmental constellations are set up. What this 
boils down to is that in settings where science and business are set to produce 
innovative results together, it is usually the scientists that are positioned to play the 
lead role. We do not disparage this as simply wrong, as there are obviously good 
reasons to support and protect the capacity for basic science. However, we want to 
point out that with respect to business innovation, and in particular what regards the 
very challenging problem of integrating scientific research and value creation efforts 
in specific production and service provision systems, and where a main challenge is 
to secure the functioning of self-organized developmental constellations, this way of 
prioritizing has significant effects. Instead of focusing attention on establishing 
balanced developmental constellations spanning science and business, scientists are 
systematically put in a position to make the significant decisions about what to do and 
not to do. Hence, development constellations spanning science and business tend to 
become small and hierarchical administrative structures, rather than self-organised, 
evolving constellations of actors.  
The establishment of the RCN was contested by some influential observers. From 
the side of industry, the sectoral interests of fisheries and aquaculture were among the 
most vocal opponents. The conviction in the industry, as well as in the Ministry of 
fisheries, was that such a research council would counter the efforts that had already 
been made in this sector, to couple industry interests and research in a productive 
way. A specialized, small research council for fisheries and aquaculture had been 
operative in Trondheim since 1972 (Norges Fiskeriforskningsråd, NFFR), and 
represented an important area for the close coupling of research and industry interests 
in the sector. The success of a long lasting efforts to establish an adequate research 
financing regime, closer to business and with sufficient distance to government, was 
threatened by the establishment of the RCN in Oslo (Ørstavik 2006).  
A specialized R&D fund for fisheries and aquaculture 
In the political processes leading up to the establishment of the RCN, the need for 
consensus led to an internal organization of the council which emphasised continuity 
and gave room for internal heterogeneity. In spite of such concessions being made to 
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existing practices, the Ministry of fisheries (today the Ministry for fisheries and 
coastal affairs) could not accept the solution that was found. This was the only 
ministry remaining opposed to the establishment of the new council (Arnold, 
Kuhlmann et al. 2001). This ministry and the key organisations of the fisheries and 
aquaculture sector, and also research performing organisations in the field, were 
convinced that the disadvantages of dismantling the sector research council in 
Trondheim in no way could balanced by the potential benefits that the RCN in Oslo 
could bring (Skoie 2005).  
Fisheries and aquaculture is a large and important industry in Norway. It is the 
biggest export industry after petroleum. During the 1990ies, the industry experienced 
serious difficulties. Both aquaculture and traditional fisheries were marked by 
decreasing employment, stagnating markets and mounting losses. There was broad 
agreement that corrective policy measures ought to be implemented. The level of 
internal conflict had to be reduced. It would be in the common interest to work 
together to achieve new growth. The conviction was that technological development 
and innovation had to be placed centre stage, and that a research and development 
promoting agency ought to be set up outside of the new, national research council.15  
The new research fund became fully operative January 1, 2001. The fund was 
established in spite of resistance from the RCN, and even if the fund stood out as an 
anomaly in policy terms. After all, this was a period when emphasis had been on 
reducing the number of funding institutions, and to promote central coordination and 
consistency in the public funding system for science and innovation. The fund was to 
be fully financed by way of a small export tax, levied on exporters of fish and 
seafood.   
It is quite obvious how the mission of the fund was associated with the belief in 
the long term potential of creative synthesis between heterogeneous actors and 
activities: It was the long term health of the fisheries sector that was at stake, after a 
period when farming of fish had emerged as an alternative production paradigm, 
creating multiple and significant strains in the business strategies, organizational 
setup, and system of governance in the marine sector. The idea was to establish a pool 
of common resources to establish learning and development activities that could 
counter tendencies to infighting, and that over time could reintegrate the different 
parts of the industry. And it is equally obvious that there was no linear model 
thinking behind the establishment of the new fund: Here, industry would have 
significant control over priorities and strategies. Scientists would be invited to take 
part in joint efforts to create progress, but in a contributing rather than in a leading 
role.  
                                                 
15 The main reference to the history about the fund is Ørstavik (2006). 
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In the recent study of the FHF, it’s ’raison d’être’ was summarized in the 
following way (Ørstavik 2006, 173ff): 
• The FHF was intended as a catalyst for R&D activities that could help develop 
the industry, by strengthening knowledge bases, increase competence in firms 
as well as the industry’s competitiveness internationally. 
• The fund should act strategically and long-term in order to develop the whole 
industry and the capacity for research and development with relevance for the 
industry, both in firms and in research institutions. 
• The fund should contribute to the initiation of long-term, strategic activities 
also in new areas and in areas that cut across existing dividing lines (such as 
between traditional fisheries, aquaculture and processing industry; between 
farming and supplier industries; between aquaculture and agriculture, etc.)  
• The FHF was to be a small, dynamic agency that should collaborate with other 
institutions funding research and innovation, such as the RCN and Innovation 
Norway. 
The study concluded that during its first five years of operation, the fund fulfilled 
its role according to the framework that had been set up for it. By integrating the fund 
closely with the organisations of the industry, one kept research and development as 
close as possible to business operations, and kept a strong focus on innovation and 
business development. The FHF remained small relative to the total public 
expenditures on R&D in Norway. For example in 2003, which was a quite normal 
year, total R&D funds of nearly 79 millions NOK allocated by FHF amounted to less 
than 5 percent of total R&D expenditures only in the marine sector that year.  
The FHF has a small administration, and a board whose members are proposed 
by the main industry associations and formally appointed by the Ministry of fisheries 
and coastal affairs. The major “rival” institutions in the public system for R&D – the 
Research Council of Norway and Innovation Norway, as well as the Ministry, each 
have one representative acting as observers in the board. 
The most important characteristic of the way the fund operates, is that 
‘intelligence is distributed’. The fund does not operate in a conventional, top-down 
manner. For example, the FHF does not receive applications. Rather, it is the fund 
itself that is responsible for conceiving and establishing projects. Programmes and 
projects are generated in a dialogue with interested parties. In this context, the 
aquaculture industry association (Fiskeri- og havbruksnæringens landsforening; 
FHL) has played a particularly important role, as it has been the host of a number of 
working groups (so-called fora) in specific fields, where representatives of industry 
and FHL meet to discuss common problems and challenges, and develop plans and 
activities related to R&D and business development.  
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Figure 2: The integration of FHF with FHL 
At the outset of the fund’s operations, it was important to realize that most firms 
in fisheries and aquaculture were small, and for the FHF a key priority is to recruit 
businesses into R&D activities. This mobilization of firms could not routinely be 
done by the board or administration of FHF, but had to be taken care of by the 
industry associations Fiskeri- og havbruksnæringens landsforening, FHL 
(aquaculture) and Norges Fiskarlag (traditional fisheries). In the case of FHL, some 
such structures were already in place, and a nearly seamless integration between the 
fund and the organisations developed, as is illustrated in figure 2. Communication 
with commercial firms in the different parts of the industry was handled by the 
regional offices of these organizations.  
It has been typical for the sector that activities are both regionally clustered and 
specific with respect to what species are being taxed, and what kind of processing is 
taking place.16 On this basis, an important part of FHF-activities have been handled 
by specific working groups (“fora”). Such groups form a local arena in which firms 
                                                 
16 For example, stock-fish is produced by a relatively small number of firms concentrated in Lofoten, 
while the Ålesund area is the centre for the production of salt cod (clip-fish). 
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can develop common projects. The working group develops its own strategic 
development plans, but has to consider also the overall strategic plans of FHF in order 
to be sure to receive the desired R&D funding. When successful, the forum is an 
effective arena for inter-firm communication, and also for establishing effective 
communicative links to academic- and institute researchers that possess relevant 
knowledge and competence.  
In the course of the 2006 study a number of in-depth interviews were undertaken 
with people from the industry, research institutions, the organizations, and from 
government. It was found that the opinions were divided on the FHF modus operandi. 
There was disagreement both with respect to the way new projects were established, 
and concerning the way projects were carried out. A main dividing line was between 
representatives of science and research, and representatives of industry. Most 
researchers expressed frustration with what they characterized as the FHF way. The 
crux of their argument was that FHF was overly concerned with short term business 
issues and not enough concerned with research and long term strategic goals. The 
fund was seen much more as a development fund than as a fund for scientific 
research, and lacking in its competence to handle scientific research projects. 
Furthermore, nearly all of the researchers we talked to complained that 
decisionmaking lacked in transparency, and that the ability of researchers to compete 
on scientific merit was extremely limited. In contrast, businesses representatives were 
expressing satisfaction that the fund was the industry’s own fund, and that the 
industry could actually influence in a significant way the activities financed by the 
fund, including the research and development activities undertaken by scientists.  
The industry representatives positive feelings towards the fund as being the 
industry’s own R&D fund was confirmed by empirical data from two surveys that 
were undertaken in order to gauge with some more accuracy “user perceptions” in the 
industry of the fund itself and of the results obtained in the R&D activities that had 
been funded. In one survey, respondents that had taken part in innovation oriented 
FHF-projects were asked about the fund’s operations. Some of the results were the 
following:  
• There was a general and almost unequivocal agreement that the organisational 
involvement in FHF had been productive and that this involvement ought to be 
continued.  
• There was agreement that the FHF system is able to set up productive 
development constellations, and that FHF projects are oriented towards the 
promoting of industry, and not simply the promoting of selected firms.  
• Respondents were less certain regarding to what extent project ought to be 
more practical and hands on than they are.  
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• Similarly, respondents were less certain about the scientific content of 
projects, although most were satisfied and very few respondents would claim 
that scientific content was insufficient.  
• Also, few respondents would agree with scientists that projects ought to be 
more long term and ambitious.  
Project participants were furthermore asked what they thought about FHF-
projects compared with RCN projects. It was found that very few of the respondents 
could report on actual involvement both in FHF-financed and in RCN-financed R&D 
projects, but respondents still thought that FHF projects typically are more relevant 
for the industry and for participating firms, more oriented towards market needs, and 
easier for firms to handle administratively. 
In line with what has been said earlier, it is not surprising to find that there is a 
cultural divide between research (academic science) and commercial operations 
(business). There is an unbalance between the two domains, as people from the 
regions and from small and medium sized businesses are perceived as less resourceful 
and in a weaker position, than trained, and in many ways privileged, scientists and 
researchers. Drawing on the theoretical elements laid out in section 2, we see that the 
FHF by using fora and by taking control over the development efforts, effectively 
forces researchers and research institutions to take seriously the need to learn about 
business and to understand the dynamics and strategies of business development. 
Interestingly, faced with the demands of business relevance from the FHF system, the 
crucial “sales argument” we heard from the various research establishments during 
our in-depth interviews went like this: No other research institute understands this 
particular business sector as well as we do.  
What this means, is that research efforts are directed in such a way that they 
contribute actively to development efforts as these are defined by business, in a 
language that is understood by business, and with input from other parties playing 
contributing roles, such as researchers and people and organisations in supplier 
industries.  
In this way, researchers are coupled into innovation systems where the business 
firms play a decisive role in creating conditions for coordinated action along value 
chains, and in coupling these efforts to knowledge development efforts in the 
scientific realm. In this way, a big problem in the academia-business collaboration is 
moved over from the commercial side to research, namely the task to connect 
ongoing project efforts into the larger innovation systems that are of strategic 
significance for the research institution and the researchers themselves. What this 
means is that researchers have to seek out relevant scientific efforts that they 
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themselves can relate to and contribute to, at the same time as efforts go on to stay 
connected in a productive way in the innovation system on the commercial side. 
But do the developmental constellation constructed in this way become 
measurably more productive? On this, the 2006 study reported the following:  
• Most project participants thought that the project had positive effects on their 
firm’s collaboration with R&D institutions.  
• Effects in terms of R&D collaboration with other firms were seen as much 
weaker, indicating that also in FHF projects, the important learning 
relationship is between the researchers (which receive the FHF-funding) and 
the firm, while the relationship to other partners in development constellations 
are much weaker.  
• About two thirds of respondents credited the project with having led to new 
R&D activity in the firm, while it was almost unequivocally the judgement of 
participants that project related R&D activities had come in addition to and not 
instead of other R&D efforts. 
• More than half of respondents expected significant positive economic effects 
in the future, whilst some one third reported significant economic effects so 
far. Few expected that the project would lead to reduced costs or to increased 
employment.  
• Three out of four of respondents praised the project overall as having had 
significant positive effect on the industry. Technological capacity, 
collaboration and international position were the more specific aspects that 
were seen as the areas were the project had its most significant positive 
effects.  
The overall conclusions we wish to highlight are, first, that measuring of effects 
is difficult, and that conclusive results would presuppose a different and more costly 
research design than what was feasible in the 2006 study. Second, we will point out 
that the results that were obtained can be interpreted as confirming how difficult it 
actually is to establish productive developmental constellations in which the joint 
efforts of science and business pay off for both parties. Third, we would emphasise 
that the FHF obtained the best results in terms of innovation in settings were local 
firms and research groups could work over time to develop more advanced topics for 
research and further development on the basis of ongoing, commercially viable 
industrial activities. For instance in the production of stockfish, the improvement of 
production processes led to considerable economic gains for producers, and at the 
same time led to pioneering research work and peer review publications in marine 
biology.  
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Conclusions and policy implications 
We have in this paper considered the significance of social relations in efforts to 
establish productive coupling of science and business. In directing attention towards 
heterogeneity and towards the creative potentials in countering the tendency that only 
birds of feather flock together, our theoretical perspective on innovation has made the 
question about the social relations of the business science interface reappear in a new 
form. 
Throughout the post World War II period, the “linear model” thinking has played 
an important role in regulating the science – business interface in many countries, and 
also in Norway. The extensive institutional system of public research and education 
that is operative in developed countries – constituting the organisational body of 
modern science – has been seen as an autonomous and exogenous force with respect 
to business development. Hence, in the general opinion, and apparently in the opinion 
of many scientists themselves, research and scientific knowledge make up 
fundamental drivers, of economic development, growth and social change.  
The point we have made here is that this thinking is reflected in the structure of 
the national system of innovation in Norway. We have shown that administrative, 
hierarchical top-down control is intended to be an important part of the institutional 
setup, but that the private business system plays a limited role. It has been impossible 
in this paper to show the subtlety and the complexity of power that exist between 
different actors in the system, and how important state ownership and ministry 
control over R&D and business sector development actually is.  
What we have concentrated our efforts on, is to show how the structuring of the 
innovation system in the pioneering post-war period was marked by systems thinking, 
and how the systemic approach gradually was forced on the defensive. We have 
argued that the Research Council of Norway in spite of its obvious efforts to promote 
innovation, fundamentally reflects a concern with promoting science and scientific 
autonomy, and that the concern with specific innovation initiatives cannot but be 
considered a secondary concern for the Council’s efforts.  
We have furthermore contrasted the RCN with the new fund for R&D in the 
sector of fisheries and aquaculture, the FHF, and have stressed the systemic 
orientation underlying the efforts of this fund. We have shown how social (and 
scientific) status has limited significance in the developmental constellations set up 
by the fund, and why this should be considered an important fact. The learning 
processes that are established in successful developmental constellations are 
genuinely interactive and lead to combinations of scientific and business learning that 
otherwise are hard to obtain. 
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When successful, the FHF establishes arenas for business – research interaction 
that at the outset is more in line with business needs than with the immediate needs of 
researchers. In this way, FHF is contributing effectively to the R&D efforts and 
innovation in the firms that are involved in FHF-projects. Over time, the fund 
contributes also to learning in the research institutions, as it forces researchers to take 
business innovation and development strategies of competitive business firms 
seriously. Researchers have to learn the language of business, and for this reason, we 
could claim that FHF actually reverse the concern with absorptive capacity which is 
otherwise so common in the Norwegian institutional system of innovation. To 
compete for FHF-funds researchers must not primarily argue their own scientific 
excellence, but must argue for their own absorptive capacity regarding challenges 
facing business.  
Certainly, the systems approach promoted by the FHF is not without weaknesses 
and dangers. It is interesting that the successful innovation efforts of the fund tend to 
involve small firms in local settings. Larger firms and big business seem not to fit 
easily into the FHF mould, which is based on the active involvement of industry 
associations and the willingness of firms to consider industry interests as important 
and legitimate concerns, beside the specific firm’s own interests. Also, the 
particularity of this co-operative orientation of Norwegian business may indicate that 
the FHF as an innovation policy tool reflects Norwegian, or Nordic, traits, making it 
of less immediate relevance for policy makers in other countries.  
Finally, with its orientation towards industry and industry’s strategic needs, the 
FHF may not be an effective tool for promoting science. In the projects funded by 
FHF, safeguarding the quality of scientific knowledge production, and making sure 
scientific efforts are considered relevant in a scientific community, is the sole 
responsibility of researchers themselves. This certainly is no trivial task, and 
commercially related research efforts will easily lose scientific attractiveness, as 
scientists involved perceive the risk of losing standing in their own professional 
community. The FHF may effectively force researchers into roles as consultants 
rather than researchers, and may risk ending up at the same time exploiting and 
undermining the scientific standing of involved scientists and research groups.  
In conclusion, the FHF reflects its predecessor NTNF in some important ways, 
and there certainly was a baby in the bathwater when the NTNF system was 
dismantled. The industry orientation of FHF and NTNF is important and useful, but 
working out how this approach should be implemented in a good way remains a 
challenge. Certainly, the institutional system of innovation as a whole benefits from a 
strong and vital system of science. Hence, the conclusion can not be that the industrial 
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approach to innovation is the whole answer to the broad challenge of innovation 
policy, only that it is an important part of the answer.  
The overall system of education, science and innovation in Norway is currently 
under intense debate, and in a process of transformation. In this picture, where 
amongst other things the dividing lines between universities, university colleges and 
institutes are being challenged, where the dual role of government in business is again 
being brought up in the debate, and where Norway’s positioning in an ever more 
globalized world is at stake, moving beyond a simplistic, linear understanding of the 
role of science is critical.     
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The relationship between a university and its technology 
transfer office: the case of NTNU in Norway 
Magnus Gulbrandsen 
Abstract 
This paper asks how the relationship between a university’s central administration and its 
technology transfer office (TTO) affects the way the TTO operates and performs. The case is 
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, which set up a TTO after 
legislative changes in Norway in 2003 that moved the intellectual property rights from the 
individual inventors to the higher education institutions. Principal-agent theory is used to 
guide the analysis, which centres on issues like goal conflicts, adverse selection and moral 
hazard. It is found that many of the challenges and problems that the TTO has encountered, 
may be due to how the technology transfer function was set up by the university rather than 
specific actions and decisions in the TTO. Unrealistic expectations and lack of a university 
IPR policy has probably created some problems that could have been avoided. However, the 
legislative changes themselves have been difficult to handle at a university where the old IPR 
regime was the backbone of a successful policy of entrepreneurship and industry relations. 
Introduction17 
In this paper, the main question is how the relationship between a university and its 
technology transfer office (TTO) affects the way the TTO operates and performs. 
Principal-agent theory is used to guide the analysis. The term “university” in the title 
refers primarily to the central administration and leadership of the university. 
The analysis is based on a case study of the technology transfer unit at the 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). This TTO unit was 
established in late 2003 following a legislative change concerning intellectual 
property rights and the missions of universities in Norway. NTNU – with long 
traditions for commercialisation – had high expectations to the TTO despite some 
sceptics among the academic staff. However, after a few years of operation, it was 
clear that the expected number of commercialisation would not be met; neither would 
the hope that the unit would generate enough income to support itself. The TTO had 
furthermore entered into some well-publicised conflicts with leading professors at the 
university, and concerns were raised about the unit’s activities and competences. An 
evaluation was called for in mid-2006, and this paper is based on empirical evidence 
collected during this evaluation (see Spilling et al. 2006 for the full report). Since the 
unit had only been in active operation for a little over two years, the evaluation 
                                                 
17 I would like to thank Olav Spilling, Helge Godø, Tor Borgar Hansen and Åge Mariussen for 
constructive comments, all the informants and respondents for their time and valuable insights, and 
NTNU for initiating and funding the study of its TTO. 
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emphasised organisational and developmental aspects rather than productivity and 
results, just as this paper does. 
Technology transfer offices – a short overview 
The literature on technology transfer offices has grown somewhat in recent years, 
reflecting an increase in the number of such units following changed Bayh-Dole like 
legislations in Europe and elsewhere and increased academic interest in them (EU 
2004; also Rothaermel 2007). There is probably a great variety in what these units do 
and how they are organised, which is also seen in varying names like Technology 
Licensing Office/Unit/Organisation and Industrial Liaison Office. Behind the names 
are national differences in university structure and policies, IPR legislation etc. Most 
of the units are fairly young, although there are examples of transfer offices that date 
back many decades (e.g. van Hoorebeek 2004; Mowery & Sampat 2001), showing 
that the tasks and challenges are not new. 
A technology transfer office’s core mission may be defined as moving research 
results and other ideas and technologies, most often originating at a certain higher 
education institution or public laboratory, into use (Guston 1999). Sometimes an 
outreach or liaison function is included in the unit (Jones-Evans et al. 1999) and there 
is disagreement in the literature about the role of the TTO in this respect (Rothaermel 
et al. 2007). The transfer process usually has several phases (see Hoppe & Ozdenoren 
2002), starting with disclosure of an invention to the TTO by the researcher or 
possibly an active idea search phase by the transfer unit. This is followed by an 
evaluation of the idea, where external consultants often are used. Subsequent steps 
may involve patenting, further development of the idea/invention, establishment of a 
spin-off company and/or negotiation of a license agreement. 
The TTO most often has a monopoly on commercialising ideas and technology 
from its host institution, although it has been found that faculty members are able to 
circumvent the formal TTO process in many cases or choose not to disclose their 
ideas (Jensen et al. 2003; Siegel et al. 2003). This could result in the transfer unit 
getting stuck with mediocre ideas as the best ones are commercialised through direct 
interaction between researchers and partners in industry and elsewhere (Jensen et al. 
2003). Some faculty members may think that the costs of interacting with the TTO 
are too high or are otherwise reluctant to disclose their ideas/inventions (Chapple et 
al. 2005; Owen-Smith & Powell 2001). Problematic initial experiences may lead to a 
bad reputation for the TTO, sending it into a negative spiral of reduced resources, 
staffing problems and delays as in one of Owen-Smith & Powell’s cases. Colyvas and 
colleagues (2002) found that technology transfer units’ activities may have the 
greatest importance in areas where existing university-industry linkages are weak. Of 
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course, a large number of investigations show how many commercialisation activities 
take place without the involvement of a TTO (see Mowery et al. 2004). 
A European survey of more than 1400 TTO-like organisations revealed three 
main types (EU 2004): 1) technology transfer units that are integrated as an 
administrative office in the host institution (53 percent of the cases), 2) units that have 
multiple hosts and are often part of a regional (public) infrastructure for 
commercialisation support (33 percent), and 3) units that are organised by a 
university as an independent for-profit venture (14 percent). There is a lot of variation 
in age, size, tasks and other aspects. Other studies have furthermore found large 
variations between the TTOs of a single country (e.g. Canada, see Fisher & Atkinson-
Grosjean 2002). Bercovitz et al. (2001) furthermore defined four different 
organisational structures of internal department TTOs, and find evidence (based on 
three U.S. cases) that structure is influenced by university history and related to TTO 
performance. 
Siegel et al. (2003) distinguish between three stakeholders in university-industry 
technology transfer – scientists, TTOs and firms – and they show that there are clear 
differences in the motives, incentives and organisational cultures of these groups. To 
some extent it is the TTO’s role to bridge the gap between the stakeholders (see 
Guston 1999), and Siegel and colleagues (2003:44) emphasise reward systems for 
faculty involvement, compensation and staffing practices in the TTOs and various 
actions to overcome informational and cultural barriers. The authors furthermore find 
that the three stakeholder groups are also quite heterogeneous – and that they all 
defend open and autonomous basic research. It may be added that there are major 
differences between entrepreneurial academics in how they work (Etzkowitz 1998; 
Meyer 2003). 
Most empirical investigations of TTOs look at issues like results, efficiency and 
productivity (Rothaermel et al. 2007). This also includes the speed of 
commercialisation (Jensen & Thursby 2001) and the volume of licenses and patents 
(e.g. Coupé 2003). Often the aim is to discuss some possible determinants of outputs 
like aspects of the TTO itself and its environment. A lot of explanations for variations 
in efficiency and results have been found. These are not easily comparable because of 
the large variations in national and institutional context between the transfer units that 
have been investigated. In general, the investigations find that many TTOs are not 
very efficient and/or do not create much income and other desired results (e.g. 
Chapple et al. 2005). 
Many investigations emphasise the competences and experience of the TTO staff 
(e.g. Friedman & Silberman 2003; Markman et al. 2005; Lockett & Wright 2005; 
Siegel et al. 2003). TTO staff should ideally have both academic and business skills, 
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with the demands possibly varying with technology area. Trust and good personal and 
informal relations between TTO staff and faculty members is an important part of 
universities succeeding in commercialisation (Owen-Smith & Powell 2001; Siegel et 
al. 2003), as is good linkages to industry and venture/seed capital (e.g. Agrawal 2006; 
Dill 1995; Thursby & Thursby 2004). UK and European studies have found that 
TTOs generally have a severe lack of both scientific expertise and business skills and 
capabilities (Geuna & Nesta 2003; Chapple et al. 2005). The effects of the size and 
age of the transfer unit are not clear but technological specialisation may be important 
(Chapple et al. 2005; Thursby et al. 2001; Siegel et al. 2003 and 2004). Incentives and 
organisational structure are probably also important, although the data are not 
unanimous (e.g. Debackere & Veugelers 2005; Markman et al. 2004; Siegel et al. 
2003 and 2004; see also Rothaermel et al. 2007). Several authors also point at 
external factors as explanations for variations in TTO performance, e.g. national or 
institutional incentive structures, IPR policies, R&D profile and intensity, and the 
dependency/organisational relationship between the TTO and the university (e.g. 
Bercovitz et al. 2001; Feldman et al. 2002; Jones-Evans et al. 1999, Siegel et al. 
2003). A fundamental issue seems to be a clear university mission in support of 
technology transfer and a clear internal patent/IPR regulation (Baldini et al. 2006; 
Debackere & Veugelers 2005; Dill 1995; Di Gregorio & Shane 2003; Fisher & 
Atkinson-Grosjean 2002; Friedman & Silberman 2003). Optional disclosure and 
unclear IPR policies can lead to conflicts over ownership and poor TTO performance 
(Fisher & Atkinson-Grosjean 2002). 
Guston (1999) does not emphasise economic performance and efficiency but 
rather how TTOs continuously try to demarcate science from other activities, but at 
the same time try to build bridges across the same demarcation. In this way, the TTO 
becomes a “boundary organisation” between public policy and the researchers. TTOs 
here constitute a legitimacy vehicle for the universities as well as a practical tool for 
defending basic science in a time when the demands for external relevance and 
industrial orientation may be higher than ever. A good TTO in this framework is one 
that is able to create a stable demarcation between research and commercialisation 
that pleases both researchers and policy-makers. Also other authors have emphasised 
the boundary-spanning role of TTOs (e.g. Siegel et al. 2003). 
Thus, technology transfer offices are complex organisations dealing with very 
complicated processes. Although their existence may make a difference for a 
university wanting to encourage commercialisation, few of them make a profit and 
they have been met with unrealistic expectations in many cases (cf. Lerner 2005). 
Some authors have predicted that many TTOs might be reoriented as broader service 
units or be closed down in the future (Mowery & Sampat 2001). However, the 
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literature studying economic performance and efficiency may have underestimated 
the role of TTOs in creating legitimacy for the universities as being “entrepreneurial” 
and “proactive”, or simply as a reflection on the outsiders view of what a modern 
university organisation should look like. 
Principal-agent theory and TTOs 
Principal-agent theory depict situations where one actor – the principal – hands over 
resources, often in a contractual relationship, to other actors – the agents – in order to 
reach goals that the principal cannot reach alone. A TTO can be viewed as a principal 
in the relationship with the university staff, but it can also be seen as an agent of the 
university central administration and thus as an “intermediary” (Jensen et al. 2003) or 
a “boundary organisation” doing “boundary work” (Guston 1999; also Debackere & 
Veugelers 2005). Guston (1999) states that boundary organisations “exist on the 
frontier of two relatively distinct social worlds” (p. 93) and help stabilise the 
boundary between them through various principal-agent relationships. Firms, venture 
capitalists, patent attorneys and other actors may also be viewed as agents of the 
TTO, or the technology transfer unit can be portrayed as a principal that signals the 
quality of inventions to potential licensees (Hoppe & Ozdenoren 2002). TTOs usually 
have a contract with the university administration where the rights and obligations of 
each party are specified, as well as contracts with the faculty members who disclose 
ideas. With internal type TTOs it is the university administration/leadership that 
selects contract terms for both the TTO and faculty (Jensen et al. 2003). 
The dual role is complex; the TTO must “balance the ojectives of the university, 
which owns the inventions, and the faculty, who create them” (Jensen et al. 
2003:1272). In addition, TTO staff need to be knowledgeable about how research-
based ideas and inventions get utilised in industry, and therefore both 
academic/technological, commercial and industrial competences are required. TTOs 
measure their own success with respect to the views of both faculty and university 
central administration (ibid. p. 1273). Or in Guston’s (1999) perspective, the stability 
of the boundary between the TTO and its principal/agents rests upon the transfer unit 
carrying out its task to the satisfaction of both principals and agents. It may be 
difficult for a principal to operate unless it becomes accepted by the agents, not least 
when it relies on the agents for submission/disclosure, evaluation and later 
involvement (Braun 1993). For a TTO, a key legitimisation process could be to 
generate sufficiently high revenues to demonstrate how this benefits basic research at 
the university (e.g. Guston 1999). 
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Three sets of problems for a TTO can be discussed with a principal-agent 
framework as the starting point, drawing on Guston (1996 and 1999) and van der 
Meulen (1998): 
 
• Goal conflicts: the principal and the agents can have conflicting or only partly 
overlapping goals. The TTO aims for commercialisation and sale of licenses 
and it wants to involve faculty in entrepreneurial projects, while they on the 
other hand often desire autonomy and a level of research funding that allows 
them to pursue the most interesting scientific problems. Universities also often 
work for autonomy and a high share of basic funding rather than a reliance on 
more uncertain sources. 
• Adverse selection: as a result of information asymmetry, the principal does 
not have full information about the agents. This often requires the principal to 
rely on the agents’ own judgement or actions – like disclosure in the TTO case 
– when selecting the appropriate agent. A delegation and review process is 
necessary, in which the agents are encouraged to disclose and the principal 
makes an evaluation of the ideas that have been submitted. This process does 
not come without costs, however, and it can sometimes be difficult to find 
evaluators without a close relationship to the agent. 
• Moral hazard: the delegation gives the agent an incentive not only to carry out 
the required task, but also to act in unacceptable ways. Blind trust is rarely an 
option, so monitoring activities, incentives and sanctioning opportunities often 
become central. Of course, these carry costs as well. 
Adverse selection may be discussed both with respect to the technology transfer 
office’s struggle to develop the right inventions and/or get in touch with the right 
professors in an idea search phase, and with respect to the university leadership 
choosing a TTO model. As seen above, there are many TTO models to choose from 
varying e.g. in degree of independency and centralisation. 
Two important types of moral hazard can be discussed, and the first is frequently 
mentioned in the TTO literature. This is the problem of getting faculty to disclose. As 
mentioned in the previous section, lack of disclosure is found to be a major problem 
in several studies, and authors have recommended proper incentive mechanisms to 
reduce the problem (Jensen et al. 2003; also Fisher & Atkinson-Grosjean 2002). 
Royalties for the researchers may be one option (Jensen & Thursby 2001) even 
though this reduces the possible surplus available for unrestricted use (Guston 1999). 
Second, there may be a danger that faculty who receive financial support for 
commercialisation to spend this as a normal research grant. This tendency has been 
referred to as “bootstrapping” (ibid. p. 96). 
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One should recall that adverse selection and moral hazard are not problems with a 
simple solution – they will always be present as tensions and challenges in principal-
agent relationships, but there are ways of balancing and stabilising these tensions in 
more or less costly and efficient ways. In addition, the creation of income that can be 
spent on basic research is central when it comes to creating good linkages to the 
research community. 
The aim in this paper is to expand on the literature reviewed here within a 
principal-agent framework to further explore how the relationship between the TTO 
and the university administration offers constraints and opportunities for the transfer 
unit. Although a somewhat similar approach has been followed before, there is a need 
to expand on the literature with data from outside of North America and with cases 
where technology transfer units are organised as independent organisations. 
The next section presents the case university NTNU and the national setting, 
followed by an account of the establishment of the university’s TTO. Three 
subsequent sections analyse goal conflicts/information asymmetry, adverse selection 
problems and moral hazard problems, and a short discussion/conclusion is found at 
the end. 
The case of NTNU and Norway’s legislative changes 
The Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim is the 
country’s second largest university with around 20000 students, half of them in 
natural science and engineering programmes. There are around 4300 full time staff 
equivalents, encompassing more than 2000 scientific staff of which 800 are full 
professors. NTNU was created in 1996 through a merger between the Norwegian 
Institute of Technology (the country’s major technical university established in 1910) 
and the University of Trondheim (a comprehensive university formally started in 
1968 but based on older institutions). It is still a major centre for technological 
education in Norway – 80 percent of all chartered engineers (master’s degree) are 
trained at NTNU, and almost all doctorate engineers. NTNU’s goal is to be ranked 
among the top 10 technical universities in Europe within 2020, and to be the leading 
institution nationally when it comes to technology transfer and commercialisation. 
NTNU’s total budget was around 3.8 billion NOK (approximately 480 million 
EUR) in 2007. The R&D statistics of 2005 show that the R&D expenditures at the 
university were around 1.7 billion NOK (approximately 210 million EUR). The share 
of R&D expenditures funded by industry has historically varied between 16 and 20 
percent, and the volume of industrial funding is much higher than at any other major 
higher education institution in Norway. In R&D activities, the most important partner 
is the research institute SINTEF, located close to the NTNU campus with 1800 
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employees. SINTEF was created by the technical university in 1950 as a means of 
technology transfer, and grew quickly to become one of Northern Europe’s largest 
technological contract research organisations. 
The university thus has a long prehistory of technology transfer and 
commercialisation. Staff and students at NTNU have established close to 200 
companies the last three decades, some of which have become fairly large 
multinationals like Fast Search and Transfer (purchased by Microsoft January 2008), 
GE Vingmed Ultrasound, Q-Free and Nordic VLSI. Inventions and research at the 
university have been behind important innovations in strong Norwegian industries 
like oil and gas, shipbuilding, marine harvesting and metals production. 
NTNU faculty have traditionally been able to choose many different ways of 
commercialising their ideas and research results: through direct collaboration with 
companies, through SINTEF and other applied research institutes, or through 
patenting/licensing and spin-off companies supported by a structure of incubators and 
science parks. All of these ways, given a successful commercialisation process, would 
result in financial gain for the entrepreneurs, not least the SINTEF way which could 
yield a stable extra income for the professors. Although there have been and still are 
few formal incentives for commercialisation in the Norwegian university system – 
promotions are e.g. based on academic criteria – entrepreneurship has been an 
element of NTNU culture for decades and a prestigious activity for the faculty 
members. To some extent, it has been “unmanaged and cost-free” for the university 
(see Guston 1999:93). 
Norway’s first research-oriented incubator was started close to NTNU’s main 
campus in Trondheim in 1984, with the university and its rector as the main 
protagonist. The incubator was later transformed into a regional science park/TTO-
like organisation called LEN (Leif Eiriksson Nyfotek) which has served as a partner 
for many NTNU professors. In 1997, the first Norwegian seed capital fund was set up 
in Trondheim, and it was later merged with LEN. Furthermore, SINTEF has had its 
own technology transfer unit, SINVENT, since the late 1980s. SINVENT was 
hibernating for some years but was revitalised a few years into the new millennium. 
Following a successful exit from spin-off companies and licensing income the unit 
has established two seed capital funds to support its activities. Finally, several student 
organisations related to entrepreneurship and commercialisation have been 
established, and the university has carried out entrepreneurship training and research 
since the mid-1980s. 
In 2003, the legislation concerning intellectual property rights (IPR) and the 
legislation concerning the mission of higher education institutions were changed. The 
so-called “professor’s privilege” or “teacher exemption clause” was removed, and the 
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ownership of research results was transferred from the individual scientific employees 
to the higher education institutions. At the same time, the institutions were given 
more formal obligations to ensure that research results find their way into practice. 
The legislative changes were partly inspired by the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act and followed 
the example of many other countries. Norwegian policy-makers were in particular 
influenced by similar changes in Denmark (2001) and Germany (2000). An important 
motive for the changes was, naturally, to increase the commercialisation of research 
results and to “change the culture” in the academic community. Having uniform IPR 
policies in the whole research sector – for example, there was no teacher exemption 
clause for the research institutes and the university hospitals – was another important 
motive. It can be argued that the legislative changes make the university a principal 
because it switches the ownership to research results and introduces a disclosure 
requirement. It furthermore delegates monitoring and review to the higher education 
institutions. In the old system, faculty approached other principals for funding and 
commercialisation support than their own university. 
As this section has indicated, NTNU and its “daughter institute” SINTEF had a 
remarkable history of commercialisation before the legislative changes. Not only did 
they have long traditions for working with industry, including systematic 
commercialisation activities. They were also the first institutions to set up incubators, 
seed capital, formalised entrepreneurship training and technology transfer support. A 
new TTO did not come to an unfulfilled need but rather to a strong existing support 
structure. 
Establishment of the NTNU TTO 
This section and the analysis in the rest of the paper is based on interviews, document 
analysis (reports, strategies and plans), and a web survey. 27 interviews were carried 
out: nine with NTNU TTO personnel, five with staff at other technology transfer 
organisations, four with university leaders and nine with NTNU professors. The web 
survey was carried out among all the scientific staff at the university (including PhD 
students, post.doc. scholars and senior technical support staff) with a response rate of 
41 percent (1280 people completed the whole questionnaire). One-fourth of the 
respondents had previous experience with entrepreneurship defined as patenting, 
creating a spin-off firm, product development for a company and/or licensing. 20 
percent of these (59 individuals, mostly full professors) had been involved in more 
than 10 such entrepreneurial projects. 
As a response to the legislative changes in 2003, all the Norwegian universities 
established technology transfer offices, with NTNU Technology Transfer AS (ltd.) as 
the first one, started in October 2003 and in full operation from mid-2004. It was 
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created as a limited company with a clear profit motive. Unlike the other TTOs in 
Norway, NTNU’s owns the relevant research results. At the other universities, the 
TTOs administer IPR on behalf of the university. The initial expectations from the 
university leadership were high, for example that NTNU and SINTEF should be the 
source of 30 spin-offs annually. 
There were several reasons behind NTNU establishing its own TTO rather than to 
collaborate with the two TTO-like organisations already in place in Trondheim. Many 
professors had expressed dissatisfaction with LEN (the regional TTO organisation) 
which was seen as “greedy” and not offering services that were sufficiently tailored to 
commercialisation of advanced research results and ideas. These voices were 
represented in the working group set up by NTNU to assess alternatives for the 
technology transfer function. SINTEF wanted to retain its own technology transfer 
unit rather than share it with NTNU. Although the collaboration is still significant, 
SINTEF and NTNU had grown apart since the late 1970s, with the former acting 
more and more as an independent research institute rather than a support organisation 
for the university. This led to NTNU establishing its own separate TTO as a service 
unit for the whole university with a monopoly on university ideas. The working group 
suggested that the new unit could collaborate with the existing technology transfer 
organisations in Trondheim, but this was not followed up in practice. 
 
The NTNU working group emphasised many tasks for the unit: 
• Advice about commercialisation to staff and students 
• Accept disclosures/register new ideas 
• Maintain a system that shows the status, history, decisions, actions and costs 
for each project 
• Decide about patentability and actual patenting, organise the patenting 
process, manage the patent portfolio and make sure that as many patents as 
possible are commercialised 
• Market NTNU’s technology to potential buyers nationally and internationally 
• Generate income through sale of licences and property rights 
• Divide the income between various involved parties 
• Promote success cases 
These were made into a more detailed list of 14 tasks, which were changed into a 
phase model after the unit was established. None of the tasks included changing 
employment contract for academic staff or creating an IPR policy for the university, 
however. In addition, the working group suggested that the competences of the TTO 
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should be available for all scientific staff at NTNU, and that the technology transfer 
unit should operate in a way that strengthens research, teaching and value creation at 
the university. No concrete goals were set up for income and self-sufficiency, but the 
group’s report emphasised that the TTO could get direct financial support from the 
university “in a build-up phase”.  
NTNU TTO established four sub-units corresponding to the university’s own 
chief areas: “science and technology”, “industry solutions”, “ICT & Arts” and “life 
sciences”. It grew quickly and in 2005 the unit had 17 people and 16 million NOK in 
turnover (about 2 million EUR). 5 millions were from the university “for services 
provided”, while 10 millions were from the Research Council of Norway, in 
particular the FORNY commercialisation support programme (the TTO budget has in 
2008 increased by a further 60 percent). Since the TTO is organised as a limited 
company, the university is not allowed to subsidise its activities in any way – it 
therefore pays for services like informing the faculty members about the legislative 
changes and arranging courses in patenting and entrepreneurship. The FORNY 
programme with its incentives and funding criteria has been a central influence on the 
TTOs in Norway. 
In 2005, salaries were the most important cost category (6.7 MNOK), followed 
by consultancy costs (4.25 MNOK) and patent costs (1.75 MNOK). In mid-2006 the 
TTO has a portfolio of a little more than 30 patents, which of course generates a lot of 
costs. Few of them have led to commercial activity, but two license agreements were 
signed in the first half of 2006 and three more agreements were expected the rest of 
the year. The TTO had helped create seven spin-off companies (by mid-2006) where 
it owns a share. Due to a lack of funds, the TTO staff said it was difficult to get 
further involved in new firms. 
From the start, it was clear both from the university’s expectations and the TTO 
leader’s background (as an ICT researcher founding a fast-growing firm) that spin-
offs would be a major output of the unit. 6-7 staff members were hired directly from 
the entrepreneurship master’s course at NTNU. It was expected that they would work 
on projects in the TTO and then follow spin-out firms as employees. These trainees, 
as they were called, were met with a lot of scepticism in the scientific departments 
due to their lack of scientific competences and industry experience. The trainee 
programme was therefore later terminated, with some of the people remaining as 
junior assistants. Contact with firms and venture capital companies furthermore 
convinced the TTO staff about the importance of patent protection, and new staff 
members were hired with expertise in this area. However, only the TTO director has a 
PhD degree, and in the survey, some of the respondents remarked this critically. 
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Figure 1: The NTNU TTO in a principal-agent framework. 
 
Figure 1 depicts NTNU TTO in a principal-agent framework, and the circles 
denote the relationships that are of particular interest in this paper. Put a bit simply, 
delegation is based on goals and involves problems of adverse selection, while 
monitoring (including sanctions and incentives) could be necessary to avoid problems 
of moral hazard. Although not part of the analysis, the central role of the Research 
Council through its FORNY commercialisation support programme is emphasised in 
Figure 1. NTNU TTO prepares an annual application to FORNY together with 
similar organisations in the region. Quantitative targets for next year are set as well as 
reports made for previous years. The TTOs furthermore get a financial reward from 
FORNY based on certain quantitative and qualitative indicators. This is a type of 
monitoring that is more thorough than the formal monitoring of the TTO by the 
university administration, which is a key theme in the next section. 
The university-TTO relationship, goal conflicts and information asymmetry 
Despite its history and the general goal of NTNU of becoming a leading 
entrepreneurial university, commercialisation and entrepreneurship have not been 
mentioned very much in its strategic plans. Its previous strategic plan from 1998 only 
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included a minor point towards the end concerning “motivating students and 
employees to innovation and entrepreneurship”. A separate plan for entrepreneurship 
was therefore made in 2001, stating that this should be an integrated part of all three 
missions of the university (teaching, research, public service/dissemination). This 
plan formulated the goal to establish at least 30 spin-off firms based on research at 
NTNU and its Trondheim partners per year. But even though the legislative changes 
were in the coming at this point, the plan does not mention a technology transfer unit. 
High expectations were also found in the university’s TTO working group in 2003 
which assumed that the primary source of income for the unit would be sale of IPR to 
firms and in a longer perspective sale of shares in spin-off companies. No concrete 
expectations about the level of income were put forward in their documents, however. 
When a new strategic planning process was started at the university in 2003 with 
a final approval in the university board in 2006, entrepreneurship was mentioned as 
an equally important activity as teaching, research and dissemination. Instead of 30 
spin-offs, this plan stated that the university and its partners should be the source of 
20 commercialisations (spin-offs and licensing deals) annually by the year 2010. 
Informants stated that new knowledge and the first experiences with the TTO were 
factors behind the new and probably more realistic level of expectations. In addition, 
NTNU should be among the 10 leading European universities when it comes to 
science-based entrepreneurship by the year 2020. However, in the background 
documents to the strategic planning process, entrepreneurship was treated very 
superficially compared to the other activity areas of the university. For those involved 
in the process, the message was still that entrepreneurship does not have the top 
management support as the traditional academic missions. Although the university 
has moderated its expectations, the TTO director is nevertheless very optimistic about 
the future and has goals about creating a financially self-sufficient unit some time in 
the future. 
Turning to delegation of authority and contractual arrangement, the tasks of 
NTNU TTO are regulated through a general collaboration agreement with the 
university as well as an annual specific agreement about which services the unit 
should provide. In addition, the university has developed “Guidelines for innovation” 
in which some principles for IPR management are defined. An important part the 1/3 
rule: in most cases, income should be split equally between the inventor(s), the 
academic unit and the TTO (for small amounts, the inventor gets more). 
In the current general collaboration agreement, two main areas are described. 
The first states that the TTO is NTNU’s primary tool for ensuring, managing, 
enlarging, marketing and selling the right to use and own NTNU’s ideas, inventions, 
research results and other immaterial rights. Secondly, the agreement states that the 
 94 
TTO should work actively towards increasing research-based commercialisation, 
including offering courses, advice and other professional services to students and 
faculty. 
The first annual agreement for 2004 defined three services that the TTO should 
offer to the university in return for funding: 1) training, advice and consultancy, 2) 
idea generation, idea development and project development and 3) Administration of 
the university’s IPR portfolio. Each of these areas contained a highly specified list of 
tasks which were related to different phases of commercialisation processes. 
However, the 2005 agreement was radically changed. Here, the detailed description 
of tasks was removed, but three new tasks were included: promotion of the university, 
general encouragement of entrepreneurship in the Mid-Norway region, and a strategic 
role related to “implementing NTNU’s plans” and giving feedback to faculty so that 
“the research activities become as tailored as possible to market opportunities and the 
needs of society”. 
This short overview points at goal conflicts, inconsistencies and uncertainties in 
the university-TTO relationship. A major inconsistency is related to the key mission 
of the TTO; it was asked to search for the best ideas in the technological departments 
but at the same required to be a service unit for the whole university, including the 
“soft sciences”. There are large variations in the degree to which these academic units 
have relevant ideas and results for commercialisation. A very wide set of tasks was 
set for the unit, and several interviewees could not easily answer the question about 
the core tasks for the TTO (or they gave different answers). Another problem was the 
initial emphasis on spin-off companies rather than IPR protection. 
Some tensions were also created when the new unit was set up outside of the 
existing support structure, even though there was no systematic analysis of strong and 
weak points about the previous support structure for commercialisation. Regional 
TTO-like organisation LEN lost most of its idea source overnight, even while the 
university maintained ownership in LEN. It took two years for the university and 
SINTEF to reduce their ownership and create a situation with fewer personal 
conflicts. One explanation might be that the university had many other things to think 
about during this period, not least a new indicator-based funding system which cost 
NTNU 40 millions NOK of reduced basic funding. The university also wanted to set 
up a TTO unit fast to preserve its image as a proactive and entrepreneurial institution. 
Still, a discussion about whether the legislative changes required some more 
fundamental changes in the university’s approach, did not emerge. It was unclear who 
would inform the faculty about the changes in property rights and about the new 
disclosure regime, and there was no systematic analysis of how NTNU should handle 
contracts and property rights generally in the strategy or commercialisation 
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committees. This meant that a uniform regulatory regime did not appear and 
disclosure may have been unknown or seemed optional. With this unclear mandate, 
the TTO felt a need to justify its existence through emphasising “high profile 
commercialization projects” and it spent much effort looking for the one idea with a 
large potential income. This situation is very comparable to the public university case 
in Owen-Smith & Powell (2001). 
Adverse selection problems 
Two adverse selection problems may be discussed: the university’s selection of TTO 
model or type and the TTO’s selection of ideas/inventions for further 
commercialisation. It has already been shown that the organisation of the TTO as an 
independent for-profit limited company was based on previous experience with 
external support units, high commercial expectations and a somewhat lacking 
analysis of the implications of the legislative changes. In addition, the university 
wanted an “arm’s length” relationship free of possible liability questions, and other 
options to the external for-profit unit were not really considered. Although the 
university director is chairman of the TTO’s board, no detailed attempts at monitoring 
the performance of the transfer unit have been made. Even the readily available 
database at the Research Council was left unused. TTO staff themselves emphasised 
that they wanted to be monitored, “with the right criteria”, but they did not develop a 
transparent and well-maintained project database. 
Because no system for disclosure was in place when the legislative changes took 
effect, the TTO decided to do an active “idea search” in the university departments, 
particularly in the ones well-known for entrepreneurship and scientific excellence. To 
some extent this was a frustrating experience for the TTO staff, as it revealed many 
accidental and “unconscious” attitudes among faculty about signing contracts with 
industry. The web survey showed that in more than half of the cases of university-
industry relationships, the university partner had given away the rights to future 
results. The search still resulted in a list of more than 200 ideas which was sorted 
down to 139 formal “disclosures” – too many for the young unit to handle which 
meant that a lot of ideas were put on hold. Some professors were unhappy about this. 
To avoid this situation where ideas are put on hold without any review or 
evaluation, as well as to fulfil legislative demands that a decision is reached within 
four months of disclosure, the TTO then adopted what the personnel referred to as the 
“Top 10 strategy”. The main intention is to focus on a few projects with an assumed 
particularly great potential and then spend as little resources as possible on the rest of 
the projects. What “Top 10” really implies is not really clear from the interviews 
apart from a slight concentration of resources compared to the first years of operation. 
 96 
Senior TTO staff also stressed that very successful examples (“listing on 
NASDAQ!”) could create a good reputation and legitimacy in the academic units. 
The new strategy affects both the idea search/disclosure phase and the selection 
phase. It does imply a somewhat stronger concentration on ideas from technology, 
natural science and medicine. This was criticised by a number of respondents in the 
survey, arguing that “I thought this was to be a service unit for the whole university” 
and “why is it only technology they want to transfer”. Again, this shows how tensions 
in the goals affect the operation of the TTO. Its solution seems to be to increase its 
internal diversification. Some of its sub-units are looking actively for few high 
potential ideas, while others – most clearly the “ICT and arts” unit – seem to build up 
a broader portfolio. 
 
 
Figure 1: Key data from the first three years of TTO operation. Source: 
www.tto.ntnu.no. 
 
Figure 2 shows how the number of disclosures has gone down yet the number of 
filed patents and the volume of project funding raised has increased considerably. The 
figure indicates that despite certain problems, the TTO has done an impressive job the 
first two years in acquiring funding and building up a patent portfolio. Interviewees 
told how selection criteria have developed gradually and bottom-up, resulting in 
fewer ideas being handled but more of them pass the first selection stages. The 
gradual expansion of the patent portfolio could indicate that the TTO does not really 
follow a highly selective “Top 10” strategy after all. 
Moral hazard problems 
As mentioned, there are two main moral hazard problems surrounding a TTO: lack of 
disclosure and commercialisation support becoming just a research support 
mechanism. Most of the Norwegian university TTOs use a “Disclosure of Invention” 
form to communicate with faculty. NTNU TTO has chosen to have regular meetings 
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with academic leaders to discuss possible ideas and inventions and has downplayed 
the role of the disclosure form. 
This may be a reasonable choice; the survey showed that most of the experienced 
entrepreneurial academics expressed that the legislative changes “took away one of 
their most important rights”. Half of the faculty members were not even aware of the 
legislative changes two years after they took effect, and many research projects 
involve, as mentioned, industry funding where IPR is given to the external funding 
partner. This is discussed in the university’s “Guidelines for innovation” although a 
uniform contract regime has not been developed. TTO staff reported that they often 
had to spend a lot of time untangling IPR issues in each single case. The moral hazard 
problem of no disclosure therefore seems highly relevant in the NTNU case. 
The legislative change did give the universities the right to all “patentable 
inventions”, so the universities may be entitled to ensuring that disclosure actually 
takes place and not least that it takes place through the TTO rather than through 
faculty’s own firms etc. However, the TTO refused to play the role of “patent police”, 
as they referred to it, because they needed to establish a good relationship with the 
academic community. The university administration did not play the police role 
either, and in practice this could be taken as an indication that disclosure has become 
optional for the researchers. Unless the researchers actively break the law by 
commercialising something on their own, the TTO has few sanctioning possibilities 
for dealing with this type of moral hazard. Many of the interviewees and respondents 
were quite content with this, praising the lack of a patent police. Some of them also 
advocated that the best ideas should be commercialised in direct partnership between 
researchers and industry, while the TTO deals with projects that “require a bit more 
work”. In other words, one is to some extent stuck with the old model from before the 
legislative changes but with a new commercialisation unit. 
The fear that commercialisation support, e.g. funds for “proof of concept” and 
“verification” phases, should become just another research support mechanism, seems 
much less as the volume of these funds is small. In addition, the TTO staff 
emphasised in interviews how “good scientists make bad entrepreneurs”, and stated 
that they look for “surrogate entrepreneurs” in many of the most promising 
commercialisation projects. In this sense they carry out boundary work by attempting 
a division of labour which keeps the researchers in the laboratory (see Guston 
1999:104). 
In the interviews and the comments in the survey, there is a fairly strong 
opposition to the legislative changes and some opposition to the TTO, both 
significantly stronger from the experienced entrepreneurs. The survey nevertheless 
shows that there is a high degree of loyalty to the university, and “because the 
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university says it is important” is the third most important motive for 
commercialisation after “societal and industrial needs”. There may be an element of 
political correctness in the responses, but even the ones fervently against the changed 
IPR regime deny that they would “circumvent the system”. There is, perhaps, at least 
when looking at the history of the Norwegian universities, a stronger sense of loyalty 
and institutional belonging at the technical and professional universities like NTNU 
than at the comprehensive traditional universities. 
The incentives and rewards called for in much of the literature may be difficult to 
introduce in the NTNU case. Although faculty would get one-third of the future 
income from sale of licenses and other forms of commercialisation, most of them 
remember a time when “we would get all the income”. Their incentives were reduced 
by the legislative changes in 2003. The TTO’s main challenge is to demonstrate 
added value to the inventions and ideas so that the researcher’s share is still 
considerable. Although the respondents deny that personal financial gain is an 
important motive for commercialisation, many still admit that commercialisation 
under the old IPR regime provided some of them with a stable addition to the 
university salary, which is generally regarded as “far too low”. 
Concluding remarks 
A technology transfer office, even when established at an entrepreneurial university 
with a strong tradition for commercialisation, may run into problems. As the cases 
from the TTO literature shows, problems of mistrust, disclosure, selection and 
monitoring are not unique to the case of NTNU in Norway. Some of these problems 
may be an effect of the relationship between the university and the TTO rather than 
organisational and management choices within the TTO unit itself. Principal-agent 
theory has guided the analysis which has centred on issues like goal conflicts, adverse 
selection (selecting the wrong agent) and moral hazard (the agent behaves 
unacceptably). Technology transfer offices have an intermediary or dual position: 
they are agents of the universities but principals in the relationship to the faculty 
members. 
The university central administration or leadership fundamentally affects TTO 
performance by selecting an organisational model for it: internal administrative unit, 
external for-profit/non-profit and external and independent or in partnership with 
others. In the NTNU case, the choice of model was strongly influenced by some 
specific historical experiences and high expectations rather than a systematic review 
of different alternatives. 
Furthermore, the university leadership may affect TTO operation by setting 
certain goals and creating procedures both for this intermediary agency and for the 
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wider population of scientific staff members. One challenge was that the initial 
expectations to the TTO were unrealistically high and formulated as a certain target 
number of spin-off companies annually. Another challenge was that the contracts kept 
being changed and expanded. Over time, the unit was been given other and broader 
tasks related to regional development and services for the whole university. A third 
problem was the lack of clear top management support for commercialisation in 
strategic plans. Unclear and wide goals may increase problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard and provide little ground for efficient monitoring. In fact, the 
university left monitoring of the TTO mainly to the Research Council programme 
FORNY, which was the transfer unit’s most important source of funding. 
Another important problem in the NTNU case was that the university did not 
have a strategy for dealing with the new IPR regime after the teacher exemption 
clause was removed in 2003. Uniform contract and IPR policies were not developed, 
and information to the researchers about changes and requirements of disclosure was 
lacking. This is again problematic with respect to the adverse selection issue and can 
lead to a situation characterised by “optional disclosure”. Many highly profiled 
faculty members – some with an impressive number of entrepreneurial projects 
behind them – were strongly opposed to the legislative changes. The TTO was 
blamed for a lot of things that it could do nothing about, and to some extent it 
functioned as a scapegoat for the university administration. Although this was 
probably not intended, it created a boundary between the TTO and the faculty that 
made technology transfer particularly challenging. Many of the critical comments to 
the TTO in the empirical material were really critical comments about the legislative 
changes and other macro developments. 
Organising the TTO as an external unit probably has many trade-offs, not least 
with “optional disclosure” and unclear or unknown rules of ownership. Moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems may be very high in this model. As other studies have 
shown, however, an external model might lead to fewer conflicts over ownership than 
when technology transfer is organised in the academic units. 
Finally, the legislative changes – specifically the removal of the teacher 
exemption clause – can create problems in a system where technology transfer is 
based on other mechanisms than formal transfer of knowledge through IPR. Efficient 
transfer used to happen directly between the inventors and potential licensees without 
the need for an intermediary (see Hoppe & Ozdenoren 2002). A successful follow-up 
of the new legislation may depend upon the universities becoming more active in 
monitoring and sanctioning, e.g. somebody taking on the role as “patent police” and 
warning researchers against circumventing the system. However, the wisdom of the 
changes may also be questioned as there were only weak indications that a lack of 
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commercialisation of public research was a major problem in Norway. A support 
structure furthermore existed, although it did not formally bear the name of 
“technology transfer” units and was located outside of the universities. Instead, the 
changes has for many researchers constituted a reduction in the incentives for getting 
involved in commercialisation. The financial incentive is smaller, and the process 
may seem more bureaucratic with a “disclosure of invention” form and a new and to 
some extent inexperienced support structure. 
Despite all the problems and challenges discussed in this paper, the case TTO 
seems to be alive and well. It has maintained a bottom-up approach to problem 
solving and conflicts handling, and it has strived to slowly build up trust and good 
relations to faculty with a support system that is fairly researcher-friendly. The aim 
seems to be to avoid the non-disclosure moral hazard problem by making disclosure 
part of an informal networking process based on an active TTO with strong personal 
linkages to faculty. Removing the teacher exemption clause has created a difficult 
learning process, increasingly also involving the university leadership who has 
recently initiated a process for creating a common IPR policy for all Norwegian 
universities. 
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Barriers to commercialization of knowledge in emerging 
technological regimes – a comparison of marine 
biotechnology and mobile commerce 
Olav R Spilling and Helge Godø 
Abstract 
This article presents and compares two case studies on barriers to entrepreneurship and com-
mercialization of research-based knowledge in Norway. The first is on marine biotechnology; 
the second on m-commerce. The marine biotechnology was developed by academic entrepre-
neurs. Being oriented towards product innovation, this type of commercialization process has 
been given recognition and public support. In contrast, m-commerce, which aims at creating 
innovations in digital mobile communications, has so far not been developed because of 
structural barriers that block the ICT-convergence that is required for m-commerce develop-
ment. At present, powerful actors and institutions, having strong interests in existing systems, 
block the m-commerce development. Furthermore, neither academia (universities) nor public 
research institutions and public innovation policy supporting mechanisms are helpful for ent-
repreneurship and innovations in m-commerce. These are more compatible with entrepreneur-
ship and innovation activities that are oriented towards product and process innovation, as 
demonstrated by the marine biotechnology case. 
Introduction 
The point of departure for this article18 is a research project focusing on barriers to 
commercialization of research-based knowledge where factors hampering and facili-
tating processes of commercialization are being analysed. The project combines two 
different approaches. First, commercialization processes are analysed in an entrepre-
neurial perspective, i.e. the entrepreneurial processes per se, and actors involved in 
these processes. However, the processes are heavily influenced by various contextual 
and systemic conditions. Thus, this entrepreneurship approach is combined with a 
systemic approach based on perspectives from the literature on innovation systems 
and technological regimes. By combining these two perspectives, the objective of our 
research is to develop a comprehensive understanding of processes of commercializa-
tion and factors crucial to their outcome.  
Our main focus will be on processes of commercialization in two different sys-
tems in order to identify the extent to which barriers to commercialization are system 
specific or of a more general nature. We analyse two systems which are very different 
in nature. The first is a regionally confined system of businesses based on marine bio-
technology which, to a significant extent, has developed in the area around a specific 
university located on the coast of northern Norway. A typical feature of this industry 
                                                 
18 This article is based on the research project “Barriers towards commercialization of knowledge” 
funded by the Norwegian Research Council, which was finalized in the spring of 2007. 
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is its high research intensity and long lead times from the initial ideas to the commer-
cial activity primarily aimed at creating product innovation. The second system is an 
emerging sector related to developing commercial activities based on mobile commu-
nication technology, i.e. the use of mobile phones for payment services, denoted here 
as m-commerce. A typical feature of this system is that innovation is more related to 
modifying and the application of existing technology in new fields, and lead times for 
developing new technological solutions may be short. However, the innovation po-
tential of m-commerce may be radical and disruptive because this may create an enti-
rely new economic sector making existing sectors obsolete or redundant. Thus, the 
technological regimes characterising the two systems are very different. 
Commercialization processes 
Commercialization may be defined as the process of transferring and transforming 
theoretical knowledge (Chiesa and Piccaluga, 1998) such as existing in an academic 
research institution, into some kind of commercial activity. Jolly (1997) defines com-
mercialization as: 
 
“… the process that starts with the techno-market insight and ends with the 
sustaining functions of the market-competent product. The problems of 
commercialization include links between technological discoveries and 
opportunities, demonstration of technology to opinion leaders, incubation of 
technology, resources for successful demonstration, market acceptance and 
transfer of benefits, and selection of proper business tools.” 
 
This definition suggests a conception of the processes of commercialization as a 
stage model in a diffusion of innovation process. Such models generally start with the 
technology-driven basic development of new knowledge discoveries and inventions, 
followed by an incubation process in which the business opportunities and business 
concepts are more systematically explored and developed, culminating with the estab-
lishment of a business activity positioned in the market. 
In the literature, a number of different approaches to describe stage models may 
be found (Andreasen and Hein 1986; Cooper 1996; Eeckles and Roozenburg 1999; 
McAloone and Robotham 1999). For instance, in their discussion of commercializa-
tion strategies, Virtanen and Laukkanen (2002) distinguished between the following 
stages: 1) invention/discovery, 2) proof of principle, 3) demonstration unit/model, 4) 
working prototype, 5) marketable product, 6) product palette, and 7) established mar-
ket position. 
An important aspect of the commercialization process is that it will often undergo 
a change from a mainly technology-driven process to a process which is mainly mar-
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ket-driven. In the early stages, it is the opportunities identified and based on techno-
logical knowledge that are the main driving forces, and which motivate the actors in 
their work. During the process, a shift towards increased emphasis on market oppor-
tunities will gradually emerge, making apparent how these may be exploited by deve-
loping products or services in order to meet anticipated needs in the market. In the 
final stages, the main emphasis will be on market opportunities and how the business 
concept and the business strategy may be designed in order to fully exploit these op-
portunities. 
By depicting the commercialization process in terms of stage models, this implies 
linearity, i.e. where the process goes smoothly through each successive stage. This 
may be taken as a support for the traditional linear model of innovation, which has 
mostly been rejected by the development of the interactive innovation model (Lund-
vall 1992). The point here is not to advocate the revitalisation of the linear model, but 
rather to point at a way of structuring and provide a basis for analysis. By this we 
identify stages in the process which may differ from others regarding what kind of 
knowledge, skills and activities that are important, and which may help identifying 
important bottlenecks in the process. At each stage issues of specific importance may 
be identified, and this may in turn provide a basis for developing a framework for 
analysis (Ndonzuau, Pirnay and Surlemont 2002). 
This is not to neglect the fact that processes are generally complex, and do not 
necessarily follow the ‘linear’ pattern indicated by the stage model, which explains 
why some theorists (van de Ven et al.1999) use terms such as ‘chaotic’ and charac-
terize this as an ‘innovation journey’. Hence, actors may go back and forth between 
the stages, where they may partly combine elements from different stages simultane-
ously, or important elements from different stages may come in a different order. 
Furthermore, the actors will also depend on interaction and communication with a 
number of other actors belonging to the business community as well as the research 
community. Interaction across our analytical constructs of stages and organisational 
boundaries are subsequently important for the process, providing the rationale for 
analysing processes of commercialization in a systemic context. 
Innovation systems and technological regimes 
The concept of ‘innovation system’ was introduced during the early 1990s. A basic 
assumption in this is that innovation is an interactive process and that an innovation 
system may be defined as the set of actors and other factors that influence the inno-
vation process (Lundvall 1992; Edquist 1997). In our context, the conceptual frame-
work of a sectorial innovation system (Breschi and Malerba 1997; Malerba 2004) is 
of particular relevance as it focuses on providing an explanation of the distinct differ-
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rences between sectors in terms of their innovation capabilities and other characte-
ristics related to innovation dynamics and patterns, such as entrepreneurship and com-
mercialization of new knowledge. In contrast to the conceptual framework of national 
systems of innovation, the sectorial approach permits a more global and general per-
spective, explaining why and how sectors evolve by analysing the technological re-
gimes that constitute a sector. 
In the analytical framework of sectorial system of innovation, the concept of 
technological regime (TR) is important. A technological regime may be viewed as a 
set of important determining factors for dynamic processes within the innovation 
system. This is inspired by Schumpeter’s works on economic development and entre-
preneurship, and may explain why the level of entrepreneurship and innovation vary 
significantly between sectors (see for instance Breschi and Malerba 1997; Audretsch 
1997). In the literature two types of regimes are distinguished – the entrepreneurial 
and the routinized regimes. This distinction explains why the dominant mode of inno-
vation may vary significantly due to characteristics of the technology as well as the 
organisation of firms in the sector. As an elaboration of this, we will  introduce the 
closely related concept of innovation regime as principles, norms and rules which 
form actors’ expectations and actions (Godoe 2000), and which may be a basis for 
analysing and explaining differences in innovative behaviour between different 
sectors. 
The aim of this article is to explore and indicate identify factors and dynamics 
within two different sectors that inhibit entrepreneurs and commercialization of new 
knowledge. The relevance of this issue becomes particularly apparent in entrepre-
neurship in various sectors, because the opportunities and constraints on entrepre-
neurship may be seen as indicators of barriers to innovation. Recently, analysts have 
suggested that “..the difference between entrepreneurship in biotechnology and other 
industries is not in the essential ingredients (which are largely the same), but in their 
proportions (which will vary)”. (Hine and Kapeleris 2006, p. 26). 
In the research we have undertaken in Norway in marine biotechnology and ICT, 
a comparison of the two cases suggests that there are qualitative differences between 
these sectors, both in terms of structural factors and framework conditions for com-
mercialization of knowledge that are significant, and which may plausibly explain 
why sectoral systems of innovation differ. 
Empirical approach 
The main approach in this article is to compare two systems that are different in na-
ture, i.e. marine biotechnology and mobile commerce, and to conduct extensive 
studies of processes of evolution and commercialization in these two systems. 
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The sector of marine biotechnology is a part of the larger sector of biotechnology, 
and is characterised in terms of its source material rather than the markets it serves 
(Biobridge Ltd 2005). The sector is strongly related to fishing and fish farming, partly 
by being based on raw materials obtained from the sea or by-products from the 
fishing industry, and partly by providing food ingredients and health related products 
to these industries. The industry is also an important provider of health-related and 
dietary products for human use. 
Although knowledge of fish farming and the genetics involved in breeding fish 
has existed for thousands of years, marine biotechnology has a history that commen-
ced with the breakthrough created by the discovery of DNA early in the 1950s, and 
the subsequent growth of molecular biology as an academic discipline. Since then, 
biotechnology has rapidly evolved into a large knowledge area with many sub-disci-
plines and specialized technological domains. Marine biotechnology is one of these. 
As such, marine biotechnology has the potential to contribute to every industry sec-
tor, from healthcare to bioremediation, from cosmetics to nutraceuticals, suggesting 
that marine biotechnology can contribute to marine as well as non-marine sectors. 
However, developing and exploiting discoveries in these sectors is difficult without a 
coherent strategy for investing in research and in proof of principle, an effective tech-
nology and knowledge transfer system, and a sensitivity to existing and emerging 
markets (Biobridge Ltd 2005). Funding these processes can be extremely costly. 
In our studies of marine biotechnology, we have focused on a specific regionally 
based system developed around, and in close interaction with, the University of 
Tromsø, in northern Norway. It is widely recognized that the university and its re-
search activities have been an important driver in developing the actual cluster of 
firms engaged in biotechnology in the Tromsø area. 
The empirical analysis is based on a holistic approach in which a first step has 
been to map the development of the whole system by analysing secondary data, partly 
obtained through open data bases and also through the firms’ own web pages. We 
have also been in direct contact (via e-mail) with most of the firms and collected brief 
information about their start-up processes and their relations to the university. This 
has been supplemented with information obtained from all relevant public support 
agencies located in the area. Furthermore, four in-depth case studies have been con-
ducted based on interviews with the entrepreneurs and managers of the firms, where 
we analysed the respective processes of entrepreneurship and commercialization.19 
In total, the empirical data provide a good overview of how the regionally-based 
system of marine biotechnology related to the university city has emerged, what have 
been the main driving forces in the processes of evolution, and who have been the 
                                                 
19 An analysis of the four entrepreneurship stories is presented in Spilling, in this volume.  
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main actors in the processes. Within this framework, we have also explored how the 
system functions what characterises processes of commercialization. 
The research on m-commerce is based on case studies of companies in Norway 
that are involved in electronic funds transfer (EFT) and related ICT services and pro-
duct development, in particular for mobile communications services. These were 
undertaken in 1998–2002 (covering the ‘dotcom-period’) and during periods between 
2005 and 2007. Some of these are multinational corporations; however, most of the 
firms are SMEs. 
In the research carried out 2005–2007, focus was set on four companies, all 
having an interest in developing and providing services for mobile communications, 
however, these ambitions were hampered by problems associated with m-commerce. 
Apart from this, they were very different. The smallest firm had only two employees 
and had existed for less than two years, doing a shoestring operation. The largest is a 
multinational corporation with more than 10,000 employees worldwide, and a long 
history. The third company is five years old and has approximately 40 employees. 
The fourth company has about 200 employees and has existed for approximately 
fifteen years.  
The largest company may be characterized as a system owner and operator, the 
next largest as a sub-system owner and operator, while the two smallest could be cha-
racterized as companies attempting to commercialize niche innovations. In this en-
deavour, they have had some success, but these also are hampered by the problems 
encountered by the m-commerce development.  
Although all the firms in the m-commerce study use and develop technological 
solutions that require a high level of technological and business competence and 
knowledge, this type of knowledge is not prominent on the curricula and research 
agendas of universities. Mostly, the knowledge is developed within the firms, but 
they also rely on knowledge from specialized public R&D institutes and R&D inten-
sive supplier companies. The typical entrepreneur is an ICT engineer with some 
MBA-type of management education. A few entrepreneurs did not have an enginee-
ring background; however, all the entrepreneurs were highly educated, i.e. having 
university degrees at MA and BA levels. Another common trait was that all the com-
panies in some way or another had business model plans related to m-commerce, and 
that these were contingent on systems and institutions outside their control and com-
mand – an aspect that represented a barrier for commercialization for these firms. 
This aspect will be elaborated further in a later section in this article.  
Although there is an underlying basic conceptual framework that has been gui-
ding our investigations of the two sectors, we also take a ‘grounded’ approach in the 
sense that the first stage analysis of each sector focus on defining who the main actors 
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are, what characterizes the evolution of the sector, and the first description of each 
system will be based on these characteristics. This means that the first models we are 
coming up with, are very different for the two systems. In the next stage of our analy-
sis, however, we compare the two systems and then analyse them based on a common 
framework.  
The marine biotech system 
The history of the marine biotech cluster in Tromsø may be traced back to the early 
1970s when the University of Tromsø and the closely related Norwegian College of 
Fishery Science were established.20 This was followed up by the establishment of the 
Institute for Fishery Research one year later. Being parts of a targeted regional deve-
lopment strategy, the institutions were developed in order to serve and interact with 
the local community and regional industries through a focus on biotechnology and 
marine biotechnology research and other disciplines relevant to the fishing and fish-
related industries. These three institutions have provided an important scientific base 
for the later development of the marine biotech cluster. 
While the first decade of operations was mostly characterised by interaction with 
the existing industries, a new development gradually emerged in the mid-1980s when 
several new firms based on marine biotechnology knowledge were established. Some 
of the new firms were spin-offs from the Department of Biotechnology and other de-
partments – the first pioneer to start a new business was actually a professor in bio-
technology (Arbo 1999). Other new firms were started by more independent actors, 
but in many cases these entrepreneurs also had their background from the university. 
Although the industrial cluster is not large, there has been a steady growth. Generally, 
there have been 1 or2 new ventures annually but not all have succeeded, and among 
those which have survived, some have been integrated in larger corporations. By now 
(2007), the entire cluster accounts for between fifteen and twenty companies, employ-
ing between 200 and 300 employees. Most of them are fairly small: only four have 
more than 40 to 50 employees. 
In parallel with the development of this industrial cluster, a differentiated struc-
ture of supporting, intermediary organisations from the mid-1990s was also deve-
loped, including a science park and an innovation centre, an incubator and technology 
transfer organisation. Various programs have been organised and more informal are-
nas been involved in order to strengthen networking activities between the actors. In 
particular, two organisations should be mentioned as particularly important (Figure 
                                                 
20 The institutions were originally established as independent organisations. Later, the College of 
Fishery Science has later been integrated in the University and now serves as a separate university 
department. 
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1). One of these is Norinnova which organises the science park and the local incu-
bator and innovation centre, and which also manages a local seed capital fund. Nor-
innova has been especially important in taking various local initiatives to facilitate 
knowledge-based industrial development in the region. Among these initiatives was 
the organisation of a regionally-based research program – MABIT (marine biotechno-
logy in Tromsø). This program has been important for stimulating and coordinating 
research activities of the marine biotech firms in the region. 
An overview of the marine biotech system is provided in Figure 1 and gives an 
indication of what we regard as the main actors and the main structure of the system.  
Naturally, the core part of the system is constituted by the marine biotech firms 
themselves and other relevant actors in adjacent industrial sectors as well as financial 
actors and industrialists. However, in this case the university and related institutions 
have been very important for providing the knowledge basis for the new industry, 
while the intermediary and supportive actors have been important for facilitating 
development, particularly since the mid-1990s. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Marine Biotech System 
 
Typically, the new firms have developed in interaction between a number of 
actors, and the process of entrepreneurship may occur in many ways (Birley 2002; 
Carayannis et al 1998). Based on our mapping three types of start-up process may be 
distinguished: 
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1. The classical spin-off in which an academic, or a team of academics, start 
their new venture directly based on their research results, such as professors or 
PhD candidates. 
2. The hybrid variant, in which an alliance between academics and external 
industrial actors is established, and the new firm is founded on the research-
based knowledge of the academics and the economic, industrial and other 
resources which the industrial actor has access to. 
3. The industrial variant, in which an independent industrial actor is the main 
driving force and initiates the new venture in collaboration with personnel 
with relevant background. 
Within the cluster, each type has almost similar number for firms. Additionally, 
there also may be identified case of complementary start-ups in which the firms’ 
knowledge base may be in completely different areas, for instance mechanical engi-
neering, to provide services of great importance to the cluster. 
There are many factors that influence the opportunities for start-up, and to what 
extent opportunities actually are recognised and exploited. One important factor is the 
prevailing culture of entrepreneurship in the region, and to what extent academic staff 
and their surrounding community are oriented toward entrepreneurial activities. 
While the University of Tromsø has a background as the ‘red’ (socialist) university 
with rather negative attitudes towards involving academia in commercial activities, 
this culture has changed significantly in recent years. Another important factor is the 
structure of the academic disciplines and the organised interface with industries and 
to what extent there is focus on industrial applications and the identification and ex-
ploitation of commercial opportunities. From this perspective, there has been a long 
tradition of regarding the university and the related research institutes as an important 
basis for regional development. 
Another important factor that heavily influences opportunities of commercializa-
tion is the structure of the relevant innovation system, how this is made up with dif-
ferent actors and resources, and the relationships within the system. There must be a 
critical mass of actors, resources and relationships to provide a high number of poten-
tial combinations. Generally, the system may be characterised as fairly small, and in 
spite of relationships to actors outside the system, and a number of efforts to build 
local arenas and relationships, there are still probably important bottlenecks to the 
evolution of the system related to the small size of the system. 
This is confirmed by some of the firms in the system which point at the fairly 
weak industrial and financial environment that makes it difficult to establish adequate 
alliances and acquire long term and ‘patient’ risk capital (Arbo and Isaksen 2002). 
Most start-ups we have examined have, in one way or another, been based on allian-
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ces with one or more partners in order to get access to resources crucial for the new 
venture, like financial means, production facilities, laboratory facilities, marketing 
resources, market access, etc. However, building relationships through alliances is a 
demanding task, and in several of the cases, for various reasons, significant problems 
have developed in their relationship with their partners. Generally, the development 
of the new ventures is often characterized by a high level of turbulence. Hence, the 
entrepreneurs’ capability to redefine their business concepts and develop new con-
stellations of resources is important for the survival of their ventures. 
Thus, barriers to commercialization and the development of new ventures may be 
related to many different factors. This is followed up in the final part of the article. 
Mobile communications and the m-commerce system 
In an international comparison, Norway is very advanced in terms of ICT prolifera-
tion, specifically in the sophistication and scope of digital mobile communications, of 
which the GSM-system is most renowned. According to recent statistics, there were 5 
million mobile telephone subscriptions in Norway, i.e. a penetration rate of 106 sub-
scriptions pr 100 inhabitants. 
Other Nordic countries have similar figures for the distribution of mobile tele-
phones in their population. Similar to Denmark, Norway does not have any large and 
successful ICT equipment manufacturing companies such as Nokia in Finland and 
Ericsson in Sweden, but it is still part of a Nordic ICT-development community fo-
cused on mobile communications. The co-development of broader bandwidths for 
mobile communications has given rise to increased use of mobile phones for various 
Internet services, in addition to voice and SMS-services.  
M-commerce may be defined as the use of mobile phones for  the transaction of 
either physical goods using mobile handsets as wallets or credit cards (merchandi-
sing), or mobile services such as ringing tones, games or any other service that may 
be mediated by a mobile telephone (Nielsen 2006). In general, the technological po-
tential of digital mobile communications has opened up numerous commercial oppor-
tunities in the new systems. Many entrepreneurs, seeing business opportunities, have 
swarmed into these fields; these new services are also perceived as highly attractive 
business potentials in the telecom sector, specifically to mobile communication ope-
rators. Contrary to SMS, m-commerce has not enjoyed much success, raising the 
question of why.  
In the research on m-commerce, we pursued this question, first by asking entre-
preneurial firms that we knew to have some type of plans for m-commerce, asking 
them their opinion and explanation for why m-commerce so far has failed to materi-
alize. They did not provide a coherent answer. However, two factors emerge from 
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their explanations: banks and the financial sector do not want to loose their grip on 
the present system of EFT (electronic funds transfer) based on the use of magnetic 
stripe cards at points of sale in shops, etc. Apart from providing banks with a lucra-
tive, steady supply of income through service charges, this is important for their lock-
in strategy which until now has provided them with a de facto monopoly in EFT. 
Banks will probably promote m-commerce in the future; however, they will do this 
gradually in order to preserve their hegemony in EFT, which implies promotion of its 
present system based on scriptural money. The other factor, which reflects this, is that 
firms outside the banking community have been able to develop informal, proprietary 
quasi-monetary systems that to some extent bypass the EFT system controlled by the 
banks. These systems have enjoyed some limited success. However, m-commerce 
that uses the technological potential of mobile communications has so far failed to 
materialize in Europe and USA: only in Japan and Korea is there evidence of some 
success with m-commerce for reasons that are not relevant in Europe and USA. 
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Figure 2: The ‘landscape’ of a potential m-commerce system 
As shown in Figure 2, the landscape from which m-commerce will emerge is 
complex, being composed of a number of different sectors in command of their own 
systems, value chains and technological regimes. One may suggest that in this land-
scape the sectors and institutions have conflicting interests, to such an extent that the 
interest of one represents a barrier to the other, thereby obstructing initiation of con-
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vergence dynamics needed for m-commerce. Some of the most important of these 
dynamics are: 
• Banks and financial institutions 
• Mobile communications operators 
• ICT equipment manufacturers 
• Institutions related to money and trust. 
Banks and financial institutions now enjoy a de facto monopoly on EFT – Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer. Although they are technologically advanced in many ICT 
areas, their main strategy is to maintain their hegemony over EFT, which is most 
conveniently carried out by having control of their own infrastructures and ICT 
systems. They do not want to let other actors into this – and they are able to justify 
this in terms of security and the trust-factor. This may possibly explain why they have 
not taken strong initiatives in m-commerce whereby they basically maintain a reac-
tive, defensive strategy. 
Mobile communications operators perceive EFT and m-commerce as a business 
opportunity with a considerable growth potential. However, this requires that they are 
able to take care of payment functions, i.e. functions that banks now control. Al-
though some mobile communication operators have petty cash banking licenses, the 
leap towards becoming ‘real’ banks seems difficult to them for many reasons. One is 
the fear of provoking the banking system, which is politically powerful and may harm 
them. Secondly, banks and financial institutions are important customers of commu-
nication services; the risk of loosing them as customers is considered high. Thirdly, 
they lack the expertise for banking and EFT. 
ICT equipment manufacturers would like to enter into the business domain of 
mobile communications operators; they think that they could enhance their business 
opportunities by by-passing operators. One strategy is to make handsets without SIM-
cards, a technological solution that enables mobile operators to exert control over 
their customers. However, in addition to lacking expertise in banking and EFT, they 
also lack a customer base. 
Institutions related to money and trust are essential because m-commerce repre-
sents a novel mechanism for economic transactions. Banks and financial institutions 
base their EFT on scriptural money, that is transfer of figures between accounts in 
their systems, either in internal systems or by means of clearing houses (Ingham, 
2002). So far, electronic fiduciary money has not had any success, which explains 
why the use of physical cash still exists. Regardless of type of money, trust is very 
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basic to diffusion of m-commerce. All actors involved, specifically users and ‘mer-
chants’,21 need to feel that engaging in m-commerce is absolutely trustworthy. 
The picture that emerges is a landscape characterized by fragmentation, i.e. con-
flicts, tensions and divergent sectoral interests and institutional incoherence. In this 
landscape, there is apparently no overarching innovation regime that has the strength 
to create solutions, e.g. business models, which would promote m-commerce to the 
benefit of most stakeholders. Because of the complex interdependencies and comple-
mentarities involved, no single actor or sector seems capable of imposing its own 
solutions. Furthermore, it lacks a selection environment or a ‘market for standards’ 
that would initiate an innovation dynamic. 
Comparison of the two systems 
As demonstrated in the previous sections, there are significant differences between 
the two systems in terms of the composition of the systems as well as how commerci-
alization processes evolve. Thus, there will also be significant differences in how 
barriers to commercialization work in the two systems. To facilitate the discussion, a 
framework is suggested as outlined in Table 1. 
 
System and technology characteristics 
The marine biotech system is characterised as having a strong focus on industry 
building processes. The interaction between a number of firms, the university and re-
search institutions, and various support organisations, is well organized. Apparently, 
the systems have developed a dedicated interest in building the industry. The main 
challenges of the system are related to the composition of the system, availability of 
various actors and resources, and to building competencies and capacities for indus-
trial exploitation. 
In m-commerce, on the other hand, there is a main problem related to conflicting 
interests between different dominant actors primarily embedded in systems other than 
m-commerce (e.g. banking, communication operators), and with a strategic focus on 
other industrial core areas than developing m-commerce. While the marine biotech 
system is consolidated around a commonly accepted industry building strategy, the 
m-commerce system is still not established. Thus, barriers to commercialization are 
manifested in very different forms in the two systems. 
 
                                                 
21 ‘Merchant’ is a common term for the role of anyone who is recipient in an electronic transaction in a 
point of sale setting. 
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Table 1: System specific characteristics of relevance to barriers towards commercialization 
 The Marine Biotech System The M-Commerce System 
System and technology 
System 
characteristics 
Small system with 15-20 core busi-
nesses and a generally weak industrial 
environment, complicated and 
fragmented support structure 
As yet non-existent in Europe and 
USA, only limited systems in Japan 
and Korea. Convergence of complex 
institutional and technological 
infrastructure required. 
Science and 
technology – general 
characteristics 
High R&D investments in companies, 
generally long lead times from research 
to industrial applications 
Will require some application and 
system integration development, but 
these are not complex. 
Science–industry 
relationships 
Close relationship between science and 
industry, strong emphasis on industrial 
applications in research departments 
In 1990s, close relationship in some 
areas, e.g. development of crypto-
graphic solutions, but less important 
now.  
Barriers to entry – 
system specific 
Weak industrial environment; limited 
access to potential industrial partners 
Institutional and political – banks and 
financial institutions guard their present 
position. 
Entrepreneurship and commercialization 
Culture for 
entrepreneurship 
Originally negative to 
commercialization, significant change 
towards more entrepreneurial and 
opportunity oriented culture   
Basically positive, but institutional 
barriers and vested interests in status 
quo has discouraged entrepreneurship. 
Entrepreneurs Often academic staff who start based 
on their own research activities or 
people with background from the 
University who have later obtained 
industrial experience. 
Highly educated, usually engineers and 
business school graduates, but their 
entrepreneurship not based on ideas 
obtained during education or research. 
Barriers to entry – 
technology and 
product specific 
Mainly inherent qualities in the product 
and process technologies 
Few, barriers are mainly related to 
systemic factors. 
Industrial structure 
and dominant actors 
Mostly small and partly marginal 
companies, a few larger actors. 
Fragmented and weak structure. 
Strong sectoral power and institutional 
interests, e.g. banks, equipment 
manufacturers, operators, etc. 
The role of 
universities and 
research institutes 
Partly close interaction with industries, 
strong focus on industrial applications 
and commercialization. Serve as an 
important and active knowledge base 
for industrial development 
Not so relevant, apart from some very 
specialized areas, e.g. cryptography, 
etc. 
Policy measures 
Support structure 
for 
commercialization 
Differentiated and cluster specific 
structure which plays an active role; 
however tendencies of overorganisation 
and too many small actors 
Not so strong, apart from some directed 
at specific product development 
projects. 
Risk capital Has traditionally been an important 
barrier, but the situation has improved 
due to public seed capital and inflow of 
private investors 
Not relevant at present; availability of 
risk capital will not remove barriers for 
entrepreneurship in m-commerce. 
 
Commercialization in m-commerce involves the development of service concepts 
embedded in long and complex value chains, technological interdependencies and 
infrastructures, which in turn have strong institutional alignments (banks, telecom 
operators, software, etc.), i.e. complex systemic innovation and commercialization 
processes. As a potential innovation, m-commerce may be viewed as a systemic 
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innovation, i.e. composed of technological elements that are highly complementary 
and interworking by means of complex network structures. 
Although this requires each interconnected element to have high compatibility 
and hence clear interfaces, the heterogeneity of various elements could also provide 
opportunity for creativity and entrepreneurship, and, ultimately, provide opportunities 
for creativity for the development of new products and services. The technological or 
knowledge barriers for this are not substantial, but because of the institutional bar-
riers, entrepreneurs have used their creativity to construct technological solutions that 
will bypass these obstacles. 
In contrast, commercialization in marine biotechnology is more related to auto-
nomous product development, aimed at substituting or supplementing existing pro-
ducts. Generally, industrial activity in marine biotechnology is based on high invest-
ment in R&D, and the lead time from research to industrial applications is generally 
long. 
In the case of marine biotechnology, because close relationships and interactions 
between science and industry have been developed, the institutions address challen-
ges related to industrial development through basic research as well as applied re-
search.  
In contrast to this, the m-commerce system is characterised by less interaction 
with universities and research institutes, and the specific issues related to developing 
this system is on the agenda of the institutions to a lesser extent. The type of R&D 
and innovation-oriented activities are often ICT-application oriented, directed to ma-
king a service embedded in a product (e.g. terminal) function within a system. This 
requires a type of implementation-oriented knowledge and skills which are generally 
not well-known at universities, even if these require a high theoretical understanding 
and competence.  
 
Entrepreneurship and commercialization 
While the culture for entrepreneurship at the Tromsø university campus was origi-
nally negative and even hostile to commercialization and to active interaction with 
industry, this has changed significantly during the last two decades. The institutions 
are now much more oriented towards commercialization and the industrial application 
of their research activities. However, entrepreneurial activities are still hampered by a 
weak industrial environment which provides few opportunities for establishing ade-
quate alliances for new industrial ventures. 
In the ICT sector, the culture for entrepreneurship has generally been much more 
positive, and there are fairly long traditions for strong entrepreneurial cultures related 
to this. In the case of m-commerce, however, entrepreneurial activity is hampered by 
institutional barriers and vested interests in the status quo. 
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Entrepreneurs in marine biotechnology are often research scientists who have 
made inventions or created ideas based on results of their scientific work. In m-com-
merce, entrepreneurs have engineering and business school education, but are less 
academically-oriented compared to marine biotechnologists. One reason for this is 
that until recently, there were few, if any academics at universities who were interes-
ted in m-commerce, just as no strong interest has existed for other ICT innovations 
that have had a profound impact on society. This, of course, may be explained by the 
institutional bias of academic institutions, because of their orientation towards disci-
plines and agendas set by these. The type of academic entrepreneurship found in bio-
technology also exists in ICT, however. These are seen in the development of com-
ponents, materials, limited parts of software development and techniques (e.g. crop-
tography) etc., in the type of knowledge that may easily be transferred and developed 
into product and process innovations. 
Due to the systemic and complex structure in m-commerce, entrepreneurs in this 
field pursue commercialization strategies that are symbiotic with the system, i.e. they 
attempt to develop new niches compatible to the systems involved because the bar-
riers, which are formidable, are structural and institutional. Yet, because of the suc-
cess of mobile communications, stakeholders who defend the status quo now seem to 
realize that they need to develop complementary services and value chains involving 
partners outside their traditional control. This may represent new opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and, as a result, contribute towards the type of convergence that evolu-
tion towards m-commerce as a new sector will require.  
In marine biotechnology, the main barriers to entry are partly related to the weak 
industrial community, and limited opportunities to organised adequate combinations 
of actors and resources. Partly, they are related to inherent qualities of the product and 
process technologies, and the frequent huge investments in R&D required to develop 
industrial activity. 
The success of m-commerce depends on the systemic process of convergence in 
ICT. This entails intertwining of vested interests of powerful economic sectors that 
are now comparatively autonomous. Hence, commercialization depends on institutio-
nal and political factors in addition to technological factors. This may require some 
type of political entrepreneurship or agency for restraining the power of strong indus-
trial players and actors. This type of entrepreneurship has so far not emerged, possi-
bly because of low public awareness of the political and economic issues involved.  
In marine biotechnology, the system is consolidated around its industrial deve-
lopment. However, the system is fairly weak with a small number for firms which 
actively contribute to the system. The industrial structure is more fragmented where 
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SMEs constitute the majority of firms, and so far there are no more than three or four 
firms of any significance. 
Although commercialization and entrepreneurship in m-commerce and marine 
biotechnology is different, this is not reflected in the organisation of knowledge pro-
duction in universities and research institutes. During the 1990s, most universities ex-
panded their ICT departments and curricula, typically under the label of ‘computer 
science’ parallel to giving high priority to biotechnology. As academic institutions, 
they focus on disciplines and research has become highly specialized. 
In the case of marine biotechnology, the structure of university departments and 
related research institutes and other infrastructure which specifically addresses the 
needs of the region has been developed. In many fields, these have a strong focus on 
industrial applications and commercialization, and the institutions have developed a 
significant knowledge base for industrial development within the system of marine 
biotechnology. In many respects, the university is the most important factor behind 
the recent development of the industry. 
In contrast to this, the organisation of universities is of less relevance to the spe-
cific development in m-commerce, mainly because this is systemic and, in an aca-
demic context, transdisciplinary, which is problematic in any academic setting. This 
may be paradoxical, because if m-commerce becomes an innovation, this could be-
come radical and highly disruptive for the economic system, and hence should be of 
great concern for a university. In history, many radical innovations have emerged 
without involvement of universities, but at present, this lack of interest is difficult to 
understand. This point, which may have policy implications, will be discussed further 
below.  
 
Policy measures 
In the case of marine biotech, a differentiated structure of support agencies and inter-
mediaries for commercialization has emerged, and to a significant extent this struc-
ture is developed in order to address the specific challenges of the marine biotech 
system. For instance, a specific research program in marine biotechnology has been 
organised, and a number of analyses over the years have been conducted to investi-
gate the future potential for industrial development.  
In contrast, m-commerce does not have a public support structure. The specific 
reason for this is that m-commerce does not involve development of tangible products 
or processes because of it systemic nature. Generally, public industrial policy sup-
porting organizations does not support development of system innovations if these are 
outside public responsibility, although there are notable (and highly successful) ex-
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ceptions, such as the US military agency DARPA’s role in the development of Inter-
net in the 1980s and early 1990s (Simcoe and Mowery 2002).  
Access to risk capital has traditionally been perceived as a significant barrier to 
innovation and entrepreneurship in Norway, and in particular this may have represen-
ted a significant barrier to commercialization in areas located far away from the Oslo 
region. However, the situation improved significantly during the last decade, partly 
due to a number of policy measures to provide traditional venture capital as well as 
seed capital, and partly due to a vitalisation of the private risk capital sector. 
Lack of risk capital has probably been a greater barrier in marine biotech than in 
the ICT sector, while there are currently few indications that this represents a barrier 
to development in marine biotech. In the case of m-commerce, the issue of risk capi-
tal is not relevant at the present due to the other and more significant systemic bar-
riers to commercialization.  
Policy implications 
As illustrated by the analyses of the two systems, processes of commercialization 
may be very complex, and there is no simple recipe for how a policy may be designed 
in order to facilitate the development of emerging systems. On the contrary, one con-
clusion might be that policy makers should pay respect to the complexity of the pro-
cesses and acknowledge that there are limited opportunities for designing policy mea-
sures which may have a significant impact on the development. The primary drivers 
of evolution are the entrepreneurs and the incumbent firms, not the policy-makers. 
However, the role of policy may be to develop adequate framework conditions and 
stimulate the development in areas where important bottlenecks or barriers are iden-
tified. 
In an innovation policy perspective, the comparison of marine biotechnology 
with m-commerce highlights a fundamental difference between activities that are 
oriented towards making product and process innovations, and those that have a sys-
temic goal. As shown, universities and public research institutes are much more com-
patible with the development of product and process innovations than with systemic 
innovations. This also explains the type of academic entrepreneurship observed in 
marine biotechnology. With m-commerce, the situation is different because its syste-
mic character requires a much more transdisciplinary approach in academia, and 
strong political commitment for making a systemic innovation in a policy perspec-
tive. Although ‘everyone’ acknowledges that transdisciplinarity is beneficial for cre-
ativity and innovation, the bottom-line is that academia and research funding organi-
zations do not encourage transdisciplinarity. In order to solve this structural and poli-
tical paradox, a different type of innovation policy approach needs to be developed. 
 121
Below, a few aspects of innovation policy related implications of this study will be 
discussed. 
In the case of m-commerce, the previous analysis illustrates that the most impor-
tant policy issue may be to influence framework conditions in order to prevent domi-
nant actors from blocking the evolution of the emerging system. In particular, two as-
pects are important, i.e.:  
• the de facto monopoly of the banks in electronic funds transfer, which blocks 
for the development of new forms of electronic transfer required for m-com-
merce, 
• the absence of an innovation regime for m-commerce which could facilitate 
the development of new standards required for the new system. 
The implications of these factors are that innovation policy should be coordinated 
with other policy fields like economic policy. Moreover, an adequate innovation re-
gime for the new system should be established in collaboration between governmen-
tal authorities and agencies, and other relevant industry actors. Cross-sectoral app-
roaches are required, and parallels may be drawn to the previous development of the 
Internet, GSM and other radical innovations that were promoted by new innovation 
regimes. 
Following up on this, a more general issue may be raised regarding how a policy 
regime may be developed on the one hand, to monitor the current innovation system 
and identify its strengths and weaknesses, and on the other, to develop routines for 
searching and identifying fields of potential policy intervention. 
In the case of marine biotechnology, our analysis illustrates how the evolution of 
a regional system may go on for several decades. The new system has developed 
gradually, one event following the other. To a significant extent, the current system 
may be recognized as being the result of a long-term strategy for regional develop-
ment in which a number of policy fields have been coordinated, like university po-
licy, R&D policy, industrial policy etc., and more recently the national innovation 
policy has also been of importance. 
On the one hand, this case illustrates how it is possible to build a ‘complete’ sys-
tem in terms of various institutions which facilitate the new development. On the 
other hand, however, the case also illustrates the importance of the local context, and 
the limitations of policy to facilitate the evolution of new clusters beyond the local in-
dustrial base. In spite of the long term and coordinated efforts between various autho-
rities and agencies, the actual cluster is still in a fairly marginal position; one of the 
main problems being the weak industrial structure of the area and the limited opportu-
nities for new businesses to develop adequate alliances or partnerships with other 
 122 
regionally based actors. Still, this shows that a targeted policy, i.e. ‘picking winners’ 
has its merits. 
The material presented and analyzed in this article accords well with other stu-
dies that portray commercialization as generally a complex process. The uniqueness 
of each case – each case being more or less idiosyncratic – amplifies this aspect. This 
makes prescription of policies and strategies aimed at increasing commercialization 
challenging. Still, there may be unexplored potentials for making some adjustments 
of policy measures and initiatives that could boost innovation and commercialization 
activities. This may be in the field of system innovations, as illustrated by the case of 
m-commerce in this article, or the introduction of new procedures in policy measures 
that are more clear and simple, as supported by the findings from the case of marine 
biotechnology. 
One key issue related to emerging systems and processes of commercialization is 
finding a realistic annual rate of new commercializations. As indicated by the regio-
nal system of marine biotechnology, the annual number of new spin-offs is fairly low, 
and may stand in contrast to general expectations in this field. In Norway, at least, 
there have been tendencies of a hype related to the organisation of technology transfer 
offices at the universities, abolishing teacher’s privilege, and the transfer of IPR to the 
universities. 
One approach to this question is a comparison of the achievements with other, 
comparable public programs designed to promote innovation and commercialization. 
In reports from the major program in Norway for commercialization of university 
research, statistics indicate that the average number of commercializations per univer-
sity is fairly low (Bolkesjø and Vareide 2004). Although comparable international 
data are difficult to obtain, at least some data indicate that Norway in no way seems 
to perform worse than other countries (Rasmussen et al 2007, EU 2004). However, it 
will be an important task in the future to develop better comparative statistics in the 
field of commercialization in order to improve understanding of what should be rea-
sonable expectations to university spin-offs and commercialization. 
Based on this, we will summarise this article by pointing at the following chal-
lenges in developing an adequate innovation policy: 
 
Challenge 1: Create more realism in expectations as to the potential for commer-
cialization by improving the knowledge base.  
Policy needs to develop a more realistic sense of what potential exist in various aca-
demic groups for commercial developments.. In this, analyses should be sensitive to 
the fact that academic groups are highly heterogeneous and that these play many dif-
ferent roles. Commercialization may be one of these. However, many academics are 
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not interested in working with commercialization. In addition, there is an inherent 
competition, possibly a conflict, between commercialization and research; many aca-
demics feel that commercialization may be detrimental to research. For this reason, 
policy should balance these interests and other obligations that academics are expec-
ted to fulfil (e.g. teaching). Still, these types of considerations need not be seen as 
giving commercialization lower priority; what is needed is more knowledge on the 
relationship and interdependencies of various roles that university people have. 
 
Challenge 2: Develop realistic, long-term strategies. 
As shown with the marine biotechnology case from Tromsø, development of this 
community has evolved over a long period. This accords well with findings from 
other commercialization efforts. The pace of development is usually incremental and 
slow, i.e. gradual and not governed by political fiat.  
Policy should recognize that commercial development needs a patient, long-term 
perspective – and that policy instruments need to adjust to the developmental pace of 
commercialization. A number of policy initiatives have set time-limits that are too 
short, creating discontinuity and disruption in the support that nurtures development 
of fledgling firms and spin-offs. For this reason, the time horizons of policy measures 
should be extended considerably. However, within such long-term perspectives, po-
licy should simultaneously develop mechanisms that undertake systematic evaluation 
of how various projects develop, and adjust their portfolio of support accordingly.  
 
Challenge 3: Developing system-related innovation competences and capabilities. 
Commercialization of novel products and services related to large systems should 
become a topic in policy and in R&D strategies. Although system approach often is 
stated as a goal in innovation policy statements, this is not reflected in policy mea-
sures and instruments and which more often than not are fragmented. Furthermore, 
innovation policy has a low awareness of issues and challenges related to develop-
ment of innovations in systems. The implication of this aspect was demonstrated in 
the case of m-commerce commercialization. As seen, this type of development de-
pends on factors and dynamics on a national or even international scale. However, 
this is also relevant in a regional perspective, as seen in the case of marine biotech-
nology in the Tromsø area and affiliated clusters of projects.  
Innovation policy should place greater focus on how systems work as systems – 
and development of innovations in systems. This should also encompass analyses in 
evaluations, i.e. become criteria in evaluations. Current evaluations are too focused 
on individual projects. By this, the systemic perspective tends to become weak or 
absent, and insights into the totality of policy measures at a system level are not 
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developed. In these types of overall system analyses, evaluation should attempt to 
identify bottlenecks and other specific barriers that are detrimental to commerciali-
zation, as shown in the case of m-commerce in this article. Hence research agendas 
and programs should be organized to accommodate strategies that are related to 
systems development. Although many policy measures and programs are designed for 
promotion of commercialization in specific industries or technological fields, these 
nevertheless seem to ignore how innovation systems work because system perspec-
tives are not taken into consideration. 
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On the role of academic staff as entrepreneurs in university 
spin-offs – case studies of biotechnology firms in Norway 
Olav R Spilling 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of academic staff in processes of commerciali-
sation. Taking the recent literature on commercialisation processes as its point of departure, 
the paper summarises contributions to describing commercialisation processes, various types 
of spin-off processes and the roles that may be taken by academic staff in such processes. The 
paper takes an explorative approach, and analyses the stories of four spin-off companies 
which all belong to the biotechnology sector, all part of an emerging cluster of firms deve-
loping in the local and regional area around one specific university. 
In the paper, various aspects of the commercialisation process and the role of academic 
staff are discussed. The entrepreneurial approaches are very diverse, from the professor who 
in collaboration with his students initiates the whole process and continues his research tasks 
in the new venture and combines it with his position as professor at the university, to the aca-
demics who leave the university and gain various sorts of experiences and then start their new 
venture based on minor contacts with the university. The results are discussed in view of the 
theory, and a classification of the cases based on the role of the academics and their links to 
the university is suggested. Based on the two dimensions of research commitment and entre-
preneurial commitment, a typology with four categories are suggested: the entrepreneurial 
professor, the industrial entrepreneur, the research oriented entrepreneur and the production 
manager. 
Introduction 
Over the last decades, an increasing interest has developed in the field of technology 
transfer from academic institutions, and as part of this a growing awareness of the 
importance of university spin-offs and academic entrepreneurship has evolved. The 
purpose of this paper is to focus on university spin-offs and analyse the role of 
academic staff in the processes of developing new firms spinning out from universi-
ties. While the concept of academic entrepreneurship may be perceived as a fairly 
wide concept including all types of entrepreneurial activity conducted by academic 
people, the concept of university spin-off focus more narrowly on the businesses star-
ting up based on new knowledge developed in a university department or a related 
research institute (Shane 2004). In this paper, focus is on the fairly complicated 
processes that may follow in the attempts of developing a new business based on 
research results, and in particular focus is on the role of academic staff in such pro-
cesses and how academic staff may contribute as entrepreneurs in the formation of 
new spin-off businesses. 
The literature on academic entrepreneurship, commercialization of research based 
knowledge and university spin-offs is fairly rich. However, much of the literature is 
based on a simple stage model approach for analysing processes of commer-
cialization, and there are tendencies of overlooking how complicated such processes 
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may be. Furthermore, although there are some important contributions to the discus-
sion of the various roles academic staff may take as entrepreneurs, there are tenden-
cies of providing a very simple picture of what the role of academic staff may be. 
The reason for this may be that much research in the field is based on surveys and 
cross-sectional approaches, which do not provide opportunities for following how the 
processes of commercialization evolve over time and to go into details about the 
complexity of such processes. Neither will these approaches provide good opportu-
nities for discussing the variety of how academic staff may contribute to the commer-
cialization process. 
In this paper the analysis is based on a longitudinal case study approach. Four 
spin-off firms have been selected for study; all four cases belong to the biotechnology 
sector and they are part of an emerging cluster of firms developing in the area around 
one specific university located in a city on the Norwegian coast. Based on the exami-
nation of the story of these four spin-offs and the entrepreneurs starting and develop-
ing the firms, the purpose of the paper is to develop more qualitative insights in pro-
cesses of commercialization and the role of academic staff in such processes.  
Although the main focus is on the entrepreneurial processes per se, it is important 
to analyse entrepreneurship as a contextualised phenomenon which is under influence 
of a number of factors (Spilling 2007). Generally, a number of institutions exist 
which are of importance in order to support the formation of university spin-offs. Par-
ticularly during the later years a number of new institutions have been developed in 
order to stimulate the creation of technology based firms and firms spinning out from 
universities. Although these institutions may be of some importance for the processes 
we are studying in this paper, they will not be our primary focus. Our main emphasis 
will be on the entrepreneurial processes per se, and the role of various support 
mechanisms will only be briefly commented to the extent they are reflected through 
the stories of the case entrepreneurs. 
Commercialization 
The main purpose of any spin-off process and technology transfer process is that of 
commercial exploitation of the new knowledge. As outlined by Spilling and Godø 
(this volume) the concept of commercialization may be identified as the process of 
transferring and transforming theoretical knowledge as existing in an academic 
institution into some kind of commercial activity (Chiesa and Piccaluga 1998). 
In the literature, one will find a number of different approaches for analysing 
commercialization processes, and generally these approaches are based on a stage 
model approach (Jolly 1997, Virtanen and Laukkanen 2002). For instance, Ndonzuau, 
Pirnay and Surlemont (2002) distinguish between the following four stages: 
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1. Generate business ideas from research 
2. Finalise new venture projects out of ideas 
3. Launch spin-off firms from projects 
4. Strengthen the creation of economic value by spin-off firms. 
As discussed by Spilling and Godø (this volume), an important aspect of the com-
mercialization process it that the process will undergo a shift from a mainly techno-
logy-driven process to a process which is mainly market-driven. This implies that 
scientific concepts and principles are turned into viable technologies and products or 
services, which means that knowledge is transformed from one mode to another 
(Chisa and Piccaluga 1998; Fontes 2003, 2005).  
Furthermore, the stage model approach invites to think in terms of linearity, i.e. 
the process goes smoothly through the various stages one by one. However, the point 
here is not to advocate a simplistic understanding of innovation processes as ‘linear’. 
As will be shown by the case studies of this paper, the processes may be very com-
plex. Thus, the purpose by referring to the stage model approach, is rather to point at 
a way of structuring and provide a basis for analysis (Ndonzuau, Pirnay and Surle-
mont 2002). 
During the commercialization process, actors may go back and forth between the 
stages, partly they may combine elements from different stages simultaneously, or 
important elements from different stages may come in a different order. The actors 
will also depend on interaction and communication with a number of other actors 
belonging to the business community as well as the research community. So, inter-
action across stages and organisational boundaries are most important for the process. 
On this background, the innovation process may be termed as ‘chaotic’ and as an 
‘innovation journey’ (Van de Ven et al 1999). 
However, a basic feature of commercialization of R&D is that it implies some 
kind of ‘linearity’ in the sense that the process necessarily will take the existing 
knowledge base as its point of departure, and the new project will start out based on 
the existing knowledge base. 
Academic spin-offs 
The main focus of this paper is on spin-offs from universities or research institutions, 
and our concern is about the entrepreneurial processes related to spin-offs and the role 
of academic staff in these processes. A commonly applied definition of a spin-off is a 
company that is created based on knowledge resources in a parent organisation, and 
which is organised independent, or at least partially independent, of the parent orga-
nisation (Birley 2002; Carayannis et al 1998; Dahlstrand 1999, 2000; Nicolaou and 
Birley 2003, Shane 2004, Steffensen et al 2004). Different concepts may be applied, 
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like academic spin-offs, university spin-offs or R&D spin-offs, and also the concept 
of ‘spinout’ is applied synonymously with spin-off. The spin-off is originated in an 
academic institution, and the entrepreneurs generally have their background as scien-
tists in this organisation. The new venture is based on the intellectual assets of the 
parent organisation (Birley 2002), and the process is typically characterised by an 
employee leaving this organisation in order to start the new company based on these 
assets (Carayannis et al 1998, Steffensen et al 2004). To qualify for a spin-off, the 
new business must be based on a business idea which originated in the previous orga-
nisation (Dahlstrand 2000); the new business is based on intellectual property deve-
loped in the parent organisation (Birley 2002; Carayannis et al 1998) and may include 
the transfer of rights (IPR) related to this. 
Pirnay et al (2002) state that any phenomenon can be qualified as a spin-off when 
it fulfils the following three conditions: 
• It takes place within an existing organization, generally known as the ‘parent 
organization’ 
• It involves one or several individuals, whatever their status and function are 
within the ‘parent organization’ 
• These individuals leave the ‘parent organization’ to create a new one. 
While much of the literature is focused on spin-offs resulting in wholly new 
firms, the concept may also include cases in which the new business activity is 
developed in an existing firm by way of selling licenses for obtaining the rights to 
exploit commercially the new technology (Shane 2002; Hill 1995). This also is a 
common way of organising technology transfer. The main point is not whether the 
spin-off ends up in a new firm, but that the result of the process is the creation of a 
new business activity, and independent of it is organised as a new legal business unit 
or it is adopted by an incumbent firm which organise the new business activity 
internally. However, in this paper we only focus on cases which involve the start-up 
of wholly new ventures. 
The literature on spin-offs provides many aspects of these processes. According 
to Roberts and Malone (1996) and Carayannis et al (1998), it may be distinguished 
between four types of actors that all will play important roles in the process, i.e. the 
parent organisation, the technology originator, the entrepreneur and the venture 
investtor, cf. summary in Table 1. Carayannis et al apply the concept of role rather 
than actor, but here we prefer to use the concept of actor as this gives a better 
identification than the concept of role. 
The classical way of organising a spin-off, is that one or more of the scientists 
who have contributed to developing the technological innovation, organise the new 
business and leave the parent organisation when the new venture is started. This is 
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what Birley (2002) characterises as an ‘orthodox’ spin-off, which is characterized by 
a ‘clean break’, that is the scientists previously employed by the parent organisation, 
leave to start the new business. This implies, referring to the types of actors summa-
rised in Table 1, that the scientist initially has the role as technology originator, and 
then follows up by taking the role as entrepreneur.  
Table 1: Main actors and their primary roles in the spin-off process  
Actor Examples Primary role 
Parent 
organisation  
University department, 
Research laboratory 
Host and organise R&D activities to create techno-
logical innovations. May also serve as a facilitator 
for spin-off processes 
Technology 
originator  
Individual or group of 
engineers or scientists  
Bring the technological innovation through the 
innovation-development process; bring the process 
to the point where technology transfer is possible 
Entrepreneur Engineers, scientists; 
‘external’ person with 
business knowledge 
Identify the business idea and develop the new 
business venture based on the technological 
innovation; take the technology to create a new 
venture from it 
The venture 
investor 
Venture capital organi-
zation, business angles, 
informal investors 
Provide the financial resources to develop the new 
venture, may also provide needed business 
management expertise  
Source: Based on Roberts and Malone 1996 and Carayannis et al 1998 
 
In addition to the orthodox spinout, Birley (2002) has introduced two other cate-
gories of spinouts (she applies the concept of spinout rather than spin-off); the tech-
nology spinout and the hybrid spinout. In the case of the technology spinout an out-
side actor (investor, manager or company) buys or leases the rights of exploiting com-
mercially the technological innovation. The academic staff continue in their roles as 
scientists and technology originators, while the entrepreneurial function of developing 
the new business activity is taken care of by external actors. Here, there is no overlap 
of personnel, the scientists remain as employees in the parent organisation, although 
they may contribute to the new venture development on a minor basis, for instance as 
consultants and equity holders. The third category, the hybrid spinout, represents a 
combination of the two previous categories; the new venture is based on a joint orga-
nisation of external and internal actors.  
A number of other authors have contributed to the discussion of spin-offs and 
academic entrepreneurship and focused on different aspects of such processes 
(Dickson, Coles and Smith 1998; Fontes 2003; Jones Evans 1997; Radosevitch 1995), 
and some typologies are summarised in Table 2.  
The typology suggested by Fontes (2003) is quite similar to that of Birley (2003). 
While Birley has distinguished between orthodox, technology and hybrid spin-offs, 
Fontes has distinguished between insider and outsider conducted commercialization 
and intermediary conducted process as the third category. The insider conducted pro-
cess corresponds to the orthodox spin-off as it is the scientific staff – the insiders – 
who conduct the process, while the technology spin-offs corresponds to the outsider 
 132 
conducted process. However, while the orthodox spin-off as defined by Birley im-
plies that the scientific staff involved in the process leave the university – it is a ‘clean 
break’ - this is not the primary focus in the typology of Fontes; her emphasis is on 
who conducts the process, whether they maintain their relationships with the research 
organisation or not. Furthermore, there is also a difference in the way the third cate-
gory is defined. While Birley regard the hybrid type as a mixture of the orthodox and 
the technology spin-off, the third category in the case of Fontes focus explicitly on 
intermediary organisations as potential actors in the process of commercialization. 
Table 2: Spin-offs and entrepreneurial roles 
Author Typology of spin-offs/ 
entrepreneurial roles 
Definitions/comments 
Birley 2002 Orthodox spinout Scientist(s) leave to form the new company – 
‘clean break’ 
 Technology spinout Outside actor organizes the commercial 
exploitation 
 Hybrid spinout Combination of inside and outside actors 
Fontes 2003 Insider conducted 
commercialization 
Insiders of the research organisation (RO) 
exploring knowledge originating from RO 
 Outsider conducted 
commercialization 
Outsiders who establish relationships to gain 
access to an RO to assist development of 
business ideas  
 Intermediary conducted 
commercialization 
Outsiders or (more rarely) insiders who operate 
as intermediaries in technology transfer as a 
business 
Radosevitch 
1995 
Inventor entrepreneur model Scientist(s)/inventor(s) organise the new 
venture 
 Surrogate entrepreneur 
model 
External actor with entrepreneurial experience 
organises the new venture 
Dickson, 
Coles and 
Smith 1998 
Academic entrepreneur Scientist who engages in entrepreneurial endea-
vours, but maintain their identity as academic 
scientists. 
 Entrepreneurial scientist Scientist operating full-time in the new business 
essentially dedicated to scientific interests. 
 Scientific entrepreneur Integration of scientific and business interests, 
utilising a high level of scientific intelligence to 
identify new business opportunities 
Jones Evans 
1997 
Research technical 
entrepreneur 
Producer technical 
entrepreneur 
User technical entrepreneur 
Opportunist entrepreneur 
Terminology based on the background of the 
entrepreneur 
 
A similar typology is also suggested by Radosevitch (1995) who has distin-
guished between two models for commercialization of public sector technology; the 
inventor entrepreneur model in which the scientist takes the role as entrepreneur and 
organises the new venture, and the surrogate entrepreneur model in which an external 
actor takes the role as entrepreneur. The advantage of the first model is that the tech-
nology originators organise the entrepreneurial process, and in this way provide 
greater technical capacity and have commitment to the technology and good relation-
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ships with the technology source. On the other hand this model implies disadvantages 
in terms of less experience from entrepreneurial activities and less business know-
ledge (Radosevitch 1995). The champion of the business idea is seldom the best to 
manage (Clarysse and Morey 2004). The advantages and disadvantages of the second 
model, the surrogate entrepreneur model, go in the opposite direction. Advantages are 
related to entrepreneurial experience and good contacts with the business community, 
while relationships with the technology originators will be less developed. 
A somewhat different framework is suggested by Jones-Evans (1997) who in his 
studies of technology-based entrepreneurs has distinguished between types of entre-
preneurs based on their background; that is in research or as producer, user or oppor-
tunist. The first category will coincide with the inventor entrepreneur model, while 
the other three relates to the surrogate entrepreneur model in which the process is 
organised by external actors with backgrounds from different positions in the busi-
ness community. 
The role of academic staff 
It follows from the previous discussion that the role of academic staff may represent a 
great variety, both in terms of what functions they are taking care of in the new ven-
ture, to what extent they get involved in the new venture, and to what extent they 
combine activity in the new firm with continued activity in the university or research 
organisation. 
One of the main issues is to what extent academic staff are involved in the role as 
entrepreneur or not. In the case of the orthodox spin-off, academic staff play the role 
as entrepreneurs, and obviously, they have to combine this role with their roles as re-
searchers devoted to further development of the technology. The same is the situation 
in the cases of insider conducted commercialization and the inventor entrepreneur 
model In the other models – the technology spin-off, outsider conducted commerciali-
zation or surrogate model – there are other actors recruited from outside that take care 
of the entrepreneurial role, and which means that the academic staff involved in the 
business may concentrate on the R&D related part of the venture development. 
Another issue is to what extent academic staff combine their role in the new ven-
ture with a role in the university or research organisation, and in what ways their aca-
demic position and activities are maintained. In most of the categories of spin-offs 
referred in Table 2, this is not clear. An exception is the category ‘orthodox spin-off’ 
which per definition implies that the academic staff leave the academic institution and 
work fulltime in the new venture.  
Furthermore, the typology suggested by Dickson et al (1998) is interesting in this 
respect as it distinguishes between academic entrepreneur, entrepreneurial scientist 
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and scientific entrepreneur. The ‘academic entrepreneur’ is the scientist who engages 
in entrepreneurial endeavours, but maintains his or her identity as academic scientist 
by maintaining the affiliation with the university or research organisation. In contrast 
to this, the ‘entrepreneurial scientist’ operates full-time in the new venture, but is 
essentially dedicated to scientific interests. The third category, the ‘scientific entre-
preneur’ is somewhat more unclear, but the point made by the authors is that this type 
of actor integrate ‘scientific and business interests’ and make important decisions re-
lated to the future development of the business based on ‘scientific intelligence to 
identify new business opportunities’ (Dickson et al 1998:36). Although their use of 
concepts are not intuitively fully clear, and it also is in conflict with the normally 
much broader concept of academic entrepreneurship, the distinctions inherent in the 
typology is interesting for the further discussion of the role of academic staff in pro-
cesses of commercialization. 
The issue of to what extent academic staff combine their role in the new venture 
with a role in the university or research organisation, has been investigated by Sam-
son and Gurdon (1993). Their conclusion is that in a significant majority of the cases 
they studied, the academics worked full time in the new ventures and maintained no 
relationships with the university. A smaller share of the academic staff combined part 
time affiliation with the new venture with full time activity in the university, and in 
just one case the academic remained in the university without maintaining any contact 
with the new venture. 
The variety of the roles of academic staff in the new venture is illustrated by a 
case described by Birley (2002), in which the roles of the different academics parti-
cipating in the team varied from fulltime participators as entrepreneurs to part time or 
temporary involvements as consultants, board members, members of advisory board 
and so on. An alternative may also be that the scientist work with the new venture for 
some time, for instance during the incubation phase, and then returns to his or her ori-
ginal position in the parent organisation. 
The institutional and systemic context for spin-offs 
As a result of the growing awareness of the importance of university spin-offs, it over 
the last decades has been developed a number of institutions and programs in order to 
facilitate processes of commercializing academic knowledge in most European count-
ries, like science parks, innovation centres and incubators (Albert et al 2002, Dahl-
strand 1999, Dahlstrand and Klofsten 2003, Stankiewicz 1998). Typically, these insti-
tutions are located in the vicinity of universities and R&D institutions, often on the 
university campus. Furthermore, the role of universities and other institutions for 
higher education has been addressed in many ways by for instance by organising in-
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dustrial liaison offices (ILO) and technology transfer offices (TTO), and by launching 
specific programs in order to facilitate commercialization processes (Rasmussen 
2006; Rasmussen et al 2007). 
The spin-off process takes place in the interface between the university or re-
search organisation and industry, and the process will to a significant extent depend 
on specific features of the university environment and milieu as well as the more 
general industrial and socio-cultural environment (Virtanen and Laukkanen 2002, 
Spilling 2008). The ability to identify and develop business opportunities will depend 
on a number of factors in this environment, including the entrepreneurial culture of 
the academic milieu, and so will the further processes of commercialization.22 The 
key driving force, however, is the entrepreneurs and their ability to identify and deve-
lop business opportunities, and as part of this to exploit resources available in the en-
vironment and organise partnerships or develop other forms of networks with impor-
tant actors. The institutional set-up may facilitate these processes, and in our analyses 
we will briefly comment on these aspects. Our main focus, however, will be on how 
the process of commercialization evolves and the role of academic staff in these pro-
cesses. 
Method and data 
This study is based on a qualitative case study approach in which four cases, all be-
longing to the biotechnology industry in the same geographical area, have been selec-
ted for study. All cases are regarded as being part of an emerging cluster formed 
around a university located in a city on the Norwegian coast. 
The research has been organised in two steps; first the development of the whole 
cluster has been mapped, mostly based on analysis of secondary data, including data 
available in public data sources. Also, some key data about the firms and their entre-
preneurship stories have been collected from the individual firms by e-mail contact. 
Furthermore, as the actual cluster is fairly small with some 15-20 companies, and is 
organised with a secretariat which organises a web site with an overview of the par-
ticipating firms, it has been fairly easy to collect information about the evolution of 
the whole cluster. 
The second step was to select four cases which seemed of interest to illustrate 
different roles of academic staff. The main criteria for selecting cases was that they 
should belong to the biotechnology cluster, they should be regarded as spin-offs from 
the university or a related research organisation located on campus, and they should 
represent variety. However, as there were problems in establishing contacts with 
                                                 
22 For a systematic account of how different system related factors may influence on the 
commercialization process, see Spilling and Godø in this volume. 
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some of the firms, we also had to be pragmatic and select among the firms with which 
we obtained contact. 
The four case companies have all been visited, and the main entrepreneur or actor 
in the process has been interviewed. In three cases the interview lasted for an hour, 
while in the fourth case, we had two interviews with a total duration of four hours. 
Data collected through the interviews have been supplemented with other available 
data of the firms, like accounting data and annual reports. For two of the cases, we 
tried to organise follow up interviews, but without success. 
The interviews were conducted as open and unstructured; the only structuring 
element was the process of commercialization and the entrepreneurship story related 
to this, and different events of importance to the development of the firms. However, 
entrepreneurial processes are often very complicated, and it takes a lot of time to map 
all details and to understand the story and the role of different actors. Given the short 
time available for most of the interviews, many details may be missing, and our main 
emphasis has been on illustrating the most important events of the entrepreneurship 
stories. 
Cases 
In the following sections we give a descriptive presentation of the four case firms and 
their entrepreneurs, here called BioX (the professor entrepreneur), BioLab (the labo-
ratory manager), BioPhD (the research based entrepreneurs), and BioGroup (the indu-
strial entrepreneur). As outlined above, all firms belong to the biotechnology sector 
and are part of an emerging cluster formed around a university. Three of the firms 
started with basis in the field of marine biotechnology, the part of biotechnology re-
lated to life in the sea, while the third company started up in pharmaceuticals. All four 
firms have evolved in the local area around the University, two of them even in the 
science park located on campus. To a significant extent, the cluster has developed in 
close interaction with the academic milieu of the University, and the University may 
be regarded as the main provider of the scientific knowledge base of the cluster. 
While the first company, BioX, started already in the mid 1980s and may be re-
garded as one of the pioneering firms of the cluster, the other firms are of later origin 
with start-ups during the 1990s and around the turn of the century. From one point of 
view the cases may be regarded as fairly homogenous, as they belong to the same sec-
tor, are based on the same type of knowledge and even are located in the same geo-
graphical area. On the other hand, as will be shown by the descriptions that follow, 
the four cases also represen significant variety, both in terms of patterns of develop-
ment and the ways academics have been involved. 
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Case A: The Professor Entrepreneur 
This is the story of one of the most successful university spin-offs within the field of 
biotechnology in Norway. The company, here called BioX, was established in 1984 
in collaboration between a university professor and four of his students. The company 
was reorganised in 1990, and experienced a steady growth during the 1990s. The 
company was listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange during the autumn 2005, and re-
ported 56 employees and a turnover of 73 million NOK in 2006. 
However, in order to understand this story, it is necessary to go back to 1972 
when the main person, the Professor, was employed at the University as professor at 
the Department of Biotechnology. From the very beginning, he was concerned about 
the industrial exploitation of biotechnology based knowledge, in particular related to 
fish farming and the health of fish. He was a pioneer in developing fish vaccines; he 
also contributed to the development of other technologies which successfully was 
exploited in the fish industry. When BioX started in 1984, the business idea was to 
develop technologies, including vaccines, for the fish farming and fish processing 
industry. The Professor was the main entrepreneur of the company and ‘orchestrated’ 
the whole business. However, he did not take the role as manager. This role was left 
to one of the participating students – Candidate A – while he himself took the posi-
tion as board chairman and research director. He also maintained his position as pro-
fessor, the first years in full position, later in an adjunct position.  
BioX had a good start and was profitable from the very beginning. However, the 
development was fairly unpredictable. The market for one of their business activities 
collapsed after a few years, while other markets developed very well. In particular, 
the team successfully developed a nutrition ingredient which turned out to be very 
favourable to the fish farming industry, and this triggered an interesting development 
partly based on research collaboration with an international company. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, a new owner took over the majority share of the 
company. After some time, however, the new owner went bankrupt, and the Professor 
and his team had to buy back the full ownership of BioX. After a short period of col-
laboration with another local firm, an exchange of business areas was organised in 
1990, and from now on BioX has focused on pharmaceutical products and developed 
its business activities within this field. During the 1990s, the company’s development 
was characterized by steady growth, one VC company was involved during the mid 
90ies, another VC was involved towards the end of the 1990s when BioX became a 
public company and prepared for the stock exchange, but due to the recession and the 
development in the capital market during the early 2000s, the listing on the stock ex-
change was postponed until 2005. 
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During almost the whole lifetime of BioX, the Professor has held the role as 
chairman of the board and worked as research director of the company. He has also, 
until recently, held his position as adjunct professor at the university. His students 
have also been involved. Candidate A had the role as managers for the first years of 
the company, then candidate B took over the role as manager after some years. In the 
mid 1990s B left the company and is now the managing director of another company. 
Candidate C, who has followed BioX all the time, took then over as managing direc-
tor, and has been in this position until recently (2006) when he moved to another 
company in the biotechnology sector. Both the Professor and Candidates B and C are 
still shareholders of BioX. 
An interesting aspect of the role of the Professor is his role as serial entrepreneur, 
as he has been involved in some other start-ups. However, this will not be discussed 
further here.23 
Case B: The research based entrepreneurs 
The story of this company, which we call BioPhD, may be traced back to 1992 when 
two doctoral students started a research project to test a protein with a very high level 
of anti-bacteria activity, and identified a field with great potential for further develop-
ment and potentials for commercialization. Contacts were established with a national 
pharmaceutical company, joint research activities were organised with the company 
as lead partner, and up to 2001 about 50 million NOK were spent on these research 
activities which resulted in five patents. 
However, the pharmaceutical company restructured and changed strategy, and 
left the project. BioPhD was then established in 2003 with the two previous doctoral 
students as cofounders, and the rights to the developed IPR were transferred to their 
company. 
The company is organised with a small staff of four people, including the two 
cofounders who are combining their work in BioPhD with half time positions as pro-
fessor and assistant professor respectively, at the University. The company is still 
(2007) in its early stage stage of development; their main activity includes further 
testing of their products, and this is estimated to continue for another 2-3 years. The 
basic funding of their activity has been provided by private placements, first in two 
rounds in 2004-2005, then a follow up round in 2006 of NOK 20 millions which was 
heavily oversubscribed. 
An option for the future may be to look for an industrial partner in order to orga-
nise a joint venture, but licensing may also be an alternative. 
                                                 
23 For a discussion of the whole story related to BioX and the Professor Entrepreneur, see Spilling 
2007. 
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Case C: The laboratory manager 
The story of this company, which we call BioLab, started in 1993 when a research 
institute, which we call RI, located on campus of the actual university was visited by 
a Japanese person interested in kitosan which is an important ingredient in cosmetics. 
The contact revealed that RI had capacity for producing kitosan of very good quality. 
However, due to various reasons, the contact with the Japanese did not lead to any 
form of collaboration. 
In 1994, RI started collaboration with a German company, and a joint research 
project was organised. In 1995 a new company, which we call Company C, was 
started jointly by the two parties in order to exploit the commercial opportunities 
which were expected to develop based on the research activities. A patent was ob-
tained, it was owned 50-50 by RI and the German company - and was licensed to 
Company C. 
In 1998 BioLab was established. It was owned jointly by the German company 
and Company C. BioLab was originally manned with a manager with background 
from the UK, and with two of the staff from RI in charge of the research activities and 
operation of laboratory facilities. A new production plant was set up not far away 
from campus, and all its produced kitosan was delivered to the German company 
which sold it to their customers. However, the Germans faced market problems, only 
parts of the production capacity of BioLab were exploited, and a very complicated 
story followed. Eventually, Company C gave up their involvement in BioLab, the 
German company started a process of restructuring, it sold out all their business acti-
vities related to ingredients which were taken over by another company which we call 
“Int-C Scandinavia”, which is the Scandinavian branch of a European company. 
Since then, Int-C Scandinavia has hired RI to manage the production activity of 
BioLab, which is still operating in 2007 on a modest scale, two people are employed 
in the production facilities, and the role as production manager is contracted to RI 
with one of their research directors in charge. 
Case D: The industrial entrepreneurs 
This company, which started as BioNutra and later was restructured into BioGroup, 
was established in 2000 by two founders with various backgrounds in biotechnology 
related research and industrial experience. One of the founders was originally an eco-
nomist and has his background in industrial activity and also research activities at a 
centre for fishery research; the other has his background in marine biotechnology and 
has also previous experience as an entrepreneur. 
Based on their industrial experience, they developed a very ambitious strategy for 
starting a new company in the consumer and animal food ingredients industry. The 
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first development was based on collaboration with an American company which had 
a product BioNutra obtained licence to sell world wide. They started planning a pro-
duction facility in Norway, and the American company acquired the majority of the 
shares of BioNutra. However, the relationship between the American company and 
the Norwegian founders did not work very well. A very complicated story followed, 
the end of which was that the founders acquired back the full ownership of their com-
pany.  
A period of reconsidering their strategy followed, they reorganised their business 
activities into the new company BioGroup. A private placement was successfully or-
ganised in 2004, and a rapid development has followed with the integration of other 
companies, among them a production facility located in the region. BioGroup was by 
2007 probably the fastest growing biotech company in the region, and planned to be 
listed on the Oslo Stock exchange during 2007. 
The reported sales in 2006 were more than 70 million NOK, and the company 
employed around 55 people. 
Processes of commercialization and firm development 
The four cases illustrate that processes of commercialization may be complicated and 
turbulent, and they may last for many years, even some decades. This is in contrast to 
the simple pictures provided by most stage models. To illustrate this, we have sum-
marised some characteristics of the evolution of the cases in Table 3. 
To the extent these cases are representative, there is no simple way from research 
to a successful, viable company. In the case of BioX (Case A), which so far seems to 
be the most successful company, it took more than twenty years from the initial start 
until the full fledging company was listed on the stock exchange; the company is still 
in its early stages of development, it is still investing heavily in R&D and have repor-
ted significant deficits the last years. Furthermore, the initial years of the development 
of BioX were characterised by a high level of turbulence, with the need for reorgani-
sing the business activities several times before finding a sustainable structure of the 
company. 
In the case of BioPhD (Case B), the initial research period lasted for more than 
ten years, and the company has so far not earned money and have yet a long way to 
go to complete the process of commercialization. Thus, the way from research based 
knowledge to an operative business may be very long. 
In case C (BioLab), the time horizon has been shorter, as the actual product basi-
cally was developed when contact was established with the industrial partner. How-
ever, in spite of this, the start-up of the new production facility was based on five 
years’ collaborative research activities. 
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In case D, the pattern of development is quite different. The main focus of the 
new company, BioNutra, was to organise production of ingredients that were fairly 
well developed and more ready for the market than in the other cases. R&D activity 
was less important in this case, and the company was profitable after a few years in 
business. 
What really seems to complicate the process of commercialization, are the rela-
tions between the emerging new businesses and their industrial partners. In the case 
of BioX, alliances with another company were important in the early stages in order 
to get access to capital, and also to technology and markets. However, when their 
partner faced economic problems, it threatened the whole development of the com-
pany which had to restructure its activities. In the case of BioPhD, the initial strategy 
was to develop the new business in collaboration with of one of the leading, national 
pharmaceutical companies, and extensive research activities were organised. A poten-
tial outcome of this process might be that the new pharmaceuticals were included in 
the company’s product portfolio. However, the company changed strategy and de-
fined its core business in other fields. The development of the new business activity 
was threatened, and this necessitated the start-up of the new company, BioPhD. 
In the cases C and D, the evolution has been even more turbulent. The industrial 
partners have faced very significant economic problems related to the market. In the 
case of BioLab, their partner reorganised, and a new partner has been involved. In the 
case of BioNutra, the relationship between the entrepreneurs and their partner turned 
out as very problematic, the relationship was ended, and the entrepreneurs redefined 
their strategy which led to a new start and the reorganisation of their business activity 
into BioGroup. 
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Table3: Stages in the processes of commercialization of case companies 
 Case A 
The Professor Entrepreneur 
Company: BioX 
Case B 
The Research Based Entrepreneurs 
Company: BioPhD 
Case C 
The Laboratory Manager  
Company: BioLab 
Case D 
The Industrial Entrepreneurs 
Company: BioNutra/BioGroup 
Pre start-up 
development 
1972-1980 
Various research activities at the Depart-
ment of Biotechnology at the University 
in collaboration with various companies; 
developing and implementing new 
technologies 
1992-2001 
Extensive research activities over several 
years organized in collaboration between 
the University and a leading national 
pharmaceutical company (NPC), with the 
company was the lead partner. E  
1993- 
Research activities in the field of 
marine biotechnology, organised at 
a research institute (RI) located on 
campus. Research collaboration with 
a German company on applying 
kitosan in cosmetics.  
1990s 
The two entrepreneurs have various  
backgrounds from research activity at 
the University and larger companies in 
Norway and abroad, one of them also 
with background as the entrepreneur in 
a regionally based biotech firm  
Entrepreneur(s) Professor at the Department of 
Biotechnology in collaboration with 
some of his students. 
Two PhD candidates from the University 
(Department of Medicine and 
Department of Chemistry) 
German company in collaboration 
with RI and a local company. 
Two  co-founders; a) a candidate from 
the University and b) an economist 
educated abroad 
Triggering factor 
for start-up 
The Professor and some of his students 
identified new opportunities for 
commercialization 
NPC restructured their business activity 
and focused on other fields 
RI contacts with industry represent-
atives interested in their kitosan. 
Ambitions to start a fast growth biotech 
company  
Start-up year/firm 1984: BioX 2003: BioPhD 1998: BioLab 2000: BioNutra / 2003: BioGroup 
Field of business Fish vaccines 
Fish food ingredients 
Enzyme technology 
Development of pharmaceutical products 
– anti-cancer drugs 
Production of kitosan. All 
production sold to the German 
company. 
Consumer and animal food ingredients 
Early development 1984-1900 
Developed and launched various pro-
ducts, turbulent market development: 
• BioX was acquired by another com-
pany which experienced economic 
problems 
• BioX was acquired back by the entre-
preneurs 
• Collaboration with a local company, 
exchange of business areas 
• Research collaboration with a leading 
international company 
2003 –  
The company is heavily involved in 
developing anti-cancer drugs, and is still 
in the stage of testing out various 
molecules. 
Funding of activity by private investors – 
two private placements organised in 
2003-2004, and a new placement in 2006. 
Additional funding by public research 
programs. 
1998-2004 
Market problems, only a smaller 
part of the production capacity was 
utilised. Turbulent development; 
was taken over by the Scandinavian 
branch of an international company 
in 2004. 
2000-2003 
Collaboration with an American 
partner, obtained licence for producing 
one of their products, majority 
ownership taken over by the partner. 
Production facility opened in 2002. 
Turbulent development, partnership 
cancelled, the founders got back full 
ownership of their company.. 
Later development 1990 – 
BioX was restructured and established in 
its current form in 1990 with focus on 
pharmaceutical products 
• Steady growth, two emission during 
the 1990s 
• Organised as public company in 2000 
• Listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in 
2005 
 
The company is still in its early 
development. 
2004- 
The company is operated on a low 
level activity; app. one third of the 
production capacity is exploited. 
The production facility is managed 
by the staff of RI.. 
2003- 
Reorganising of company, steady 
growth in own business activities and 
expansion through investments in other 
companies, building a company group. 
Plans to be listed on Oslo Stock 
Exchange during 2007. 
Status 2006 
(million NOK) 
No of employees: 56  
Turnover: 73 
Profit: - 40 
R&D activity: 35 
Employees: 4 
Turnover: 2,8 
Profit: - 4.2 
Two people employed in 
production, two academic staff 
sharing the role as manager 
Employees; 55 
Turnover: about. 72 
Profit: 5,2 
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Although the cases are not necessarily representative for the whole cluster, im-
pressions based on summary information about the other companies of the cluster 
may indicate that the four stories are not unique. A common feature of the evolution 
of this type of biotechnology firms seems to be the long time horizon of their deve-
lopment and that the outcomes of the processes are less predictable. There is a long 
way to go from the initial research results and to the new, commercially viable busi-
ness is established (Hine and Kapeleris 2006). Thus, the cases support our earlier 
comments that simple stage models may be less adequate to describe the complexity 
and turbulence of the processes. It seems to be a quite common phenomenon that pro-
jects have to be redefined and reorganised, and support the view that such processes 
often may be chaotic (Van de Ven et al 1999). 
The spin-off processes 
To facilitate our further discussion, we have summarised some characteristics of the 
spin-off processes in Table 4. Our point of departure is that all four cases may be 
classified as university spin-offs as they have developed in close relationship with the 
university or related research institutes. However, the form of this relationship varies 
between the four cases. 
Case A and B are similar in the sense that the point of departure for the develop-
ment was research activities conducted at the university. In case A, the new firm was 
initiated by the Professor in collaboration with some of his students, and the new 
start-up was directly based on knowledge developed in the university department. 
Thus, the University Department may be regarded as the parent organisation, the pro-
fessor and his students were the technology originators, and the spin-off process may 
be classified as an insider conducted process; insiders were in charge of the process of 
commercialization in the early stages of development. 
Similarly in case B, the development of the new venture was triggered by the re-
search activities of the two PhD candidates. However, their original research was only 
a point of departure for extensive further research which was organised over several 
years in a national pharmaceutical company, and when the new company eventually 
was started by the two PhD candidates, the spin-off may be said to originate from the 
national company rather than the university. However, the link back to the university 
is quite clear as the initial research activities started there, and the follow up research 
was organised in collaboration between the company and the university. So this may 
also be classified as an insider conducted university spin-off, although the links are 
more indirect than in the previous case. 
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Table 4: Characteristics of the spin-off processes 
 A. BioX B. BioPhD C. BioLab D. BioGroup 
Parent 
organisation 
University Depart-
ment (Department of 
Biotechnology) 
University Department 
in collaboration with a 
national pharmaceutical 
company (NPC) 
Research Institute 
(RI) located on 
University campus 
No specific parent 
organisation.  
Technology 
originator 
The professor and 
some of his students 
Two PhD candidates in 
collaboration with the 
R&D department and 
NPC 
The Research Institute No specific techno-
logy originator; based 
on already developed 
technology 
Entrepreneur(s) The Professor and 
some of his students 
The two PhD candidates Industrial partner 
(German company) 
Two academic candi-
dates with supplemen-
tary industrial and 
entrepreneurial back-
ground; also some 
background in 
research 
Type of spin-off Insider conducted Insider conducted Outsider conducted Indirect spin-off 
Outsider conducted 
Role of 
academic staff 
Entrepreneurial, with 
combined focus on 
R&D and business 
development 
Entrepreneurial, but 
with main focus on 
R&D 
Production 
management 
Entrepreneurial from 
an outsider position 
Location of 
company 
Headquarter and labo-
ratories located in the 
city close to campus; 
also an office in Oslo 
In the science park on 
campus 
Production facilities 
located a few kilo-
metres outside 
campus 
Headquarter located 
in science park on 
campus, production 
facilities located else-
where in the region 
Venture 
investors 
Start-up: The Entre-
preneurs 
Next stages: 
• Industrial partners 
• National Venture 
Capital firms 
• IPO (Listed on 
Oslo stock 
exchange 2005) 
Start-up: The entre-
preneurs 
Next stages: 
• Private placements  
Industrial partner Start-up: The entre-
preneurs 
Next stages: 
• Private placements  
• Planned IPO (Oslo 
Stock Exchange) in 
2007 
Public research 
funding? 
Yes, extensively Yes, extensively No Yes, moderate 
Support from 
Innovation 
Norway? 
No Yes, start-up grant No No 
Public seed 
capital? 
No Yes, regional seed 
capital fund 
No Yes, regional seed 
capital fund 
 
The third case, BioLab, is different in the sense that the main entrepreneurial 
actor in the commercialization process was an international company, and the spin-off 
may be regarded as an outsider conducted spin-off. However, the scientific 
knowledge was developed on campus. 
The fourth case, BioGroup, comes in a different category in terms of how the spe-
cific knowledge for commercialization has been originated, and what role the acade-
mic staff have taken in the process. First, it is not possible to identify a specific parent 
organisation of the research the company is based on. The basis for developing the 
company has mostly been already developed or semi-developed nutrition products, 
and the company has to a significant extent evolved through acquisition and expan-
sion of existing production processes. Second, the founders of the firm have started 
 145
from a position as outsiders; based on their previous industrial and entrepreneurial 
experiences they developed their new business idea and so far succeeded in develop-
ing a fast growing company. 
Although their links to the university are not as clear as in the other cases, the 
links seem strong enough to classify the company as a university spin-off. The two 
founders have significant relationships with the university; one of them as a graduate 
(master candidate) from the university, while the other was employed as research fel-
low at one of the research institutes. Furthermore, the company headquarter is located 
in the science park on campus, and the company is now conducting R&D in part fun-
ded by a R&D program organised in order to stimulate the development of the bio-
tech cluster around the university. It seems quite obvious that BioGroup would never 
have been established in the area, if it had not been for the local knowledge base and 
the emerging cluster formed around the University. However, it may be adequate to 
classify this case as an indirect university spin-off. 
The role of institutions 
The four cases belong to an emerging industrial cluster located in a fairly marginal 
region facing some significant problems related to industrial development. For seve-
ral decades, the region has pursued a systematic strategy for regional development. 
One of the main elements in their strategy has been the development of the university 
and to provide education and develop research activities in areas with a high potential 
for industrial development. As a part of this strategy, a diversified structure for facile-
tating technology transfer and university spin-offs has been developed; research cent-
res have been established in order to specialise in areas like fishery and marine bio-
technology, a science park and related incubator facilities was established in the mid 
1990s, a specific research program focusing on marine biotechnology has been orga-
nised to stimulate commercialization and interaction between the academic institu-
tions and industry. Furthermore, regionally based seed capital funds have been or-
ganised, the University has organised its technology transfer office, and a process for 
developing forum and network to support the cluster development has been organised 
in collaboration between many parties during the last years. 
In Table 4 we have briefly summarised to what extent the case companies has 
taken advantage of the various support mechanisms. This may be summarised in the 
following points: 
• The most important factor is the research activities organised at the university, 
and the quality and entrepreneurial orientation of the research staff. This has 
been an important basis for establishing all four companies. 
• Two cases are located in the science park on campus. 
 146
• Three cases have obtained funding from national and regional R&D programs 
• Mostly, the four cases have been based on private risk capital obtained 
through private placements and public offerings. Local seed capital is invol-
ved in two of the cases, and as a part of this, representatives for the seed capi-
tal fund are on the boards of these companies. 
• Start-up grant is obtained from the national innovation agency in one case.  
On this background it may be concluded that there are some working support me-
chanisms that may be of importance for the evolution of the cluster. However, when 
talking with the actors involved in the new ventures, their main concern is about all 
the challenges related to the organising and strategic development of their company. 
Various support mechanisms may facilitate this; however, the main driving force is 
the entrepreneurs themselves. 
The role of academic staff 
The role of the academic staff varies between the four cases, and will now discuss in 
some details their roles in developing the new venture, in particular how they have 
been involved as entrepreneur, and how they have conbined their role in the new ven-
ture with their role at the university or the research institute. 
BioX (Case A): The Professor was the main entrepreneur and took the role of 
“orchestrating” the whole business while combining the position of research director 
with the position as chairman of the board, a position he has held continuously until 
recently. During the whole period, he has also maintained close contacts with the uni-
versity. During the first years he kept his position at the university in combination 
with part time involvement in the company, later he was working full time in the 
company as research director and combined this with a part time position as adjunct 
professor at the University, a position he held until the turn of the century. And as 
part of this he has also been the supervisor for PhD students.  
With his main focus on ‘orchestrating’ the development of the new venture, the 
Professor may be characterised as very entrepreneurial. Based on the framework sug-
gested by Dickson et al (1998), he may be characterised as a ‘scientific entrepreneur’. 
He has been ‘utilising a high level of scientific intelligence to identify new business 
opportunities’ (Dickson et al 1998:35), and during most of his life long career, he has 
been able to combine his role as entrepreneur with his position as professor at the uni-
versity.24 
BioPhD (Case B) has to some extent followed the same pattern of development 
as BioX. The main focus of the two entrepreneurs has been on R&D. They were 
                                                 
24 The Professor is widely recognised as a pioneer in developing industrial applications based on 
marine biotechnology, and he was in 2005 appointed Doctor of Honour by the University 
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involved in research projects at the university, identified interesting opportunities for 
commercialization, established collaboration with a national company which 
organised more research in the field. When the company changed strategy, the IPR 
was transferred to the research fellows who started their new business in which they 
continued their R&D activities related to developing new anti-cancer drugs. Both 
founders combine their activities in the company with half time positions at the 
University. However, what distinguishes this approach from that of BioX, is that they 
still have a long way to go to develop the commercial potential, and they have not yet 
clarified what will be the future commercial model of the company. They also seem 
to have a stronger focus on R&D and disciplinary matters than on the commercial 
issues which they leave to other members of the team. 
BioLab (Case C) represents a very different story as the academic staff have not 
taken the lead role in the entrepreneurial process, but rather have had a supportive 
function to the external partner that has organised the new business. The main focus 
of the research institute and the two research fellows involved in the process, has 
been that of supporting their industrial partner in developing the production facilities, 
while they have not been involved in other functions related to the new business. 
When the new business eventually was operating, their main task has been that of 
managing the production process on a contract basis. 
BioGroup (Case D) represents another and quite different story. The two entre-
preneurs have both backgrounds as academics – one as a business economist who 
graduated at a university in the US, the other as a biologist who graduated at the 
University – and both have some academic experience in research related to fishing 
and the marine sector. However, their main background is industrial as they have 
worked with larger industrial companies for some years. One of the entrepreneurs 
also has previous experience as an entrepreneur as he during the 1990s was one of 
two cofounders of a biotechnology firm in the region. 
The approach of the two founders of has been very entrepreneurial. Their 
business idea was to organise commercial production of consumer and animal food 
ingredients that basically were developed, and their main focus has been on 
exploiting business opportunities in this field, and they are pursuing a very ambitious 
growth strategy. Based on the previous framework, they are operating as actors who 
are external to the university and the research institutes, they are the ‘surrogate 
entrepreneurs’ (Radosevitch 1995), and with their strong emphasis of 
industrialisation, it may be adequate to characterise them as ‘industrial entrepreneurs’. 
The four cases illustrate that the approaches in the entrepreneurial processes may 
be rather diverse. To some extent, this diversity may be explained due to differences 
in types of knowledge that are exploited in the process of commercialization, and thus 
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the role of R&D is very different. In case A and B, continued R&D activity is a basic 
precondition for the commercialization process, and actually the R&D activity is the 
most important part of the business, at least in the early stages. Naturally, then, the 
academic staff may take a leading role in organising the new venture.  
In case C, R&D activities were important in the early stages, and it was related to 
testing out the use of a specific ingredient for a cosmetic product controlled by their 
industrial partner. The role of the research institute was basically that of testing out 
the product and developing the production facilities, while knowledge related to the 
final consumer product and marketing was controlled by the partner. In this case it 
was a natural solution to hire the research institute and their staff for managing the 
production process. 
In case D, the products mostly were developed prior to start-up. The start-up was 
based on a licence agreement, and an important task was to set up production facili-
ties. It has also been an important part of the company’s strategy to integrate other 
businesses in the group. Thus, their primary activities have been less research based, 
it is the entrepreneurial process and knowledge related to this that has been most es-
sential when organising this venture. 
When processes of development are in the early stages of development and a high 
level of R&D activity still is required, this will naturally give much more opportuni-
ties for academic staff than commercialization processes focusing on more developed 
areas. Both Case A and B are examples of early stage processes in which it is a long 
way to go to be in the market with their products. Case D represents the opposite situ-
ation, the commercialization process is close to the market, other types of competen-
ces are more essential, and this gives room for the ‘surrogate’ entrepreneurs. 
In order to structure our understanding of the roles of academics in spin-out pro-
cesses, we have set up a matrix based on two dimensions, research commitment and 
entrepreneurial commitment, and the typology derived from this, is displayed in 
Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Typology of the role of academic staff in spin-off ventures 
  Research Commitment 
  High Low 
 
 
 
High  
The entrepreneurial professor 
Continued focus on developing new 
commercial activities based on a high 
level of scientific commitment 
(BioX) 
The industrial entrepreneur 
Main task to organise and develop the 
new business, strong focus on market 
opportunities and industrialisation 
(BioGroup) 
 
 
 
Entrepre-
neurial 
Commit-
ment 
 
 
Low 
The research oriented entrepreneur 
Main focus on research and 
disciplinary activities in the new firm, 
involvement in business activities is 
balanced with the academic career 
(BioPhD) 
The production manager 
The role in the company mainly 
devoted to manage routine tasks, no 
R&D activity involved. Keeps the main 
position in the university or research 
institute 
(BioLab) 
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‘The entrepreneurial professor’ has the main focus on the over all development of 
the business and works continually with developing the commercial activity. He com-
bines a high level of entrepreneurial commitment with a high level of commitment in 
research. The basis for this is his or her scientific merits, and in order to maintain the 
high level of scientific quality, it is important to combine the role in the company 
with a continued position at the university. In the specific case of BioX, the Professor 
has maintained such close relationships through out his whole career, although he du-
ring the last decade worked full time in the company. 
‘The industrial entrepreneur’ is highly committed to entrepreneurial activities, 
and is less committed to research and disciplinary activities. This also means that 
links to the university are weaker, although the background as an academic with 
knowledge in the specific field is important and may be a key precondition for 
conducting the role as entrepreneur in an adequate way. In the case of BioGroup, the 
entrepreneurs have important industrial and entrepreneurial backgrounds, which 
provided a platform for starting up one of the most dynamic and fast growing biotech 
companies in the actual cluster. 
The next category is ‘the research based entrepreneur’ who starts a new business 
to develop commercial activity based on own research. Although this type of entre-
preneur contributes to start new businesses which may have a high potential, the main 
focus of the academic is on research and disciplinary matters. This category is close 
to what Dickson et al (1998) denote as ‘entrepreneurial scientist’ with main focus on 
scientific issues, while other aspects of the entrepreneurial function is left to other 
members of the team. In the case of BioPhD, the company is organised with a small 
team, and important functions related to the commercial development are delegated to 
the other team members, while the two founders dedicate much of their time for their 
work in the University. 
The fourth category is called ‘the production manager’, and point to a situation in 
which the academic staff who have contributed to the start-up of the new venture, 
have a rather limited role in new business in terms of R&D. Their main role is con-
fined to routine management activities. In the case of BioLab, the staff have conti-
nued in their ordinary positions in the parent organisation (the Research Institute) and 
serve as manager for the new production facility on a part time basis. 
Conclusion 
This study has provided some important insights regarding processes of commerciali-
zation and the role of academic staff in commercialization processes. 
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First, it is important to recognise that processes of commercialization may be 
characterised by complexity, turbulence and a high level of uncertainty. While the 
literature to a significant is based on simple stage model approaches, evidence presen-
ted here indicate that processes may be very complex, sometimes chaotic, and there 
may often be a need for redefining and reorganisation of the project. Processes of 
commercialization are often less predictable, and when planning such processes – to 
the extent planning is possible – it is important to have an open and flexible approach 
and be prepared to redefine and start the project in a new way. It may be of the great 
importance that academics involved in such acknowledge these aspects of processes 
of commercialization. 
Second, academic staff may take different roles in processes of commercializa-
tion, and there may be different routes from the academic position in the university to 
the new venture where the academics may be involved in various ways. Based on the 
two dimensions of academic and entrepreneurial commitment, we have developed the 
following typology of roles of academics in processes of commercialization: 
• The entrepreneurial professor with a high commitment in entrepreneurial tasks 
as well as research 
• The industrial entrepreneur with a high commitment in entrepreneurial tasks 
while less commitment in research 
• The research oriented entrepreneur with a high commitment in research acti-
vities and less in entrepreneurial tasks 
• The production manager, who has low commitment in research as well as in 
the entrepreneurial tasks of the firm, but who still has an important role in ma-
naging the production of the new company. 
The typology may provide a framework for a more differentiated discussion of 
the role of academic staff in spin-offs. While much of the literature do not discuss the 
various roles that academics may take in such processes – this framework may 
provide a basis for a more differentiated discussion, and for further development of 
knowledge in the field. 
In academic milieus there are often perceived conflicts between academic and 
commercial activities, and there may be significant barriers to develop a more entre-
preneurial culture. And pointing at ‘the entrepreneurial professor’ as the ideal role, 
may even increase the barriers, as this role will be unrealistic to most academic staff. 
Probably, there are few academics that are able to take this role, as it requires a very 
unique combination of scientific and entrepreneurial skills. In this context, the sug-
gested framework may be of importance to point at different ways that academic staff 
may contribute to develop new ventures and to contribute to the development of a 
more entrepreneurial university. 
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The suggested typology is the result explorative research, and as the empirical 
evidence so far is limited, it would be interesting with follow up studies to test out the 
typology, and possibly develop it further. 
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Innovation in the public sector – identifying the concept and 
the systems of innovations 
Rannveig Røste 
 
Abstract 
The innovation literature has established a thorough understanding of the main processes 
underlying the development of new products and production processes in the private sector. 
On the other hand, the public sector has been largely ignored. Recently though, there has been 
a growing interest in studying innovation in this sector. But what is innovation in the public 
sector? It has been a tendency to consider the public sector as something uniformly different 
from the private sector – as rigid and bureaucratic in contrast to competitive and innovative. 
This paper questions this dualistic view, and aims at identifying the genuine understanding of 
innovation in the public sector. The paper reviews the literature that addresses the 
phenomenon and reveals the definitions and discussions of the concept. Moreover, the paper 
discusses how the System of Innovation approach might contribute to identify the systems of 
innovation in the public sector. 
Introduction 
Innovation might be defined as “(…) new creations of economic significance. They 
may be brand new but are more often new combinations of existing elements” 
(Edquist 1997, p. 1). Despite this relatively broad definition of innovation, the 
innovation literature is dominated by studies of new products and production 
processes in the traditional manufacturing industry (e.g. Drejer 2003). Moreover, the 
literature has almost totally neglected what is a major aspect of all European 
economies: the public sector activities. Recently though, there has been a growing 
interest in innovation in the public sector (e.g. Osborne 1998a; Borins 2001; Albury 
2005). But what is actually innovation in the public sector? Is innovation in the public 
sector the same as in private companies? The studies mentioned do not answer these 
questions fully. Thus, the aim of this paper is to develop the understanding of the 
concept of innovation in the public sector.  
Generally, it is a tendency to consider the public sector as something uniformly 
different from the private sector – as bureaucratic, inactive and constant in contrast to 
the productive, competitive and innovative private sector. The difference is thought to 
be in the lack of the mechanism of the market. The market mechanism is understood 
to be the overall mechanism for the success in the private sector, pushing the firms to 
develop new products and production processes in order to be competitive and 
survive in the market. The productivity in the public sector, on the other hand, is 
thought to be held back by monopolistic production systems and bureaucratic 
structures. This is the foundation for the New Public Management (NPM), a set of 
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fairly similar administrative doctrines that have dominated the bureaucratic reform 
agenda in the OECD countries from the late 1970s until today. What unites many of 
these reforms is the use of private sector management principles for improving 
efficiency in the public sector. The debate around these principles has been one of the 
most striking international trends in the public administrative literature in the last 
decades, and is undoubtedly central for the understanding of innovation in the public 
sector. However, this paper will not follow the debate of NPM, but questions a basic 
premise for the debate, namely that the public sector is something uniformly different 
from the private sector. This paper then, aims at exploring what are the main 
mechanisms for innovation in the public sector, and how these are different from and 
similar to innovation in the private sector. 
The conceptual framework of the classic System of Innovation approach (e.g. 
Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Edquist 1997) emphasises that 
innovation emerges within systems, where all the actors and the relations and 
dynamics between the actors, must be studied to understand the cumulative 
accumulation of knowledge and competence in a company. That is, how the company 
undergoes a learning process when the expertise and experiences in the system are 
absorbed and transferred into own skills and know-how. Malerba (2004a, p. 9) claims 
that: “(…) innovation takes place in quite different sectoral environments”, and it is 
only by studying the systems of these sectors, i.e. their technology, the actors and 
networks and the institutions that we can understand the systems and dynamics of the 
different sectors. Hence, in order to understand innovation in the public sector, the 
systems of innovation relevant to the sector must be identified. 
This paper starts with discussing the concept of innovation in the public sector, 
by pointing at classic public policy and administration literature that has discussed the 
theme and how the dominance of NPM has created new perspectives on the public 
sector. Section 3 identifies different definitions of innovation and discusses the 
literature that addresses the phenomenon of innovation in the public sector. Section 4 
debates the dualistic postulate that depicts the public and the private sector as 
something fundamentally different. Section 5 introduces the System of Innovation 
approach to the discussion, and section 6 identifies and discusses systems of 
innovation in the public sector. Section 7 concludes on how the paper can contribute 
to the further discussion of the concept and systems of innovation in the public sector. 
Demystifying the innovation concept 
The innovation concept in the public sector may stand out as modern catch-phrase, 
but the phenomenon is not new. It might for example be traced back to articles on 
public entrepreneurship in the 1960s (e.g. Ostrom 1964; Wagner 1966). The role of 
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public entrepreneurs, the organisation of institutional goals and the reform processes 
is also found in the classic organisation perspectives (e.g. Gulick and Urwick 1937; 
Simon 1945; Selznick 1948) and in the new-institutional perspective of March and 
Olsen (e.g. March and Olsen 1976, 1989). It may also be recognized in classics on 
power as a relational phenomenon (e.g. Dahl 1961), on decision-making as 
incremental steps (Lindblom 1959) and in the perspective of bureaucrats as budget-
maximizers (Niskanen 1971). Besides, it is found in the still dominant paradigm of 
NPM (e.g. Hood 1991; Boston 1996; Minouge 1998) and the Reinventing 
Government tradition on the need for improving the efficiency in the public sector 
(e.g. Peters and Waterman 1982; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). However, the 
innovation concept as a term is very seldom used in the classic literature on public 
policy and administration. In general, the focus seems to be more on the democratic 
consequences of change than on how changes happen per se. Still, it is highly 
interesting how the classic perspectives might contribute to and elaborate the 
understanding of innovation in the public sector25.  
This article is limited to the literature that applies the concept innovation in the 
public sector. The innovation concept is found in literature that focuses on various 
aspects in the public sector, but in spite of this diversity very few discusses what the 
concept actually covers in the various settings. Moreover, the concept is further 
mystified by being used in literature that does not focus on innovation per se. The 
literature is very broad in scope and covers several related phenomena, among others: 
political and bureaucratic entrepreneurship (Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005; Shockley et 
al. 2006), innovative leaders (Altshuler and Zegan 1990; Golden 1990) and barriers to 
innovation in the public sector (Drucker 1985; Borins 2001; Albury 2005). 
Furthermore, the innovation concept is also used in literature that focuses on how to 
enhance creativity in organisations (e.g. Frost and Egri 1991; Glor 1998), in the 
literature on NPM (Grote 2000; Eshima et al. 2001) and in the Reinventing 
Government tradition (e.g. Bellone and Goerl 1992; Moon 1999). Especially, the 
understanding of the innovation phenomenon is twisted when the concept is brought 
up in the NPM and the Reinventing Government literature, where the focus is on 
efficiency improvement rather than on innovation. On the other hand, as Bartlett and 
Dibben  (2002, p. 108) emphasizes, NPM might also be studied as an innovation: 
“(…) the role of performance management can be viewed not as a driver of change, 
but as a tool at the disposal of the public sector entrepreneur which can be used to 
embed and institutionalize the innovative changes.”  
                                                 
25 see Roste (2005) for discussions of how the classic organisation theory, studies of public policy and 
the NPM literature might contribute to understanding innovation in the public sector. 
 156
Some of the literature on innovation in the public sector holds that the dominance 
of the NPM paradigm seems to have resulted in so strong a call for change in the 
public sector that the character and the consequences of change are not regarded as 
necessary to discuss. Glor (1997, p. 1) states for example that “(…) innovation is 
portrayed as something desirable in the current public administration and business 
management literature: public administrators want to be innovative”. Moreover, 
Osborne (1998b, p. 1134-1135) claims that: 
 
“(…) innovation in the public sector “has become a policy and research buzzword 
which has apparently risen above the need to define it”. Innovation has been 
acknowledged in the formulation and implementation of social policy as “the 
promotion of the idea of ‘innovation’ as normative good (…) This is a crucial 
flaw. By having the ability to be ‘all things to all people’, innovation has 
invariably resisted all attempts to evaluate its achievement” (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, Hartley (2005, p. 30-31) emphasises that “(…) innovation and 
improvement need to be seen as conceptually distinct and not blurred into one policy 
phrase. Unfortunately, this is not always the case”. The public sector “(…) feels 
almost obliged to provide evidence and arguments that they are ‘modernizing’ and 
‘improving’.” Osborne (1998b, p. 1134-1135) states that innovation has reached such 
a status in the public sector because of two trends. The first is the increasing demand 
for efficiency related to the pressure and constrain on social services to meet the 
needs of a growing population. Second there is the effectiveness need, caused by 
growing consumer pressure and the individualisation of citizen’s needs in the meeting 
with public social services. “While in part this emphasis can be seen as a reaction 
against the standardized and universalistic services of the post-war welfare state, it 
also has its roots in the growth of managerialism, and of the NPM, as the dominant 
paradigm for managing public services in the late twentieth century” (ibid).  
Hartley (2005; Benington and Hartley 2001) suggests that the ideological 
conceptions, or paradigms, of governance and public management have changed 
through three epochs. The epochs may be linked to a particular ideology and 
historical period or as coexisting realities that calls forth behaviours and decisions 
related to one of the three paradigms.  
The first paradigm is the public administration approach that might be dated 
from the post-war period and up to the early 1980s. The paradigm “(…) is largely 
based on a legislative, bureaucratic and rule-based approach to public service 
provision”. The paradigm is characterised by top-down implementation, where the 
“(…) role of policy-makers is to act as commanders, creating legislation and then 
support for whole-scale changes, while assuming that the detailed work of 
implementation will be carried out by officials” (Hartley 2005, p. 29).  
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The second paradigm is NPM that developed from the 1980s. The paradigm is 
underpinned by neo-liberal economics and a particular form of management theory. 
“The innovations arising through this approach focus particularly on organisational 
forms and processes such as executive agencies in central government, the purchaser-
provider splits seen in health, education and local government, and a ‘customer’ 
focus” (Hartley 2005, p.30).  
The third period is the “(…) move toward networked governance, the role of the 
state is to steer action within complex social systems rather than control solely 
through hierarchy or market mechanisms. Innovation under networked governance 
revitalizes the leadership role of policy-makers in translating new ideas into new 
forms of action”. Although this might be regarded as linked to a particular ideology 
and historical period, it might also be seen as coexisting as “(…) layered realities for 
politicians and managers, with particular circumstances or contexts calling forth 
behaviours and decisions related to one or the other conception of governance and 
service delivery” (ibid). Hence, it is not only efficiency and effectiveness needs for 
innovation in the public sector, but also legislative, bureaucratic and governance 
needs. 
What is innovation in the public sector? 
The classic understanding of innovation goes back to Joseph Schumpeter (1934) 
seminal work The Theory of Economic Development26. Schumpeter challenged the 
classic economic model of the profit-maximizing firm and defined economic 
development as discontinuous changes of new combinations in the circular flow of 
economic life.The new combinations might occur in five different types: (1) a new 
good or a new quality of a good, (2) a new method of production, (3) the opening of a 
new market, (4) a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods, 
and (5) a new organisation (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66).  
However, when is discontinuous change innovation and not just a customary 
change or regular production? Schumpeter focused on the introduction of radical and 
revolutionary new technology. On the other hand, the modern innovation literature 
has held that continuous improvement, characterized as incremental innovation, is of 
equal importance (e.g. Lundvall 1992; Fagerberg 2005). Moreover, radical 
innovations in most cases require several incremental improvements to reap economic 
benefits. Furthermore, a company may be innovative in two different ways; it may 
develop brand new technology or introduce an existing innovation from another 
company (e.g. OECD 1997, Oslo Manual p.52). In contrast, one may argue that 
                                                 
26 Original version in German in 1911, translated to English in 1934 
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introducing an innovation into a new context is imitation and not innovation. Yet, 
introducing it into a new context implies considerable adaptation and might as well 
lead to new innovations and increased productivity (e.g. Kline and Rosenberg 1986; 
Godinho and Fagerberg 2005).  
The literature on innovation in the public sector focuses on the same problem. 
Albury (2005, p. 52) underlines that although innovations might be radical, 
incremental or systemic, the majority of innovations are incremental changes. 
Incremental changes are “(…) relatively minor changes and adaptations to existing 
services or processes - brought about by public service professionals to improve 
performance and the lives of service users”. Radical innovations, on the other hand 
are “(…) development of new services or a fundamentally new way of organising and 
delivering a service”, whereas systemic innovations “(…) require fundamental 
changes in organisational, social and cultural arrangements to have full impact”. 
Though, the editor of the internet-based The public sector innovation journal27 
Eleanor Glor (1997), on her side, claims that improving existing processes, e.g. 
redesigning something that already exist and “the dissemination of new activities or 
ideas” can never manage to challenge the existing regime. Then again, it is held in a 
report on innovation in the public sector that: “Note that the measure employed for 
‘newness’ is newness to the organisation, not necessarily newness to a region or the 
world. Nearly all of the innovation examples referred to in the literature involve the 
adoption of best practise and new technology evident elsewhere” (Manley 2001, p. 
10). This is also underlined by others. Sanger and Levin (1992, p. 97) hold that 
“Innovation in the public sector typically is evolutionary (…) it is often simply the 
use of old stuff in new ways”. Newman et al. (2001, p.61) also define innovations as 
“(…) discontinuous or step change, as something which was completely new to a 
particular local authority, though which may have previously been applied 
elsewhere”. The central point seems to be as Moore et al. (1997, p. 276) emphasises: 
“Those changes worth recognising as innovation should be new to the organisation, 
be large enough and durable enough to appreciably affect the operations or character 
of the organisation”.  
Osborne (1998b) has developed a typology of innovation in the public sector that 
illustrates both the dimension of radical and incremental innovation and the 
contextual dimension of innovators and imitators. As he puts it, the typology “(…) 
allows the exploration of the relationship between the staff of an agency (the 
producers) and the end-users of a service (its market)“. Innovation is categorized as 
(1) total change, (2) expansionary change, (3) evolutionary change and (4) 
                                                 
27 http://www.innovation.cc/, an internet-based journal aiming at sharing ideas and discussing public 
sector innovation. 
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developmental change. Total change implies radical newness, while expansionary 
change is when methods developed elsewhere is used to meet the needs of a new 
group of end users. Evolutionary change is new methods developed over time for a 
defined client group, and developmental change is to refine and modify the methods 
in order to meet the goals more efficiently. Osborne emphasises that the typology is 
useful for studying social policy and change because it differentiates innovation from 
incremental organisational development. The three first types “(…) all involve 
discontinuity for the organization, in terms of its services and/or its end-user group, 
but the fourth type, developmental change does not (Osborne 1998b, p. 1142). 
The literature on innovation in the public sector points at definitions of 
innovation “(…) such as ‘novelty in action’ (Altschuler and Zegans 1990) and ‘new 
ideas that work’. These definitions emphasise that innovation is not just about new 
ideas, but also about new practices. Altshuler and Zegans (1997, p 20) underlines 
that: “An innovation has at least two elements: a fresh idea and its expression in a 
practical course of action. The idea may be an invention (if it is a product of 
creativity) or a discovery (if it has been found in nature or in some wider human 
environment)”. Albury (2005, p. 51) defines innovation as: “Successful innovation is 
the creation and implementation of new processes, products, services and methods of 
delivery which result in significant improvements in outcomes efficiency, 
effectiveness or quality”. Moreover, Hartley (2005, p. 28) points at that some writers 
(e.g. Damanpour 1993; Moore et al. 1997) have tried to develop typologies of 
innovation, and finds that these might at least distinguish between product, service, 
process, position, strategic, governance and rhetorical innovation. Other types are also 
defined in the literature on innovation in the public sector: service concept, a new 
way of putting elements together, new goals, new approaches to organising and 
introducing new decision rules (Nice 1999, p. 5; Altshuler and Zegans 1990). Sanger 
and Levin (1992, p. 102) also hold that “(…) new ways can also involve public-sector 
use of techniques that are typically associated with the private sector”, e.g. NPM 
related changes.   
Although Schumpeter’s (1934) five types might be said to have been recognized 
in the literature – as well as other types that appear as specific for the public sector – 
it is not much discussed what this implies for the understanding of innovation in the 
public sector. In general, there seem to be an over-focus in the literature on 
innovation in the public sector on Schumpeter’s first innovation type, the emergence 
of new material goods. The discussion is often based on the fact that the public sector 
does not produce material goods at the same level as in the private sector. From this it 
is then inferred that not much innovation takes place in the public sector. The over-
focus on material goods innovation may be due to the fact that the innovation 
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literature in general is dominated by studies of new products and production 
processes (e.g. Drejer 2003; Fagerberg 2005).  
On the difference between innovation in the public and private sector 
Are the main processes underlying innovation in the public sector different from the 
private sector? The main difference is thought to be the lack of the mechanisms of the 
market that is understood as the overall mechanism for success in the private sector. 
Drucker (1985) claims for example that public-service institutions have three main 
hindrances for innovation, and that this results in maximizing rather than optimizing 
of the activity in public service institutions. First, public sector activity is based on 
budgets and not on results, and “(…) any attempt to slough off activities and efforts 
therefore diminishes the public-service institution. It causes it to lose stature and 
prestige.”  Second, the public-service institution has to satisfy everyone. The private 
enterprises, on the other hand can make alliances and abandon upon others and have 
success as long as they sell to consumers in a small part of the market. Third, “(…) 
public-service institutions exist after all to ‘do good’. This means that they tend to see 
their mission as a moral absolute rather than as economic and subject to a cost-benefit 
calculus. (…) If one is ‘doing good’ then there is no ‘better’” (Drucker 1985, p. 179).  
Borins (2001) points at the lack of success mechanisms in the public sector, and 
claims that the public sector has asymmetric incentives for innovation. The public 
sector does not reward successful innovations, while unsuccessful innovations have 
grave consequences. There are no bonuses, pay rise or share ownership to motivate 
the employees. Besides, innovation failures are often denounced in the media and by 
the political opposition, and might ruin the careers of the public servants involved. On 
the other hand, Kalu questions whether market mechanisms can be transferred to the 
innovation dynamic in the public sector. Do “(…) rational individuals acting in a self-
interested manner, within a competitively driven market, achieve the maximum social 
good for all?” (Kalu 2003, p. 542) According to Kalu these key assumptions serve 
different and even conflicting value orientations, as ”(…) self-interest serves an 
individual end, competition creates value for the market, and social good stands for 
the public interest”. Other mechanisms are also pointed at, and Borins (2001, p. 310) 
states that: “(…) despite this inhospitable environment, frontline public servants and 
middle managers are responsible for many innovations”. Such innovations can be 
linked theoretically to the “Total quality management (TQM) movement, which 
believes that ensuring quality is the responsibility of everyone in a company, 
regardless of their position or level of formal education” (Borins 2001, p. 313). 
Unfortunately, Borins (2001b) does not say much about how TQM and relevant 
motivating factors lead to innovation in the public sector. In general, there seems to 
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be a lack of empirical studies in the literature on innovation in the public sector (e.g. 
Hartley 2005). Kalu (2003, p. 540) for example calls for attention to the need for 
studying practical policy implementation in order to bridge the ideological rhetorical 
gap between the reinventing government movement (Bellone and Goerl 1992; 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Peters and Waterman 1982) and the democratic 
governance tradition (e.g. Diver 1982; Moe 1994; Reich 1990). It is a philosophical 
duel between the two as to “(…) whether administrative leaders and bureaucrats in 
the public sector should operate as private sector entrepreneurs or should be seen as 
the conservators of our constitutional values”. Kalu emphasises that “(…) whereas the 
idea of bureaucrats as public entrepreneurs is philosophically problematic, the idea of 
bureaucrats as conservators, though partly relevant, is insufficient”. He emphasises 
among other things that: “As every ordinary person, bureaucrats are rational actors 
driven by self-interest. Altruism and the moral obligation to do good cannot be 
adjudged as the primary factor that drives bureaucrats to become effective public 
servants.” (Kalu (2003, p. 556).   
As indicated above, the literature also emphasises that there is a fundamental 
difference between the private and the public sector. Kalu (2003, p. 544) puts it this 
way:  
 
“The market system pursues one goal above all others, the goal of efficiency. But 
the government, as the repository of the public interest, pursues multiple goals 
inclusive of efficiency. Whereas efficiency in the private sector is achieved 
through reductions in the cost of operation and in the generation of profits, 
efficiency in the public sector is secured through marginal cost reduction through 
gauging clientele satisfaction as well as procedural adherence to the rule of law, 
due process and obedience to legislative mandates”.  
 
Moreover, as Drucker (1985) pointed at the public service institutions have to 
satisfy everyone. It should benefit the public good (Manley 2001). Hence, given these 
essential dimensions of multiple goals that are complexly linked together and the 
need for satisfying the public good – how then can innovation happen at all in the 
public sector? This bring us back to where the discussion in this section started, 
pointing at the lack of the market mechanism and the hindrances for innovation in the 
public sector. However, the literature on innovation in the public sector also points 
out that innovation in the private sector does not always lead to success. Though, as 
Hartley (2005, p. 31) highlights: “In the private sector, innovation based on 
increasing choice is valuable in its own right as this may give market advantage. Yet, 
in public services if the extra choices are not wanted or needed, or only give wider 
but not better services, then innovation has not led to improvement”. At the same 
time, the literature also underlines that being an entrepreneur – and risk taker – is not 
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directly connected with the economic rewards or penalties in the market. The issue of 
risk is rather an outcome of behaviour and other more or less accidental 
circumstances, as for example: government policies, economic climate, competitor’s 
actions, the weather, and other factors that may intervene to cause variations in 
outcomes (Eisenhardt 1988, p. 490).  
Furthermore, the literature also recognizes that multiple goals in the public sector 
can and is divided into relatively manageable policy goals. Albury (2005, p. 51) 
suggests for example that for the public sector the most “(…) important critical 
success factor is an effective set of linkages and relations between the innovators and 
the end-users, and between elements of the ‘supply chain’”. The adoption of terms 
such as customer instead of citizen to describe the users of public services is one of 
the main features of NPM and the characterising of the public sector in terms of the 
market. The term customer indicates freedom of choice, and an effective market 
relationship between the public sector as a seller of public services and the citizens as 
buyers and users. The choices of the customers are seen to act as feedback-processes, 
in the same way as in the private sector.  
On the other hand, it might be argued that the use of such terms is mainly 
symbolic as a type of euphemism. The customer concept is for example inappropriate 
regarding receivers of unemployment benefits. These users do not have a number of 
different funding systems to choose between. On the other hand, there are groups 
such as the elderly that often have a range of choice opportunities regarding for 
example home helpers, nurse on call, elderly houses and nursing homes. Though, 
how free is actually the choice for the public customer? The choices of elderly houses 
and nursing homes are highly rationed by long waiting lists and are only offered to 
the elderly in need of full medical treatment. Although these elements are recognized, 
the literature neither focuses much on how innovation processes progress through 
success and failure in the public sector, on how the various parts or sectors of the 
public domain have defined relatively manageable policy goals, or on how the role of 
citizen as customer can function as a basis for feedback to the service providers. 
One possible conclusion of this discussion is that the market dynamic seems to be 
somewhat overstated as the demarcation criterion between the private and the public 
sector. The main processes underlying innovation in the private sector is also highly 
dependent on other mechanisms, e.g. to entrepreneurs and dominating companies in 
the market. Schumpeter (1934) underlined the role of the entrepreneur for the new 
combinations to be carried into effect. Entrepreneurs are individuals that see 
possibilities for creative destructions and that are strongly motivated – more often by 
the joy of creating than the quest for profit. They are the driving-force in convincing 
others to support and contribute to the development. However, in his later 
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contribution: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Schumpeter (1942) underlined 
the role of the creative accumulation taking place in big firms’ research and 
development departments, and that these firms are a barrier to the entrepreneurial 
start-up activity he had focused on earlier.  
These two perspectives on innovation dynamics are referred to as Schumpeter 
Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II in the classic innovation literature. Remarkably, the 
literature on innovation in the public sector does not refer much to the Schumpeterian 
literature at all. In general, the literature refers little to the classic innovation literature 
and to the literature on innovation in the private sector. Given this, it is quite amazing 
that the literature on innovation in the public sector focuses on the role of market 
mechanisms for innovation. Innovation in the public sector seems to be a rather 
separate theoretical tradition. Thus, the literature seems to be in an un-clarified 
parallel position. This may be due to the fact that the literature that addresses the 
phenomenon of innovation in the public sector is quite new, and the fact that 
innovation theory is not a formal and established theoretical tradition but an amalgam 
of various disciplines: economics, management, organisational psychology, cognitive 
theory and system theory, dealing with various aspects of innovation.  
The System of Innovation Approach 
The classic System of Innovation approach (e.g. Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; 
Nelson 1993; Edquist 1997) claims that companies do not innovate in isolation, but 
interact with other companies, suppliers, competitors, customers, financial 
institutions, universities, government agencies and others to “(…) gain, develop and 
exchange various kinds of knowledge, information, and other resources” (Edquist 
1997, p.1-2). In order to understand and explain innovations, a holistic perspective is 
needed, taking in all relevant actors, their relations and the complicated feedback 
mechanisms of the system. Still, innovation is in the classic approach strictly a micro-
level phenomenon, starting within companies trying to solve certain problems. The 
actors and the relations in the system represent various sources to knowledge and 
competence. Moreover, the company undergoes a learning process, a cumulative 
accumulation of the knowledge and skills in the system that is needed for the 
innovation to take place. Hence, the absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) 
is essential, as “(…) this reflects the cumulative and embedded character of firm-
specific knowledge” (Fagerberg 2005). 
The perspective revitalized Schumpeter’s (1934, 1942) ideas. Although several 
studies during the 1960s and 1970s challenged the neoclassic perspective on 
economic development, the breakthrough of Schumpeter’s ideas of innovation came 
first with Nelson and Winter’s book: An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change in 
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1982, “(…) that represented the catalyst for the creation of a new, general approach” 
(Saviotti 1997, p. 181). Nelson and Winter (1982; Nelson 1987, 1995b) claims that 
economic development is driven by mechanisms similar to Darwin’s natural 
selection. Technology never reaches a state of equilibrium, because the development 
is never optimal in an absolute sense, only “(…) superior to those earlier in existence 
and adjustment forces work slowly (Nelson 1987, p. 16)”. The evolutionary 
dimension was brought further by Dosi (1988) who claimed that the innovation 
opportunities are defined in the technological trajectories of the existing 
technological paradigm. That is, ”(…) firms seek to improve and to diversify their 
technology by searching in zones that enable them to use and to build upon their 
existing technological base. In other words, technological and organisational changes 
in each firm are cumulative processes too” (Dosi 1988). 
The System of Innovation approach is not a formal and established theory, but 
rather a conceptual framework underlining the systemic aspects of innovation. 
Actually, the various perspectives that make up the framework focus and define the 
system of innovation in various ways, geographically and functionally. The National 
System of Innovation (e.g. Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993) defines 
whole nation states as innovation systems and focus on national differences in 
innovation. This perspective has been criticised for being too broad and too all-
embracing and especially for taking the geographical boundaries of the nation state as 
given. Alternative boundaries for the innovation system have been developed in the 
Regional Systems approach, defining the innovation systems  by geographical regions 
or clusters within a country (e.g. Saxenian 1994), in the Technological Systems 
perspective (e.g. Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991) defining the system in specific 
technology fields and in the Sectoral Systems of Innovation approach (e.g. Breschi 
and Malerba 1997, Malerba 2004a; 2004b) defining the system in various sectors as 
“(…) unified by some related product groups for a given or emerging demand and 
that share some basic knowledge (Malerba 2004a, p.9.)”.  
The Sectoral System of innovation approach (Malerba 2004a, p. 9) claims that 
“(…) innovation takes place in quite different sectoral environments”, and it is only 
by studying the systems of these sectors, i.e. their technology, the actors and networks 
and the institutions that we can understand the systems and dynamics of the different 
production arenas. However, as Tether and Metcalfe (2004, p. 317) have highlighted: 
“(…) whilst the ‘sectoral systems’ approach has tended to be more specific than the 
‘national systems’ literature the sectors still tend to be defined by using conventional 
‘industries’ as points of reference”. Their perspective, the Sectoral Innovation 
Systems in Services does not “(…) attempt to study entire ‘sectors’ of service 
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provision, but have instead focused on particular problems, innovations and wider 
transformations arising within the production of specific services”. 
In general, the System of Innovation approach underlines the need for defining 
the actors, the relations between the actors and the feedback mechanisms, and how 
these represent various sources to knowledge and competence. It is important to study 
the learning processes, the absorptive capacity and the cumulative accumulation of 
knowledge and skills in the public sector. Moreover, it is essential to understand these 
systems as coexisting systems at national, regional and sectoral level, also including 
the technological systems in the production of specific public services.  
Systems of innovation in the public sector 
The literature on innovation in the public sector generally regards the public and 
private sectors as two separate innovation systems at the national level. In this regard 
the literature largely follows the National system of Innovation approach. However, 
what is the public sector? In fact very few discuss what innovation is in the various 
settings of the public sector. This is somewhat surprising given that the literature 
draws attention to very different parts of the sector, as for example the conservator 
role of democratic values (e.g. Reich 1990; Moe 1994), the rigidness of the hierarchic 
and bureaucratic organisation of the state (e.g. Peters and Waterman 1982; Bellone 
and Goerl 1992; Osborne and Gaebler 1992) and the lack of incentives to motivate 
the employees in the public service organisations (Drucker 1985; Borins 2001). 
However, this paper argues that the public sector might be divided into similar 
“industries” as in the private sector, and that these sectors must be identified to 
understand the main processes underlying innovation. Moreover, innovations happen 
in organisations and institutions within these public sectors. Are the main processes 
underlying innovation in for example the bureaucracy, the ministries and the local 
policy institutions the same? This problem is little addressed in the literature on 
innovation in the public sector. This becomes a problem if we agree with Moore 
(2005, p. 48) who states that innovation must be studied at the “(…) organisational 
level rather than sector or industry level variables”. 
To remedy this it is first necessary to identify the industries or sectors in the 
public sector. The public sector consists of numerous specialized fields that are parts 
of more overall policy areas, as for example the areas of health, defence and 
education. These areas may be studied with basis in the sectoral system of innovation 
approach (e.g. Breschi and Malerba 1997; Malerba 2004a, 2004b). The policy areas 
or policy sectors differ according to their technology, what actors and networks are 
involved, and the institutions that are relevant. The knowledge base and scientific 
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fields differ clearly from health to education and defence, and in how the technology 
is applied to produce sectoral results.  
Malerba (2004a, p. 24) suggests that “(…) firms are the key actors in a sectoral 
system. (…) characterized by specific beliefs, expectations, competencies and 
organisation, and are engaged in processes of learning and knowledge accumulation”. 
Although, the actors in the public sector can not be defined as firms, the “production” 
also here takes place within similar small or large organisations, as for example 
hospitals, schools, public job centres and the armed forces. Furthermore, the 
organisations in the various sectors are connected in formal and informal networks 
and framed by institutions as in Malerba’s sectoral systems of innovation. Malerba 
(2004a, p. 26) points at the “(…) norms, routines, common habits, established 
practises, rules, laws, standards and so on, all of which shapes agent cognition and 
action and affect interaction among agents”. Hence, one should also expect that the 
policy areas in the public sector might vary according to the technology 
characterizing the sector and the various possibilities for learning processes and 
cumulative accumulation of knowledge and skills. Moreover, one should also expect 
that these processes vary according to who are the actors, the relations between the 
actors and the feedback mechanisms of the sectoral system. The armed forces is 
perhaps the most archetypical example of a closed sectoral innovation system. The 
armed forces and the defence industry have a clear mutual existence relationship. The 
defence industry had hardly existed without the addressed needs of the defence and 
the tasks and the military-technological level of the national defence is clearly shaped 
by the weapon production industry. President Dwight D. Eisenhower named this 
mutual existence relationship the “military-industrial complex” in his last speech as 
US president in 196128.  
Moreover, as Moore (2005) points out, there is a need for studying the innovating 
organisation. Moore describes two different models for the main processes of 
innovation in the public sector. The first model focuses on “(…) break-through 
technologies that are large, robust, and can solve the performance problems of whole 
industries. The other model focuses on learning organisations that seem to have a 
continuing capacity to improve their operations and do so through the daily 
accumulation of a large number of small innovations that results in an important 
change in overall organisational performance” (Moore 2005, p. 44).  
Whereas the first model might be regarded as having clear similarities to 
Schumpeter Mark II, the learning organisation model is also stressed by others. The 
‘groping along’ literature (Behn 1988; Golden 1990) emphasises the need for trying 
out ideas in action and learning from experiences to innovate. Learning organisations 
                                                 
28 see for example: http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/indust.html 
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“(…) should evaluate its implementation of these policies, not against prospectively 
stated objectives alone, but in light of discoveries made during implementation” 
(Browne and Wildavsky 1984, p. 255). Sanger and Levin (1992, p. 104) highlights 
the learning aspect: ”We found that public sector innovations generally did not spring 
anew as if from blueprints, but evolved through and adaptive process. Their novelty 
more often was in their assemblage – often of familiar parts. Like natural selection, 
the evolutionary tinkering that ultimately produces innovation is messy. Organisms 
change and adapt; their ultimate fate is tested in the field. Evolutionary tinkering – 
using bits and pieces of what is around in new ways to meet changing circumstances 
– is iterative, incremental and disorderly. Failure – error – becomes the basis for 
evolutionary learning. Analysis occurs at the implementation stage, after a process 
that is begun to ‘do the doable’”. This seems to have clearly resemblance to the 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982). 
Moreover, given that the public sector consists of very varied organisations, with 
varied institutional settings, tasks and technology, one should also expect to find that 
there are different mechanisms, as for example these two models, underlying 
innovation in the various organisations. The health sector is for example partly 
developed through huge technological break-throughs as for example the x-ray 
technology, but also continually learning is probably essential for these and other 
innovations in the health sector. The mechanisms in the democratic and the political 
organisations, on the other hand, as for example the Government and the political 
parties might be described by these processes but perhaps also by “political 
entrepreneurship” (e.g. Zerbinati and Souitaris 2005). That is, as a special type of 
entrepreneurship attached to the role of being a politician driven by ideological ideas. 
It might be argued that this type is driven by the joy of creating emphasised by 
Schumpeter (Roste 2006). Whereas innovation in the public services in still other 
situations may be driven by customer feedback as there is a demand for some services 
and not others. 
Thus, it should now stand out as relatively clear that innovation in the public 
sector is not something uniformly different from the private sector. Innovation in the 
public sector happens in very heterogeneous sectors and organisations. Figure 1 
illustrates the systems of innovation in the public sector, as happening in highly 
different organisations in several systems at the same time, in national, regional, 
sectoral and technological systems.  
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Figure 1: The system of innovation in the public sector 
 
The system of innovation in the public sector consists of several systems at the 
national, regional and sectoral level. Each of these systems consists of the policy 
institutions at national, regional and local level, the “state” and the public agencies 
implementing the policy, and the public services providing practical services to the 
citizens and the customers. The service providers are not necessarily limited to public 
organisations, but might also be provided by private companies and non-
governmental organisations. The services are here defined as public as long as the 
public sector is responsible for the service produced.  
In principle, the systems may be understood as based on the traditional top-down 
image of the public sector; with the national policy institutions on the top framing the 
activity in the policy goals and in “the State” and the public service providers as the 
implementers of the policy goals. This traditional idea is very embedded in the 
literature of innovation in the public sector. For example, Altshuler and Zegans 
(1990, p. 17-18) state the following: “Business innovation is driven mainly by 
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inspire many politicians to welcome new ideas. (…) Public agencies on the other 
hand, are typically monopolists within their specified jurisdictions, with management 
systems that provide few stimuli for innovation”. However, as Albury (2005, p. 51) 
underlines, innovation might also happen as bottom-up processes where the initiative 
comes from below. As in the private sector, innovation is often happening as parallel 
developments that have impact over time, where the innovation processes are 
dependent on entrepreneurs to survive through tuff times. The sources for ideas for 
future innovations should be several, given the many and various political actors, as 
for example the citizens, the non-governmental organisations and the mass media that 
tries to influence on the outcomes of the public sector. Moreover, technology and 
research in society in general probably also influences on idea generation, and that 
these vary according to different sectors. The innovation potential in the public sector 
is probably also dependent on the laws and regulations in the sector, and the demands 
of potentially customers in the market.  
Concluding remarks 
The public sector is often thought of as homogeneous, as something uniform that 
differs from the private sector. At the same time, the private sector is not thought of at 
the same scale of uniformity, but more of as various industries. This paper argues that 
the public sector might be divided into similar “industries”, and that these sectors 
must be identified to understand the main processes underlying innovation in the 
public sector. Moreover, innovation happens within organisations (e.g. Moore 2005; 
Newman et al. 2005). The public sector consists of a large number of organisations, 
of for example Governmental agencies, the ministries and public service institutions. 
These various organisations are quite different from each other when it comes to the 
actors, their relations to other organisations, their technology and their institutional 
setting. Hence, the underlying mechanisms for innovation must vary between these 
organisations. Figure 1 illustrates how innovation in the public sector happens within 
various organisations in several systems of innovation at the same time, in national, 
regional, sectoral and technological systems.  
This paper has attempted to clarify the concept of innovation in the public sector 
by questioning the dualistic view of the private and public sector that has dominated 
the social sciences in the last decades. However, this view seems also to dominate the 
literature on innovation in the public sector. Still innovation happen. Hence, 
innovation appears almost as a mystery that happens more as an in spite of 
phenomenon than because of identifiable underlying processes in the public sector. 
Though, it might be due to an ideological shift in the public sector that the literature 
has not yet taken in. Hartley (2005) points at that it has been an historical shift from 
 170
the paradigm of NPM to the networked governance, but that these paradigms also 
coexists.  
In general, it seems to be a tendency to regard innovation in the public sector as 
something good in principle that does not need to be defined. Yet, in reviewing the 
literature, discussions and definitions are found. The phenomenon is here discussed 
and defined in similar ways as in the classic innovation literature, which is along the 
radical-incremental dimension of change and of various types of innovation. 
However, very few discuss what innovation actually means in the various settings of 
the public sector. Besides, it is also very few empirical studies illustrating the 
phenomenon. This might be due to the fact that the public sector has been ignored 
until recently in the innovation literature and that the phenomenon is still quite new 
and unexplored.  
Moreover, the literature seems to focus more on the differences between the 
private and the public sector, and how to foster innovation in the public sector than on 
identifying the genuine understanding of innovation. The problem for the public 
sector is thought to lie in the market as the overall mechanism in the private sector, 
pressing the firms to develop new products and production processes in order to be 
competitive and survive in the market. The public sector, on the other hand, is 
thought to lack the mechanisms of the market and to be held back by budget based 
production-systems, the lack of motivating rewards of the employees, multiple policy 
goals and the demand for the public good. However it is not referred to literature that 
shows that this is the underlying dynamic of innovation in the private sector. 
Schumpeter (1934, 1942) emphasised in his early contributions the role of 
entrepreneurs seeing the possibilities for creative destruction, and in his later 
contributions the role of creative accumulation in large established firms. The System 
of Innovation approach (e.g. Freeman 1987; Carlsson and Stankiewicz 1991; 
Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Saxenian 1994; Edquist 1997; Breschi and Malerba 
1997, Malerba 2004a; 2004b) revitalized Schumpeter’s ideas. The approach points at 
the fact that companies do not innovate in isolation, but they interact with other 
companies, financial institutions, universities and research institutions and public 
policy etc. All these actors, their relations and the feedback mechanisms of the system 
must be studied to understand innovation. Moreover, the production dynamic and 
systemic interaction do not happen within one clearly defined innovation system, but 
within several systems at the national, regional, sectoral and technological level. 
These systems are also complexly linked to each other. This paper is a first attempt to 
show how the System of Innovation approach might contribute to understand 
innovation in the public sector by identifying the systems of innovations in the public 
sector. 
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